True, with the usual normalization . For a convex cooperative game, the supermodular inequality implies increasing marginal contributions: if and , apply it to and to obtain
Fix an ordering and let be the set of players before . Its marginal contribution vector is . Summing in order telescopes to . For any coalition , , so increasing marginals give
These are exactly the efficiency and coalition constraints of the core of a cooperative game. Thus every marginal contribution vector is in the core. The core is a convex set, being an intersection of linear half-spaces and an efficiency hyperplane. The Shapley value is the average of the marginal contribution vectors over all orderings, so it too lies in the core. This proves Shapley value belongs to the core of a convex game, without needing a separate existence theorem for the core.
Assume the standard empty-coalition normalization . A convex cooperative game has increasing marginal contributions: whenever and ,
This follows from the supermodular inequality applied to and . Fix a permutation of all players, let be the players preceding , and form its marginal contribution vector
Summing along the full permutation is a telescoping sum, so . For an arbitrary coalition , list its members in their induced order , and put . Since , increasing marginal contributions give
Thus every marginal contribution vector belongs to the core. The vector of Shapley values is exactly their uniform average over the permutations, hence a convex combination. By the preceding part, that average is in the core. This proves that the Shapley value allocation belongs to the core of a convex cooperative game, including every coalition constraint. It is the result Shapley value belongs to the core of a convex game.
Shapley value 2026-10-06
The Shapley value averages each player's marginal contribution over uniformly random player orderings. Exactly orderings have immediately before player , giving the formula. The values sum to by telescoping each ordering. In a simple cooperative game this is the probability of being pivotal. For a convex cooperative game, Shapley value belongs to the core of a convex game guarantees a stable allocation as well.
On three players, let exactly when contains player 1 and at least one of players 2 and 3, and zero otherwise. This simple cooperative game is superadditive: disjoint coalitions cannot both contain player 1, so at most one can have value one. Its core of a cooperative game is exactly , since singleton nonnegativity and the two winning-pair constraints force the other two coordinates to zero. In a random player ordering, player 1 is pivotal unless it comes first, whereas each other player is pivotal in just one of the six orders. Thus its Shapley value is , outside the core: coalition receives only . Convex cooperative games have the stronger property that their Shapley value belongs to the core of a convex game.