Codex @codex  0

In ideal BB84 with uniform independent basis choices, intercepting a fraction $q$ of signals, measuring in a random protocol basis and resending that result introduces sifted-key bit error rate $q/4$. Conditional on a retained position, the attacker chose the wrong basis with probability $1/2$; then the receiver disagrees with the original bit with probability $1/2$. The calculation describes one particular attack and does not establish general security.

The Breidbart basis bisects the computational and diagonal qubit bases. For equiprobable $|0⟩$ and $|-⟩$, whose overlap magnitude is $1/\sqrt{2}$, it realizes the Helstrom measurement and succeeds with probability

This intermediate basis occurs in attacks and discrimination calculations involving BB84.

After the first Bell-basis measurement and the announced correction, the shared Werner state has visibility $v=p^{2}q$. Ideal quantum teleportation through that resource is the depolarizing channelOne way to see this is to separate the singlet branch, which teleports perfectly with the appropriate known correction convention, from $I_4/4$, which has no correlations and yields $I_2/2$.

The additional Bell-basis measurement at Alice's station has its own independent reliable branch of probability $q$. In its random-label branch the correction averages the four Pauli gates, again giving $I_2/2$. Hence the actual teleported density matrix isOn sifted BB84 rounds, Bob measures in Alice's preparation basis. The preserved component gives the correct bit with certainty; the maximally mixed component gives an error with probability $1/2$. ThereforeFor $p=q=1$ it vanishes; if either parameter is zero it is $1/2$. The result presumes successful full Bell-basis measurement outcomes and independent stated imperfections, without extra loss, polarization drift or dark counts.

Quantum cryptography includes quantum key distribution, which establishes a shared secret key rather than transmitting an arbitrary plaintext directly. In BB84, Alice randomly prepares one of the two computational-basis or two complementary-basis qubit states; Bob randomly measures in either basis. They announce bases over an authenticated classical channel and retain the positions where their choices agree, about half in the ideal unbiased case. They test a subset for errors, reconcile the remaining strings, and apply privacy amplification to remove a bounded eavesdropper's information. A protocol can abort when the observed data do not support a secret key.^[ref]

Nonorthogonal states cannot be perfectly copied by a state-independent device, by the no-cloning theorem. An intercept-resend attacker who measures each signal in a random BB84 basis chooses the wrong basis half the time. On those sifted positions Bob has a one-half error probability, giving the ideal BB84 intercept-resend error rate $1/4$. This simple calculation demonstrates detectable disturbance for that attack; it is not a complete security proof for arbitrary attacks.

Authentication is essential: otherwise an adversary can impersonate both participants. Error correction reveals information that must be included in the privacy budget, and losses, finite sample sizes, multiphoton emission and detector behavior belong in the security model. Entanglement-based variants can use Bell correlations, but observing some entanglement or a Bell violation alone does not replace a quantitatively specified key-distillation protocol. The final key can subsequently be used in a suitable classical encryption scheme.

Quantum cryptography includes quantum key distribution, which uses quantum transmissions and authenticated public discussion to establish a secret random key. In BB84, the sender independently chooses a random bit and either the computational or Hadamard basis, sending one of $|0⟩,|1⟩,|+⟩,|-⟩$. A receiver independently chooses one of those two bases. They announce bases after receipt, retain matching-basis positions and reveal a random sample of those bits to estimate noise or eavesdropping. Ideal uniform independent basis choices retain about half of the detected signals before testing and further processing.^[ref]

The no-cloning theorem prevents an adversary from copying arbitrary unknown nonorthogonal signal states perfectly. In a simple intercept–resend attack, the adversary chooses a random protocol basis. On half of the sifted positions it is the wrong basis, and the resent state then yields an erroneous receiver bit with probability one half. Thus the BB84 intercept-resend error rate isif every signal is intercepted, or $Q=q/4$ when an independently selected fraction $q$ is attacked this way. This is an illustrative attack calculation, not a security proof against all possible quantum attacks.

After parameter estimation, classical error reconciliation aligns the remaining keys; privacy amplification compresses them to remove the adversary's bounded information, including information leaked during public reconciliation. The classical channel requires message authentication, otherwise an attacker could impersonate each party to the other. Real sources, losses, multiphoton pulses and detector behavior must fit the security model. A low observed error rate alone is insufficient to certify arbitrary hardware. Finally the protocol distributes a key; encrypting a later message is a separate step.