 Solution

There are two distinct explanatory questions. One asks why a proposed system of equations has a particular dynamical symmetry. The other asks why the common spacetime geometry is the right geometry for the behavior of physical rods, clocks and fields. A geometric account and a dynamical account give different directions of explanation, and their merits cannot be decided by a change of notation alone.

For the geometric account, Minkowski spacetime has a fixed Lorentzian metric; its spacetime isometries form the Poincaré group. If the matter equations use that metric tensor and no additional symmetry-breaking background structure, with couplings and boundary assumptions appropriate to the transformation, these spacetime isometries take solutions into solutions. For example, the Klein-Gordon equationin metric signature $(-,+,+,+)$ is invariant under the Poincaré group. This provides one common reason for the same transformation rules appearing in many laws. An individual solution, such as a particular plane wave, need not possess every symmetry of the equation.

Geometry alone is insufficient unless the assumed coupling to geometry is included. In the covariant equation with a preferred timelike vector,the fixed timelike $n$ selects a preferred rest frame. All the quantities can be transformed consistently under a coordinate transformation, but boosts that change $n$ are not symmetries with the physical background fixed. Thus general covariance, tensor notation and the mere presence of the Minkowski metric do not by themselves establish Einstein's principle of relativity.

A dynamical account instead starts with the common invariance of the actual interactions and asks why their composite rods and clocks measure a common interval. If their equations and suitable equilibrium solutions transform consistently under Lorentz transformations, their moving configurations can exhibit length contraction and their periodic processes time dilation. This is the explanatory strategy defended by Harvey R. Brown and Oliver Pooley, who deny that merely redescribing these effects geometrically supplies their microscopic explanation.^[ref] Such an account must still explain why independent interactions have the same relevant symmetry and why a particular clock is a good clock; it cannot simply infer those facts from the word “dynamics”.

The positions therefore need not disagree about experimental predictions. The geometric presentation makes a shared constraint explicit and permits economical deductions. The constructive presentation investigates why material systems realize that constraint. Defining geometry from universal dynamical behavior is a substantive proposal; deriving behavior from geometry also requires substantive matter-coupling assumptions. Neither direction is made compulsory by the formal equivalence of the descriptions.