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An abstraction function maps a valid concrete representation to its abstract value. Write $R_{\mathrm{valid}}=\{r:I(r)\}$ and $\alpha :R_{\mathrm{valid}}\to Q$. Different storage states can denote the same abstract value. Correct implementation requires both preservation of the representation invariant and agreement with the specified operation after applying the abstraction function; preserving a length bound alone would not prove first-in, first-out behavior.

The representation invariant answers "is this storage state allowed?" The abstraction function answers "which value does it represent?" Thus $I(r)$ is a truth value, whereas $\alpha (r)$ is a value of the abstract data type. Treating $\alpha$ as a partial function on all storage states, or as a function defined on $R_{\mathrm{valid}}$ only, expresses the same restriction. The abstraction function may forget storage details, and need not be executable code: its purpose is to connect an implementation to its formal specification.^[ref]

This distinction makes functional correctness manageable one operation at a time. The unreduced rational representation below separates valid storage from mathematical meaning; correct operations through an abstraction function then checks whether an implementation performs the promised addition. For an example with hidden mutable storage and failure cases, the bounded queue with encapsulation supplies a different abstraction function, reading an occupied prefix of an array as a sequence.

Partial correctness means that, if the algorithm terminates on a permitted input, its output meets the formal specification. Total correctness additionally requires algorithm termination on every permitted input.

A precondition $P$ describes permitted starting circumstances; a postcondition $Q$ describes the required result. Partial correctness says that starting with $P$ and finishing implies $Q$. Total correctness also guarantees finishing. A loop invariant supplies the connection between these conditions during repeated steps.^[ref]

Correctness is relative to a formal specification. Returning the first entry of an array correctly implements "return the first entry", but fails "return the maximum" on $[3,1,4,4,2]$. A fast wrong answer does not acquire algorithm correctness from its time complexity. Numerical closeness matters only when the formal specification allows an approximation. Software testing and test coverage provide evidence about selected executions; they do not by themselves establish algorithm correctness for every permitted input.

For a deterministic binary operation on an abstract data type, let $f$ be its specified operation on abstract values and $F$ the implementation on concrete states. For every permitted valid input pair $(r,s)$, require bothThe first condition preserves the representation invariant. The second makes a commutative diagram: either execute $F$ and then apply the abstraction function, or apply the abstraction function to both inputs and then execute the abstract operation $f$; both paths reach the same value. These conditions state functional correctness of a completed operation; termination is an additional obligation for algorithm correctness.^[ref]

For addition in the unreduced rational representation, chooseFor example, $F((1,2),(1,3))=(5,6)$ represents $5/6$, precisely the sum of $1/2$ and $1/3$. The short correctness argument uses nonzero denominators: $b\ne 0$ and $d\ne 0$ imply $bd\ne 0$, preserving the representation invariant, and

Now consider an incorrect implementation that uses addition on the numerators and multiplication on the denominators:It preserves the representation invariant for every valid input pair because its denominator is still $bd\ne 0$. Yet $B((1,2),(1,3))=(2,6)$ represents $1/3$, not the specified sum $5/6$. Even perfect checks of the representation invariant before and after this call would miss the error: the result is a legal representation of the wrong rational number.

The incorrect operation also exposes an accidental dependence on representation. Replace $(1,2)$ by the equivalent state $(2,4)$ while keeping $(1,3)$. The correct operation gives $(10,12)$, still representing $5/6$; the incorrect operation gives $(3,12)$, representing $1/4$ instead of its previous $1/3$. A correct addition must yield the same abstract result for equivalent inputs, although its concrete outputs may differ. This is why checks against the formal specification should compare abstract values, including unreduced representations and representations with a negative denominator, rather than demand identical stored pairs.

The calculation assumes exact integers. An implementation with bounded storage must additionally specify how it handles products and sums outside its supported range; the mathematical argument alone does not establish its functional correctness. The bounded queue with encapsulation illustrates the corresponding need to account for returned status values and failed operations, alongside the abstract state transition.

A mathematically precise description of permitted behaviour. A formal specification for the microkernel file-read example's service could relate an authorized request to the exact returned bytes; a formal specification of its microkernel's IPC need only describe the protected transport operation. They state different obligations.

