Backward induction proves or computes a finite sequence of statements by starting at its terminal index and stepping toward the initial index.
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- Mathematical induction
- Mathematical proof
- Foundations of mathematics
- Area of mathematics
- Mathematics
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Incoming links (24)
- Backward induction in games
- Expectimax
- Expectiminimax
- Exponential-utility trading with Gaussian increments
- General-sum game
- Iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Max-n search
- Minimax search
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- Perfect-information game
- Subgame perfect equilibrium
- Unique outcome under strict outcome preferences
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