C standard library by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
C POSIX library by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
Exmples under c/posix:
Non Reuters ranges by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
Gathering key points from the articles by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
citizenlab.ca/2022/09/statement-on-the-fatal-flaws-found-in-a-defunct-cia-covert-communications-system/ did an investigation and found 885 such websites, but decided not to disclose the list or methods:
Using only a single website, as well as publicly available material such as historical internet scanning results and the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, we identified a network of 885 websites and have high confidence that the United States (US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used these sites for covert communication.
The websites included similar Java, JavaScript, Adobe Flash, and CGI artifacts that implemented or apparently loaded covert communications apps. In addition, blocks of sequential IP addresses registered to apparently fictitious US companies were used to host some of the websites. All of these flaws would have facilitated discovery by hostile parties.
The websites, which purported to be news, weather, sports, healthcare, and other legitimate websites, appeared to be localized to at least 29 languages and geared towards at least 36 countries.
The question is which website. E.g. at citizenlab.ca/2021/07/hooking-candiru-another-mercenary-spyware-vendor-comes-into-focus/ they used data from Censys.
We searched historical data from Censys
citizenlab.ca/2016/08/million-dollar-dissident-iphone-zero-day-nso-group-uae/ mentions scans.io/. citizenlab.ca/2020/12/running-in-circles-uncovering-the-clients-of-cyberespionage-firm-circles/ mentions: www.shodan.io/, Censys really seems to be their thing.
Another critical excerpt is:
The bulk of the websites that we discovered were active at various periods between 2004 and 2013. We do not believe that the CIA has recently used this communications infrastructure. Nevertheless, a subset of the websites are linked to individuals who may be former and possibly still active intelligence community employees or assets:
  • Several are currently abroad
  • Another left mainland China in the time frame of the Chinese crackdown
  • Another was subsequently employed by the US State Department
  • Another now works at a foreign intelligence contractor
Given that we cannot rule out ongoing risks to CIA employees or assets, we are not publishing full technical details regarding our process of mapping out the network at this time. As a first step, we intend to conduct a limited disclosure to US Government oversight bodies.
This basically implies that they must have found some communication layer level identifier, e.g. IP registration, domain name registration, or certificate because it is impossible to believe that real agent names would have been present on the website content itself!
The websites were used from at least as early as August 2008, as per Gholamreza Hosseini's account, and the system was only shutdown in 2013 apparently. citizenlab.ca/2022/09/statement-on-the-fatal-flaws-found-in-a-defunct-cia-covert-communications-system/ however claims that they were used since as early as 2004.
Notably, so as to be less suspicious the websites are often in the language of the country for which they were intended, so we can often guess which country they were intended for!
The Reuters websites by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
The Reuters article directly reported only two domains in writing:
But by looking at the URLs of the screenshots they provided from other websites we can easily uncover all others that had screenshots, except for the Johnny Carson one, which is just generically named. E.g. the image for the Chinese one is www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/assets/usa-spies-iran/screencap-activegaminginfo.com.jpg?v=192516290922 which leads us to domain activegaminginfo.com.
Also none of those extra ones have any Google hits except for huge domain dumps such has Expired domain trackers, so maybe this counts as little bit of novel public research.
The full list of domains from screenshots is:
This brings up to 8 known domain names with Wayback Machine archives, plus the yet unidentified Johnny Carlson one, see also: Section "Searching for Carson", which is also almost certainly is on Wayback Machine somewhere given that they have a screenshot of it.
Fingerprints by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
From The Reuters websites and others we've found, we can establish see some clear stylistic trends across the websites which would allow us to find other likely candidates upon inspection:
The most notable dissonance from the rest of the web is that there are no commercial looking website of companies, presumably because it was felt that it would be possible to verify the existence of such companies.
IP range search by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
One promising way to find more of those would be with IP searches, since it was stated in the Reuters article that the CIA made the terrible mistake of using several contiguous IP blocks for those website. What a phenomenal OPSEC failure!!!
The easiest way would be if Wayback Machine itself had an IP search function, but we couldn't find one: Search Wayback Machine by IP.
viewdns.info was the first easily accessible website that Ciro Santilli could find that contained such information.
Our current results indicate that the typical IP range is about 30 IPs wide.
