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For an orthogonal decomposition $\Psi ={\sum }_i{\Psi }_i$, the squared norms add to the total norm. Refining one component into orthogonal subcomponents preserves its total weight by the Pythagorean theorem. In an Everettian account these weights are candidates for governing probabilities, rational credences or decisions; the algebra alone does not select which interpretive role is justified. Counting arbitrarily refined components is not the same measure.^[ref]

Author of Quantum Probability and Decision Theory, Revisited by David Wallace.

Author homepage with portrait: sites.pitt.edu/~dmw121/

The Born rule assigns $p_i=⟨\psi |P_i|\psi ⟩$ to a projective measurement with projection operators $P_i$. Its numerical form can be shared by theories while the source of the probabilities differs. Comparing Bohmian mechanics, the GRW model and the many-worlds interpretation exposes three different roles: uncertainty over actual configurations, fundamental stochastic events, and weights for branch-relative expectation.

In Bohmian mechanics, the Schrödinger equation implies a probability continuity equation for $|\Psi {|}^2$ with current $j$, while the guidance equation transports an ensemble density $\rho$ with velocity $v=j/|\Psi {|}^2$:Thus $\rho =|\Psi {|}^2$ is preserved: quantum equilibrium equivariance. If an apparatus interaction produces disjoint configuration regions ${\Gamma }_i$ with occupied-branch norm $|c_i|$, integrating the equilibrium distribution gives $\mathrm{Pr}(Q\in {\Gamma }_i)=|c_i{|}^2$. The actual outcome is fixed by initial configuration; the distribution describes the typical or uncertain configuration, not a fundamental random collapse. Equivariance alone does not prove equilibrium initially: every admissible density is transported by the velocity field. A typicality account privileges the equivariant $|\Psi {|}^2$ measure and then explains subsystem statistics conditionally; that explanatory premise must not be hidden in the continuity equation.^[ref]

In the GRW model, the centre law $p(X)=\Vert L_i(X)\Psi {\Vert }^2$ is part of the stochastic dynamics. Since $\int L_i(X{)}^{†}{L}_i(X)dX=I$, it is normalized. For two well-separated correlated pointer packets with coefficients $a,b$, integration over centres around their respective occupied regions gives approximately $|a{|}^2,|b{|}^2$; cross-contributions are suppressed at separations large compared with $r_C$. This explains why macroscopic records follow the Born rule approximately, without a special postulate applying only when an observer measures. However, the squared-norm centre law already carries the relevant mathematical probability structure. The theory relocates the rule into a universal physical law; it does not derive all probabilities from a deterministic equation. There are also small predicted deviations from standard unitary quantum mechanics.^[ref]

In the many-worlds interpretation, every nonzero decohering component persists, so the question is not which single global branch will survive. It is why a rational observer should use branch weight $|c_i{|}^2$ for expectation or caring about successor records. Equal-amplitude symmetry and decision theory motivate equal weights for physically equivalent alternatives. For rational $|c_i{|}^2=m_i/M$, an ancillary refinement into $m_i$ equal-norm alternatives can motivate weight $m_i/M$, followed by continuity for other amplitudes. This argument requires assumptions that refining irrelevant details does not change value, that preferences respect the relevant quantum symmetries, and that weight tracks the intended notion of expectation. Those are substantive premises, not consequences of branch existence alone.^[ref]

Naive branch counting is unsuitable: decoherence yields approximate, refinement-dependent branches, and splitting one record into more environmental records should not change its weight. Nor is diagonality of a density matrix already an account of probability. The comparison therefore has no common derivation from bare formalism. Bohmian mechanics needs a justified equilibrium or typicality measure, GRW model needs a justified stochastic law, and an Everettian account needs a justified connection from branch structure and rationality to experienced statistics. Each offers a coherent location for the Born rule; the remaining explanatory costs differ.

Born rule probabilities can be given a coherent role in an Everettian interpretation, but that role cannot simply be the chance that one branch alone will be created. In the many-worlds interpretation, unitary measurement produces all of the decohering outcome components. The question is why their squared amplitudes should govern rational expectation, typical recorded frequencies or concern for future observers.

For a state ${\sum }_i{c}_i|s_i⟩$ and a measuring apparatus, the resulting correlated state has components $c_i|s_i⟩|A_i⟩$. The squared norms $w_i=|c_i{|}^2$ supply additive branch weights. They are preserved by unitary refinements of an outcome into orthogonal subcomponents: if a branch splits internally, its descendants' weights sum to its original weight. Everett's original paper introduces the relative-state description and a measure associated with the statistical analysis; this should not be confused with an independent stochastic collapse law.^[ref]

A simple example shows why counting branches is not an alternative rule without further structure. Begin withIf an irrelevant environment interaction refines B into two orthogonal components of equal amplitude, there are now three displayed components, each of amplitude $1/\sqrt{3}$. The total weight of B is still $2/3$. Counting displayed components instead changes A's assigned share from $1/2$ to $1/3$, merely because the description has resolved additional environmental detail. Real decoherent branching is approximate and has no unique fundamental branch count. Squared norm, in contrast, respects such refinements.

There are at least two ways to understand the remaining epistemic issue. An observer may have self-locating uncertainty in Everettian quantum mechanics, especially after branching but before accessing a record: the uncertainty concerns which centred observer situation is theirs, not ignorance of the global wave function. Alternatively, a decision-theoretic account can ask how a present observer should value all future successors without assuming that exactly one successor is uniquely them. These are distinct proposals, and the second does not become incoherent simply because the first is disputed.

David Wallace's decision-theoretic programme argues that suitable rationality and measurement-equivalence assumptions lead to expected-utility weights equal to squared amplitudes. The assumptions, including the appropriate neutrality of the measurement implementation, do real work.^[ref] A critic can question whether the constraints already privilege the desired measure or whether a preference theorem establishes the empirical role of chance. The defender must answer those objections; unitarity and normalization alone do not automatically turn a deterministic global theory into ordinary single-outcome randomness.

Repeated experiments add a consistency check. With Born weights, the total weight of frequency records is binomial and concentrates near the Born frequency as the number of trials increases. Yet calling the high-weight records typical already uses a measure, so this is not by itself a noncircular derivation of the weighting rule. The balanced conclusion is that Born probabilities are not meaningless in Everettian quantum mechanics: they can organize credence, decisions and typical records. Their status requires an argued connection between branch weights and those roles, rather than a bare appeal either to all outcomes happening or to the algebraic identity ${\sum }_i|c_i{|}^2=1$.