For , pointwise concavity of the utility function gives
Taking expectations is legitimate because all three values are finite. Therefore : is concave. Strict concavity is not required and is not asserted.
For secant domination for expected utility derivatives, at each sample value set . This is a differentiable concave function, regardless of the sign of . Fix and . For , concavity bounds its derivative between the two outer secant slopes:
Because , finiteness of means at each of these four endpoints. Their absolute values divided by therefore give a common integrable bound on . Difference quotients satisfy the same bound by the mean value theorem. The dominated convergence theorem permits differentiation under the expectation, and pointwise continuity of with the same bound gives continuity of the derivative. Hence and . This argument proves absolute integrability of the displayed derivative; no unjustified differentiation assumption is needed.
A strictly increasing differentiable concave utility function on all of has everywhere. Otherwise monotonicity and the decreasing derivative would make it constant on a right half-line. Its tangent at zero also shows as .
If has only one sign, the stated second alternative already holds. Otherwise both and are positive. As , tends to infinity on ; as , it does so on . Since , Fatou lemma implies at both ends. Continuity gives a finite maximizer , and differentiability gives .
For optimal marginal utility as a one-period pricing density, put . It is strictly positive. On it is bounded by , whose expectation is finite by part ii. On continuity bounds on the compact interval . Thus is integrable and is absolutely integrable. Consequently . Normalizing by its positive expectation, if desired, makes it a probability density with the same zero pricing expectation.
Under a proportional transaction cost, the sample gain is concave when . The utility function is increasing and concave, so
Take finite expectations. Thus . The monotonicity of is essential to composing it with the concave transaction-cost payoff.
On each open half-line the sample objective is a utility of a linear gain: on the positive half-line, and on the negative half-line. On a compact subinterval wholly inside either half-line, the secant domination argument from the frictionless part ii applies verbatim, using finiteness of at four surrounding points. The dominated convergence theorem therefore gives the derivatives
They are continuous on their respective half-lines. Near zero, the same outer secants of the globally concave sample objective bound its one-sided slopes. Dominated convergence consequently gives
Here : the frictionless derivative at zero already proves it, since . Thus zero generally has a transaction-cost kink; when the two formulas agree.
For marginal utility pricing with proportional transaction costs, if almost surely or almost surely, the source's second alternative holds. Otherwise and . The Fatou lemma argument now gives at both ends, since a large positive holding loses on the first event and a large negative holding loses on the second. Let be a finite maximizer.
If , set . The derivative condition gives . As before, split according to to obtain integrability of from the absolutely integrable derivative, with a compact-set bound on the complement. If , use and obtain . In either case normalize ; then , , and is absolutely integrable.
If , a concave maximum has , so . Choose . In every case of this first alternative, . The normalization establishes a stronger, economically meaningful statement than the literal unnormalized condition: the expected gain under the resulting density lies inside the transaction-cost spread.

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