For the summation loop verification, require a nonnegative integer input $n$ and a returned value $s$ satisfying $2s=n(n+1)$. The formal specification describes what answer is acceptable without requiring this particular loop: another implementation may satisfy the same contract. State separately whether partial correctness or total correctness is required. A Hoare triple packages the precondition, the program and the postcondition; Hoare logic supplies rules for establishing such claims.

Precision alone does not ensure a useful requirement. The postcondition $s\ge 0$ permits returning zero for every nonnegative integer input; it does not specify the intended triangular number. Conversely, an impossible precondition permits no starts, making a universal correctness claim vacuous. Check both that intended inputs are admitted and that admitted outputs express the intended task.

Establishing specified properties of a system using formal proofs about a precise model. Formal verification connects an implementation to a formal specification; correctness of the model and its assumptions still matters when applying the result to a physical system.

For a small example, the summation loop verification below starts with executable steps and asks two separate questions: does any returned value satisfy the postcondition, and does execution reach that return? A loop invariant answers the first; a loop variant answers the second. This turns an unbounded family of permitted inputs into a few reusable proof obligations.

The model must specify programming language semantics, including the meaning of variable assignments, comparisons and integer arithmetic. A proof about exact mathematical integers need not describe a machine that wraps on integer overflow. Similarly, a correct formal proof of a weak or mistaken formal specification does not establish the intended behavior. Choosing the right formal specification and relating the model to the implemented system remain substantive tasks.

Software testing examines chosen executions and can expose a counterexample. A formal proof instead justifies a statement throughout its stated model; it does not require executing every permitted input. This makes formal verification valuable when rare boundary cases matter, while software testing can still reveal an incorrect model or misunderstood requirement.

In 1969, Tony Hoare presented rules for variable assignment, composition and iteration in a small programming language. His paper explicitly says those rules do not prove successful termination, and discusses the dependence of arithmetic reasoning on the chosen overflow behavior. These reservations already make the model's scope part of the argument.^[ref]

Conformance of an implementation's behaviour to its specified functional requirements. The exact obligations come from the formal specification: correct delivery of an IPC payload and correct computation of a file read are different requirements. Neither requirement by itself supplies a numerical response-time bound.

Every operation requires $u\in U$. The queries have postconditions “return $I_0(u)$” and “return $O_0(u)$” respectively, leaving both functions unchanged. An incoming increment additionally requires $I_0(u)<M$ and hasThe outgoing increment analogously requires $O_0(u)<M$, increments only $O(u)$, and preserves $I$. These frame conditions prevent an implementation from accidentally changing another user's count. Here a subscript zero denotes the old program state.

trait Payments {
  // All methods require 1 <= user && user <= 99999999.
  // Queries leave the abstract state unchanged.
  def incoming(user: Int): Int
  def outgoing(user: Int): Int

  // Require the corresponding old count < Int.MaxValue.
  // Increment only that user's named count by one.
  def recordIncoming(user: Int): Unit
  def recordOutgoing(user: Int): Unit
}

The preconditions and postconditions are part of the formal specification; the trait's type signatures alone cannot express all of them. The implementation below uses checked require calls for the relevant invalid operations.

Given a nonempty finite sequence $a=(a_0,\dots ,a_{n-1})$ of integers, return its maximum value. Represent the sequence by an array whose contents remain unchanged during execution. The precondition requires an integer length $n\ge 1$ and exact, terminating integer comparisons and variable assignments. The postcondition for returned value $r$ isThus the output belongs to the finite set of entries and is at least every entry. The contract permits ties and negative integers; it asks for a value, not the position of a particular occurrence. There is no maximum of an empty set of integers, so empty input is deliberately outside this precondition. A service accepting empty inputs needs a different formal specification, such as a separate absent result.

This Python implementation makes the variable assignments explicit. Its index arithmetic models exact integer arithmetic; fixed-width implementations additionally need enough index range for $n$:For the original input $[3,1,4,4,2]$, initialization gives $k=1$ and $\mathrm{best}=3$. Reading $a_1=1$ keeps $3$; reading $a_2=4$ changes it to $4$; reading $a_3=4$ and $a_4=2$ keeps $4$. At successive condition checks, the pairs $(k,\mathrm{best})$ are $(1,3),(2,3),(3,4),(4,4),(5,4)$. The returned maximum is $4$.