E.g. searching: viewdns.info/iphistory and considering only hits from 2011 or earlier we obtain:
  • capture-nature.com
    • 65.61.127.163 - Greenacres - United States - TierPoint - 2013-10-19
  • activegaminginfo.com
    • 66.175.106.148 - United States - Verizon Business - 2012-03-03
  • iraniangoals.com
    • 68.178.232.100 - United States - GoDaddy.com - 2011-11-13
    • 69.65.33.21 - Flushing - United States - GigeNET - 2011-09-08
  • rastadirect.net
    • 68.178.232.100 - United States - GoDaddy.com - 2011-05-02
  • iraniangoalkicks.com
    • 68.178.232.100 - United States - GoDaddy.com - 2011-04-04
  • headlines2day.com
    • 118.139.174.1 - Singapore - Web Hosting Service - 2013-06-30. Source: viewdns.info
    • 184.168.221.91 2013-08-12T06:17:39. Source: 2013 DNS Census grep
  • fightwithoutrules.com
    • 204.11.56.25 - British Virgin Islands - Confluence Networks Inc - 2013-09-26
    • 208.91.197.19 - British Virgin Islands - Confluence Networks Inc - 2013-05-20
    • 212.4.17.38 - Milan - Italy - MCI Worldcom Italy Spa - 2012-03-03
  • fitness-dawg.com
    • 219.90.62.243 - Taiwan - Verizon Taiwan Co. Limited - 2012-01-11
Neither of these seem to be in the same ranges, the only common nearby hit amongst these ranges is the exact 68.178.232.100, and doing reverse IP search at viewdns.info/reverseip/?host=68.178.232.100&t=1 states that it has 2.5 million hostnames associated to it, so it must be some kind of Shared web hosting service, see also: superuser.com/questions/577070/is-it-possible-for-many-domain-names-to-share-one-ip-address, which makes search hard.
Ciro then tried some of the other IPs, and soon hit gold.
Initially, Ciro started by doing manual queries to viewdns.info/reversip until his IP was blocked. Then he created an account and used his 250 free queries with the following helper script: cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/viewdns-info.sh. The output of that script can be seen at: github.com/cirosantilli/media/blob/master/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/viewdns-info.sh.
Ciro then found 2013 DNS Census which contained data highly disjoint form the viewdns-info one!
Summaries of the IP range exploration done so far follows, combined data from all databases above.
TODO by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
Data sources by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
This is a dark art, and many of the sources are shady as fuck! We often have no idea of their methodology. Also no source is fully complete. We just piece up as best we can.
In order to explore IPs in known IP ranges, what we need are good DNS databases.
Reverse engineering by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
In this section we document the outcomes of more detailed inspection of both the communication mechanisms (JavaScript, JAR, swf) and HTML that might help to better fingerprint the websites.
Google searches for known domains and IPs by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
Googling most domains gives only very few results, and most of them are just useless lists of expired domains. Skipping those for now.
Googling "dedrickonline.com" has a git at www.webwiki.de/dedrickonline.com# Furthermore, it also contains the IP address "65.61.127.174" under the "Technik" tab!
Unfortunately that website appears to be split by language? E.g. the English version does not contain it: www.webwiki.com/dedrickonline.com, which would make searching a bit harder, but still doable.
But if we can Google search those IPs there, we might just hit gold.
IP search did work! www.webwiki.de/65.61.127.174
But doesn't often/ever work unfortunately for others.
Searching on github.com: github.com/DrWhax/cia-website-comms by Jurre van Bergen from September 2022 contains some of the links to some of the ones reported by Reuters including some of their JARs, presumably for reversing purposees. Pinged him at: github.com/DrWhax/cia-website-comms/issues/1
Wakatime redirects by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
Summary: this is just a red herring. Wakatime owner likely registered the domains just after this article was published as a publicity stunt. Fair play though.
As raised at: news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36280666, many, but not all, of the domains currently redirect to wakatime.com/ as of 2023, and apparently they were taken up in 2013 (TODO how to confirm that). TODO what is the explanation for that? Some examples that do:But some failed resolution examples:Even more suspiciously, according to his LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/alanhamlett/, the owner of Wakatime, Alan Hamlett, worked at WhiteHat Security, Inc from Aug 2011 - Sep 2013. The company was then acquired by Synopsys in 2022. Holy crap!!! As shown at: web.archive.org/web/20131013193406/https://www.whitehatsec.com/ that company made website security tools. Did that dude use the tools to find the vulnerabilty and then just gobble up all the domains??? What a fucking legend if he did!!!
Running e.g.
curl -vvv dedrickonline.com
gives:
*   Trying 162.255.119.197:80...
* Connected to dedrickonline.com (162.255.119.197) port 80 (#0)
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: dedrickonline.com
> User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
< Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 20:30:19 GMT
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
< Content-Length: 55
< Connection: keep-alive
< Location: https://wakatime.com
< X-Served-By: Namecheap URL Forward
< Server: namecheap-nginx
<
<a href='https://wakatime.com'>Moved Permanently</a>.

