Weakly dominant strategy 2026-10-25
A strategy giving at least as large a payoff as every alternative against every opponent strategy profile. Under the convention distinguishing weak dominance from complete payoff equivalence, require a strict advantage somewhere. In a two-action finite game, it suffices to check the opponent's pure strategies: expected payoff differences against an opponent's mixed strategy are weighted averages of those pure-action comparisons.
Zero-sum game Created 2026-09-24 Updated 2026-10-14
In a zero-sum game, the players' payoffs sum to zero at every pure strategy strategy profile. For two players this means : maximizing the column player's payoff is minimizing the row player's. A single payoff matrix therefore specifies a finite two-player matrix game, and independent mixed strategies give expected payoffs and .
Matching pennies and the usual rock paper scissors are two-player zero-sum games. The asymmetric coordination example is not: its total payoff is when choices match and otherwise. Applying a two-player minimax theorem to general bimatrix games would discard this possibility of shared gains. For a two-player zero-sum game, however, optimal mixed strategies guarantee the value of a zero-sum game, and pairing any two opposing optimal strategies gives a Nash equilibrium.