A finite sequence of all-pay contests in which each stage awards one prize and its winner leaves. Losing players remain eligible for later stages. A player can receive at most one prize, while its effort costs are incurred whenever it participates. Subgame perfect equilibrium accounts for both the immediate prize and the value of remaining eligible.
Subgame perfect equilibrium Created 2026-10-06 Updated 2026-11-05
A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile inducing a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, including subgames not reached during equilibrium play. A proper subgame starts at a node that forms a singleton information set, includes all its descendants, and does not cut any other information set; one cannot treat indistinguishable nodes as separate games.
The requirement excludes noncredible threats. Suppose an entrant chooses Out, giving both players , or Enter. After Enter, an incumbent chooses Fight with payoffs or Accommodate with payoffs , with entrant payoff first. Out together with a prescribed Fight is a Nash equilibrium: the threat deters entry and the incumbent's off-path action does not change its realized payoff. It is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, because after entry the incumbent prefers to . The subgame-perfect outcome is Enter followed by Accommodate.
In finite perfect-information games, backward induction in games constructs such profiles. More generally, continuation subgames may require solving simultaneous-move games in mixed strategies, as in an all-pay contest. Node-by-node optimization cannot ignore information sets in games of imperfect information.
Suppose a finite perfect-information game has no chance moves, and every player strictly ranks the possible outcome labels. Different terminal histories may have the same outcome label and thus the same payoff. Every subgame then has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, even though its equilibrium strategy need not be unique.
The proof is backward induction. Each child subgame has a unique continuation outcome. The moving player's strict ranking selects exactly one best label among those outcomes. Several actions can tie only by leading to that same label, which proves uniqueness at the current node. For a sequential election, the labels may be winning candidates: a voter can have several optimal ballots, all producing its same favourite achievable winner. If preferences have ties between different labels, the conclusion can fail.