Let the value function at time be the greatest conditional expected terminal utility attainable from wealth . Independence of the innovations gives the Bellman equation
for . A policy obtained from the maximizing choices is admissible because each time- holding is a predictable process, hence is known before is observed.
We prove the claimed properties by backward induction. They hold at because is increasing and concave. Suppose they hold at time . For fixed , the map
is increasing because , and taking a supremum preserves this inequality.
For concavity, let and be optimal at wealths and . For , use the admissible portfolio
The next wealth is the same convex combination of the next wealths generated from and . Therefore
This completes the induction and proves monotonicity and concavity of a portfolio value function.
Measure all payoffs in millions of dollars, in the order (Ann, Bob). Since both players maximize expected money, those numbers are already their expected utility scale.
In the extensive-form game, Ann moves first. Staying out terminates at . Entering leads to Bob's observed decision between fighting, with terminal payoffs , and acquiescing, with terminal payoffs . Each decision node is its own information set, so this is a perfect-information game.
The corresponding normal-form game gives Ann the pure strategies (stay out) and (enter), and Bob the complete contingent pure strategies (fight if entry occurs) and (acquiesce if entry occurs). The payoff matrix is
The pure strategy Nash equilibria are and . Against , Ann prefers ; against , Ann prefers . When Ann stays out, Bob's contingent response does not affect his payoff, so is a best response there.
There is exactly one subgame perfect equilibrium, . In the subgame following entry, Bob strictly prefers to , so backward induction selects acquiescence; Ann then strictly prefers entering for to staying out for . The threat supporting is not optimal in that one-shot subgame.
For infinite repetition, the paper specifies no discount factor. First take the long-run average payoff convention, with all past actions observed. The feasible payoff set is the convex hull
Ann can guarantee in every stage by staying out; Bob can guarantee at least in every stage by acquiescing whenever entry occurs. These guarantees are also their minmax payoffs: fighting holds Ann's best possible stage payoff to , and entering holds Bob's best possible stage payoff to .
Therefore the sustainable Nash equilibrium average payoffs are exactly the feasible, weakly individually rational payoffs in a repeated game:
This is the closed triangle with vertices .
Here is a direct sufficiency argument for this particular game. Choose a publicly known sequence of stage outcomes whose frequencies give the target point. Before any observed deviation, follow that sequence. After an Ann deviation, Bob fights forever, so Ann can thereafter obtain at most per stage. After a Bob deviation, Ann enters forever, so Bob can thereafter obtain at most per stage. A finite prefix has no effect on long-run average payoff, so no unilateral deviation improves a target with . Rational frequencies can be implemented periodically; arbitrary real frequencies can be implemented by a deterministic sequence with convergent frequencies. Thus even the weak boundary is covered here. In particular, staying out forever and entry followed by acquiescence forever are sustainable; fighting forever is not.
For discounted payoffs , the folk theorem for repeated games instead gives the usual patience qualification: every feasible point with can be sustained for all sufficiently large . It does not classify the whole region for an unspecified fixed . The two one-shot Nash equilibrium outcomes remain sustainable for every .[ref]
Finally consider the particular history-dependent pair in the paper. Initially Bob has never acquiesced, so Ann stays out. That preserves the same condition forever, giving payoffs . The pair is a Nash equilibrium. Holding Bob's strategy fixed, Ann cannot induce an acquiescence: he fights whenever she enters, and his rule never changes unless he has previously acquiesced. Every entry would give her instead of , so no unilateral deviation helps. Holding Ann's strategy fixed, Bob never reaches a decision node because she stays out; changing his strategy alone cannot create a history in which he actually acquiesces. Hence he also cannot improve.
This direct argument works for both discounted and long-run average payoffs. The outcome gives Ann exactly her minmax payoff and Bob more than his, so it is compatible with the folk theorem for repeated games. A version requiring strict gains above both minmax payoffs is a sufficient condition, and cannot be used to rule out this boundary example.
Perfect-information game 2026-10-24
An extensive-form game in which each information set contains a single decision node. Each acting player knows the entire preceding sequence of moves. Finite games with this property can be solved for a subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
Suppose a finite perfect-information game has no chance moves, and every player strictly ranks the possible outcome labels. Different terminal histories may have the same outcome label and thus the same payoff. Every subgame then has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome, even though its equilibrium strategy need not be unique.
The proof is backward induction. Each child subgame has a unique continuation outcome. The moving player's strict ranking selects exactly one best label among those outcomes. Several actions can tie only by leading to that same label, which proves uniqueness at the current node. For a sequential election, the labels may be winning candidates: a voter can have several optimal ballots, all producing its same favourite achievable winner. If preferences have ties between different labels, the conclusion can fail.