Shamir's secret sharing distributes a secret in a finite field so that any of shares recover it, while fewer than shares reveal no information about it. Choose , distinct nonzero field elements , and independent uniformly distributed coefficients , independent of . Setand give participant the pair . Any shares determine by polynomial interpolation, hence determine . Fewer than shares have a distribution independent of ; this is Perfect secrecy of Shamir's threshold scheme.[ref]
How to Share a Secret by Adi Shamir. Pages 612–613: polynomial construction and threshold property
For example, over the finite field , a two-share threshold with secret and coefficient gives . The shares and recover and . Either share alone is compatible with every secret, and the uniform choice of makes its distribution independent of that secret.
In Shamir's secret sharing, observing any shares leaves the secret's prior distribution unchanged. In particular, the posterior distribution is uniform if the prior distribution was uniform; uniformity of the secret is not required for perfect secrecy.
To prove this, fix distinct nonzero evaluation points and a candidate secret . The evaluations impose independent linear equations on the random coefficients. The evaluation matrix has rank : its first columns form a Vandermonde matrix multiplied by a nonsingular diagonal matrix of nonzero evaluation points. Every observed share tuple therefore has exactly compatible coefficient tuples. Since the coefficients were independently uniform, its conditional probability isindependent of . Thus the shares and the secret are independent random variables, which proves perfect secrecy.[ref]
How to Share a Secret by Adi Shamir. Pages 612–613: interpolation argument for fewer than the threshold number of shares
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Shamir's Secret Sharing is a cryptographic algorithm conceived by Adi Shamir in 1979. It is designed to securely distribute a secret among a group of participants, in such a way that only a certain threshold of them can reconstruct the secret. The main idea behind the scheme is to split the secret into pieces, or "shares," using polynomial interpolation.