Single-peaked preferences ($a\text{ is a peak on a common linear axis}$)

A strict preference order is single-peaked on an axis when moving away from its most preferred alternative along either one side of the axis makes alternatives less preferred. Comparisons between opposite sides need not follow symmetric physical distance. A profile is single-peaked when all voters' orders share such an axis. This restricted domain admits the median voter rule, unlike the unrestricted-domain conclusion of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem.

On a fixed common axis, select the median of reported peaks. For odd $n$ this is the unique Condorcet winner. For even $n$, a fixed lower-median or upper-median convention selects a weak Condorcet winner. Holding other peaks fixed, the attainable outcomes form an interval between two order statistics. Truthful reporting obtains the true peak if it is inside that interval, or its nearest interval endpoint otherwise, so no allowed report improves the outcome under single-peaked preferences.