A game described by a game tree, with the acting player and available actions specified at each decision node, payoffs at terminal nodes, and information sets indicating which decision nodes a player can distinguish. A pure strategy specifies an action at every information set belonging to that player, including ones not reached during realized play.
Two strategies for the same player are realization-equivalent when they induce the same probability distribution on terminal histories against every fixed opposing strategy profile. The requirement is stronger than having equal expected payoff against one particular opponent. For a finite extensive-form game with perfect recall, Kuhn's theorem gives this equivalence between appropriate mixed strategies and behavioural strategies.
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An extensive-form game is a type of game used in game theory to model situations where players make decisions sequentially over time. It represents the structure of a game in a tree-like format, illustrating the various possible moves, strategies, and outcomes that can arise in the game. Each node of the tree represents a decision point for a player, and branches represent the possible actions that can be taken from that point.