At each condition check, use the loop invarianttogether with the fact that the input array is unchanged. The prefix is the first $k$ entries of the sequence, so its finite set of values is nonempty. The maximum need not be unique as an occurrence: the invariant concerns its value.

Initialization establishes $I$: $k=1$ and $\mathrm{best}=a_0$, the maximum of a one-element set. For preservation, suppose $I$ and $k<n$ hold. Then $a_k$ is a valid array entry. Either the comparison replaces $\mathrm{best}$ with the larger value $a_k$, or it keeps a value at least $a_k$. Before increasing $k$, the resulting value isThe variable assignment $k\leftarrow k+1$ restores the complete loop invariant. Between the two variable assignments, the old prefix formula may temporarily be false; the loop invariant is required at condition checks, not at every instruction.

At exit, $k\ge n$, while $I$ gives $k\le n$. Hence $k=n$, and $I$ gives exactly the required postcondition. This establishes partial correctness. The preservation argument is mathematical induction on the number of completed iterations, covering every permitted integer sequence, rather than just the pictured input.

For algorithm termination, the loop variant $V=n-k$ is a nonnegative integer whenever $I$ holds. If $k<n$, then $V\ge 1$. Every body terminates under the precondition and changes $V$ to $V-1$. Starting at $n-1$, it reaches zero after exactly $n-1$ iterations. For $n=1$, the initial value is already zero and the body is never entered. Together with partial correctness, this proves total correctness.

Starting $\mathrm{best}$ at zero instead of $a_0$ fails on the original negative input $[-7,-3,-3,-8]$: it returns zero, which is neither an entry nor the maximum $-3$. Keeping $k=1$ forever preserves the correct initial prefix claim but loops forever when $n>1$; a loop invariant alone does not ensure algorithm termination. Using >= instead of > still returns the same maximum value when entries tie, although a version returning a position would need an explicit tie rule.

Formal verification uses machine-checked formal proofs to establish functional correctness: the C implementation of verified seL4 configurations conforms to its formal specification. Binary correctness connects compiled machine code to that C behaviour where supported. Separate security formal proofs cover integrity, resource-access availability and confidentiality under their configuration requirements; these properties are not all available in every configuration. For example, the documented confidentiality theorem separates scheduler security domains rather than arbitrary pairs of software threads. ^[ref]

The documented assumptions include correct hardware, selected handwritten machine-interface code, correct boot state, translation lookaside buffer and memory cache management, and noninterfering or trusted DMA. The confidentiality result covers information channels in its model; the assumptions page explicitly excludes timing channels from that coverage. ^[ref]

Return to READ(7, 9, 0, 4). Correct IPC delivery does not establish that the service looked up the right file, returned LIME, or ever replied. A service can produce an incorrect payload while the operating-system kernel exactly follows its formal specification. The formal proofs therefore do not automatically prove all user-space services, nor turn the resource-access availability theorem into a guarantee that this file read completes. The verified foundation supports further algorithm correctness and system reasoning; the service protocol and its recovery obligations still need their own justification.

// Destination: computer-science.bigb

Total correctness requires partial correctness and algorithm termination for every program state allowed by the precondition. For a deterministic sequential program, every permitted start must reach a final program state satisfying the postcondition after finitely many steps. Thus an infinite execution can satisfy partial correctness, but refutes total correctness for a permitted start.

In the summation loop verification, the loop invariant establishes the answer conditional on exit, and the loop variant establishes exit. Both parts matter: replacing the body by a step that never returns would defeat total correctness even if every completed iteration preserved the loop invariant. Likewise, a terminating loop with the wrong sum fails partial correctness and therefore fails total correctness.

These obligations depend on the formal specification. A program that rejects every input might correctly implement a rejection service, but does not meet a contract promising a sum for every nonnegative integer. A proof of total correctness also gives no particular physical response-time guarantee: time complexity and the execution environment require their own assumptions.