Under a proportional transaction cost, the sample gain is concave when . The utility function is increasing and concave, so
Take finite expectations. Thus . The monotonicity of is essential to composing it with the concave transaction-cost payoff.
On each open half-line the sample objective is a utility of a linear gain: on the positive half-line, and on the negative half-line. On a compact subinterval wholly inside either half-line, the secant domination argument from the frictionless part ii applies verbatim, using finiteness of at four surrounding points. The dominated convergence theorem therefore gives the derivatives
They are continuous on their respective half-lines. Near zero, the same outer secants of the globally concave sample objective bound its one-sided slopes. Dominated convergence consequently gives
Here : the frictionless derivative at zero already proves it, since . Thus zero generally has a transaction-cost kink; when the two formulas agree.
For marginal utility pricing with proportional transaction costs, if almost surely or almost surely, the source's second alternative holds. Otherwise and . The Fatou lemma argument now gives at both ends, since a large positive holding loses on the first event and a large negative holding loses on the second. Let be a finite maximizer.
If , set . The derivative condition gives . As before, split according to to obtain integrability of from the absolutely integrable derivative, with a compact-set bound on the complement. If , use and obtain . In either case normalize ; then , , and is absolutely integrable.
If , a concave maximum has , so . Choose . In every case of this first alternative, . The normalization establishes a stronger, economically meaningful statement than the literal unnormalized condition: the expected gain under the resulting density lies inside the transaction-cost spread.

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