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A search algorithm whose OR nodes represent controllable choices and whose AND nodes require solutions for every possible outcome of a chosen action. In nondeterministic planning, a successful OR choice needs successful continuations for all its AND children. In contingent planning, those children can represent different observations and updated belief states. Cycle handling must match the required solution concept: ignoring a repeated state is not a proof that the goal will inevitably be reached.

Without a prior probability distribution, a belief state is the set of physical states still compatible with an observed history. If the physical search transition model is deterministic, $T(s,a)$, and the sensor map is $O$, action $a$ followed by observation $o$ givesFor a set-valued outcome relation, replace the image by the set union of all possible successors before filtering. A guaranteed-success goal test requires every member of the surviving belief state to satisfy the physical goal. A probabilistic belief is instead a posterior probability distribution, requiring a specified prior and observation law.

Automated planning with a completely specified initial state, deterministic actions and a goal condition. A finite STRIPS model is a common representation. A plan is an action sequence applicable from the initial state, ending in a goal state. Unknown facts about the initial world require an epistemic representation such as a belief state, rather than silently interpreting every unlisted fact as false.

Automated planning whose result may branch on information revealed during execution. In partially observable search, an AND-OR search chooses an action at each OR node and requires a continuation for each possible observation at its AND branches. A contingent plan can therefore be a conditional tree or a policy on belief states, rather than one fixed action sequence.

An incremental belief-state search initially plans for a small subset $B_0$ of the possible initial states, then tests the candidate plan on the full initial belief state $B$. If a state in $B$ makes an action inapplicable or fails the final goal test, add that counterexample to $B_0$ and solve the enlarged problem. The new search may need to revise the entire plan, rather than append actions to the previous candidate.

With finitely many initial states and a complete finite-model solver for each restricted problem, at most $|B|$ state additions are required. Failure to find a plan even for a restricted subset proves that none can work for the whole belief state. A candidate that passes full validation is a genuine plan for sensorless planning. The advantage is selective tracking: a small number of representative initial states may force a universally successful plan without constructing the full power set search space.

A search problem in which the available observations need not identify the current physical state. The controller must choose the same action for physical states that its observed history cannot distinguish. A belief state summarizes those possibilities; contingent planning selects future actions according to subsequent observations.

For an action sequence $\pi$, let $T_{\pi }(B)$ be the set of all physical states obtainable by applying it to the initial belief state $B$. Under a deterministic model this is an image; for nondeterministic outcomes it is the union of all permitted images. For $B^{\prime }\subseteq B$,If each action is applicable to every current possibility from $B$, it is also applicable to every possibility from $B^{\prime }$. If the final belief state for $B$ is contained in the physical goal set $G$, then $T_{\pi }(B^{\prime })\subseteq G$. Thus the same plan solves every subset of $B$.

Nothing comparable follows for an arbitrary superset. For example, let an action take $s_1$ to a goal and leave $s_2$ at a non-goal. It solves $\{s_1\}$ but not $\{s_1,s_2\}$. A larger belief state is solved by this particular sequence exactly when all added states also permit it and end in $G$. It may succeed on some supersets and fail on others; it cannot be guaranteed merely from success on $B$.

Use incremental belief-state search to find only the initial possibilities needed to constrain a successful plan. Choose one possible initial state, or a small subset $B_0$ of the full initial belief state $B$. Find an action sequence solving this restricted problem, then simulate it from every state in $B$.

If validation succeeds, return the candidate. Otherwise choose a state that makes some action inapplicable or ends outside the goal, add it to $B_0$, and search again for a plan that works for every selected state. Replanning can revise the earlier sequence; merely appending a repair to one arbitrary candidate can miss solutions. For a finite initial belief state, there are at most $|B|$ additions before every initial possibility has been included. If a complete restricted solver proves that even the selected subset is unsolvable, part (g) shows that the full problem is unsolvable.

The benefits are smaller intermediate belief states, fewer states propagated through candidate actions, and avoidance of unnecessary portions of the full power set search space. One physical-state counterexample can eliminate many invalid candidates. The worst case can still require all initial states; the method exploits instances where a few representative possibilities already force a plan that passes universal validation.

Ordinary classical planning with STRIPS starts from one completely specified state. Here the missing locations express ignorance: not listing a pit or a monster at a room does not establish its absence. Applying the closed-world assumption to those omissions would manufacture knowledge of safety. Moreover, future sensor readings can determine which action is appropriate, so a fixed action sequence need not suffice.

The suitable object is a belief state and a contingent plan that branches on observations. A finite belief state model could in principle be compiled into a larger classical planning instance, but the ordinary physical-state STRIPS representation does not directly represent the required uncertainty and sensing.

This is a finite, discrete, partially observable, single-agent, sequential search problem with an unknown initial state. The cave is static while the agent deliberates. Given a complete world and an action, the described physical effects and ideal sensor readings are deterministic; ignorance of the world does not itself supply a probability distribution. The fixed monster and gold are environmental objects, not competing decision makers. A known action/sensor law with unknown object locations is different from having to learn an unknown search transition model.

Use partially observable search over belief states. A complete physical state can be writtenwhere $p$ is the agent’s room, $m$ the fixed monster room, $P$ the pit set, $g$ the fixed gold room, $\ell$ records whether the monster lives, $r$ whether the arrow remains, $k$ whether gold has been collected and $e$ whether the agent has exited or failed. The known room dimensions and exit are fixed data. Include death or entrapment as failure states. Movement, shooting toward an adjacent room, collection and departure have their physical meanings. In particular, a shot consumes the arrow, and kills the monster exactly when it targets the live monster’s room.

Let $T(s,a)$ be this physical search transition model. For a surviving agent, an ideal observation is the tuple of three truth valuesrecording sound, breeze and glitter. Here $\sim$ denotes geometric adjacency and $1$ an indicator function. Initially $B_0$ contains all worlds compatible with the known facts and any initial observation. After action $a$ and observation $o$, update the belief state byKnown success or failure observations are included as needed. No prior probabilities are required. A guaranteed-success goal test accepts $B$ only when every $s\in B$ has exited carrying gold. A policy must use the same action in all worlds still indistinguishable to the agent.

An AND-OR search has OR choices for the agent’s next action and AND branches for every possible resulting observation with nonempty $B_{a,o}^{\prime }$. Its output is a contingent plan, not merely a route. To demand safe success, reject any action whose possible outcomes include irreversible death or entrapment, and require a successful continuation on every observation branch. In an online execution the agent updates its belief state, follows the observation branch and can plan again. A strong plan need not exist: some admissible worlds have no safe route, and even solvable worlds can be observationally indistinguishable until a dangerous choice. Without an added prior and numerical rewards, expected-risk optimization is not determined by the description.

Sensorless planning chooses one action sequence that succeeds from every possible initial physical state without receiving distinguishing observations during execution. A belief state is a set of possibilities. For a deterministic search transition model $T$, an applicable action maps $B$ to $\{T(s,a):s\in B\}$; for nondeterministic outcomes, take the union of all possible successors. Applicability must hold for every member of $B$, and success requires the resulting belief state to be a subset of the physical goal set.

Every fixed action sequence preserves inclusion of the initial belief states. Consequently, a successful plan for $B$ also succeeds for every subset of $B$. Success on a superset is an additional requirement, so cannot be inferred from success on $B$ alone. This property supports incremental belief-state search.