* Connection #0 to host dedrickonline.com left intact
so we see that he must have setup redirection with Namecheap as mentioned at: www.namecheap.com/support/knowledgebase/article.aspx/385/2237/how-to-redirect-a-url-for-a-domain/
Let's also try DNS history
  • whoisrequest.com/history/:
    • dedrickonline.com: registered: 1 Nov, 2010, dropped: 24 Nov, 2013
    • activegaminginfo.com : registered: 1 Feb, 2010, dropped: 1 Apr, 2012
  • tools.whoisxmlapi.com/whois-history-search
    • dedrickonline.com:
      • CIA (registrar: Godaddy, registrant name: domainsbyproxy.com)
        • Created Date: October 27, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: October 28, 2013 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: October 27, 2014 00:00:00 UTC
      • Alan (namecheap):
        • Created Date: June 11, 2023 09:59:25 UTC
        • Expires Date: June 11, 2024 09:59:25 UTC
    • activegaminginfo.com:
      • CIA (Network Solutions, registrant name: LLC. Corral, Elizabeth|ATTN ACTIVEGAMINGINFO.COM|care of Network Solutions)
        • Created Date: January 26, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: November 27, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: January 26, 2012 00:00:00 UTC
      • Alan:
        • Created Date: June 11, 2023 09:59:40 UTC
        • Expires Date: June 11, 2024 09:59:40 UTC
    • iraniangoalkicks.com:
      • CIA (registrar: Godaddy, registrant name: domainsbyproxy.com)
        • Created Date: April 9, 2007 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: March 2, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: April 9, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
      • Alan:
        • Created Date: June 11, 2023 09:59:20 UTC
        • Expires Date: June 11, 2024 09:59:20 UTC
    • iraniangoals.com:
      • CIA (registrar: Godaddy, registrant name: domainsbyproxy.com):
        • Created Date: March 6, 2008 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: March 7, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: March 6, 2014 00:00:00 UTC
      • Reuters:
        • Created Date: September 29, 2022 11:16:09 UTC
        • Updated Date: September 29, 2022 11:16:09 UTC
        • Expires Date: September 29, 2023 11:16:09 UTC
So these suggest Alan might have just come along in 2023 way after the 2022 Reuters article and did the same basic IP range search that Ciro is doing now, so possibly no new tech. Let's ask... twitter.com/cirosantilli/status/1668369786865164289
The domain name history presented is however of interest, and could lead to patterns being found.
Searching tools.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search with term "Corral, Elizabeth" gave no results unfortunately.
Basic search under tools.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search for "Corral" also empty. They can't see their own data? Ah, need advanced. Marked "Historic" and selected "Corral, Elizabeth", ony one hit, activegaminginfo.com.
IP and DNS metadata by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
Some dumps from us looking for patterns, but could not find any.
Sources of whois history include:
When that data comes in JSON format as from whoisXMLAPI, we are going to just dump it in github.com/cirosantilli/media/blob/master/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/whois.json
The vast majority of domains seem to be registered either via domainsbyproxy.com which likely intgrates with Godaddy and is widely used, and seems to give zero infromation at all about the registrar.
A much smaller number however uses other methods, some of which sometimes leak a little bit of data:
Big question: webmasters.stackexchange.com/questions/13237/how-do-you-view-domain-whois-history DomainTools also has it.
How on Earth did did Citizen Labs find what seems to be a DNS fingerprint??? Are there simply some very rare badly registered domains? What did they see!
COCO 2017 by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
This is the one used on MLperf v2.1 ResNet, likely one of the most popular choices out there.
2017 challenge subset:
  • train: 118k images, 18GB
  • validation: 5k images, 1GB
  • test: 41k images, 6GB
Coinbase Bitcoin hello world by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
Test buy 2023-04-10 in the UK:
  • fee: 0.99 pounds, minimum buy: 1.99 pounds
  • bought 10 pounds, minus 0.99 fee, totalled: 0.00039162 BTC (£8.92) presumably after further fees/spread
  • bitcoin price on Google on that day: 22,777.54 GBP / BTC
  • bitcoin transaction fees were about 2.7 BTC on that day
Sending 5 pounds to wallet 12dg2FaiZLp3VzDtLvwPinaKz41TQcEGbs
  • network fee: 0.00001989 BTC
  • total bitcoin cost: -0.00023928 BTC
  • new balance: 15,234 satoshi (39,162 - 23,928).
  • total spent: £5.45
  • time est.: about 30 minutes
This worked and I received 21939 satoshis (23928 - 1989) on Electrum on one of the outputs of transaction 1177268091cbeaacbcaac5dc4f6d1774c4ec11b4bcffafa555cd2775eafb954c.
Sending 1 satoshi back! The lowest fee in Electron is 1120 Satoshis targeting 25 blocks (4 hours). Let's do it. Failed, server forbids dust, minimum is 1000 satoshi. OK, sending 1000 satoshi, at 1139 fee.
CNN convolution kernels are also learnt by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
CNN convolution kernels are not hardcoded. They are learnt and optimized via backpropagation. You just specify their size! Example in PyTorch you'd do just:
nn.Conv2d(1, 6, kernel_size=(5, 5))
as used for example at: activatedgeek/LeNet-5.
This can also be inferred from: stackoverflow.com/questions/55594969/how-to-visualise-filters-in-a-cnn-with-pytorch where we see that the kernels are not perfectly regular as you'd expected from something hand coded.
Interesting transactions by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created
This is about transactions that are interesting not because of their inscriptions, but for some other reason, such as transaction size, etc.
Ordinal ruleset inscriptions by Ciro Santilli 35 Updated +Created

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