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Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 2 d Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
The stated portfolio has initial wealth and terminal payoffs and . For CRRA utility, . The market is complete, and an interior optimum in its positive payoff domain has marginal utility proportional to the unique state-price density. ThereforeThe Lagrange multiplier is , and both state equations are satisfied. Part (b) verifies sufficiency and strict concavity gives uniqueness of the optimal payoff. This illustrates risk aversion recovered from an optimal two-state payoff.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 2 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Let be the state-price-density values at the higher and lower risky payoff. Pricing the two assets givesSolving yieldsBoth values are positive, and the two independent equations make the solution unique. The payoff matrix has nonzero determinant, so this is a complete two-state market. The actual Arrow state prices, including physical probabilities, are and . Their sum is , the discount factor. Normalizing gives risk-neutral probabilities . Thus itself is not a probability density of mean one: its mean is because the riskless asset earns interest.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 2 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Admissible terminal wealth must lie in , the domain of the utility; alternatively extend by outside that domain. A one-period state-price density has and , componentwise. Therefore for , .
The dual definition gives the pointwise inequality for . Apply it with and take expectations on the finite state space:Equality holds precisely when , because that is the unique maximizing payoff in the dual definition. If the feasible portfolio has , thenThe same right side bounds every competing feasible portfolio. Thus is optimal. This is the one-period marginal-utility certificate of optimality; it does not require the erroneous second-differentiability assertion in part (a).
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 2 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
The Inada conditions give and . Differentiability and strict concavity make continuous and strictly decreasing, with range . Hence the inverse marginal utility exists. The unique maximizer in the utility conjugate is , andThe derivative formula does not require differentiability of : compare the optimizing values at and to squeeze the difference quotient between and , and use continuity of . Thus the dual is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing, and strictly convex, since is strictly increasing.
For the requested second-derivative assertion, a curvature hypothesis is missing. Under the intended nondegeneracy for every , inverse differentiation givesThis proves the intended dual differentiability with nonvanishing utility curvature. If is only twice differentiable, it gives pointwise twice differentiability of the dual; continuous second derivatives additionally follow when .
Literal strict concavity does not imply nonvanishing curvature. An explicit Inada utility with vanishing curvature isIts derivative is positive, strictly decreasing, tends to infinity at zero and to zero at infinity. It is smooth and strictly concave, but . At , a finite derivative of would contradict differentiation of , giving . Hence is not differentiable there. As printed, the twice-differentiable-dual claim is false; it is valid with . The remaining differentiability, monotonicity and strict-convexity conclusions above hold under the printed hypotheses.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 1 d Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Define , where is the Dirac measure at . For the full sigma-algebra of subsets of a finite , affineness directly gives .
The statement also holds for an arbitrary sigma-algebra on a finite set. List each atom of a sigma-algebra as and choose . Points in one atom have identical Dirac measures on this sigma-algebra, so is constant on each atom and is measurable. Every probability measure decomposes as , whenceThis is the expected utility representation on a finite measurable space. It does not silently assume that each singleton is measurable.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 1 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
First, equality of two values forces equality of the corresponding values: neither strict comparison holds for , and the same is then true for in both directions. Thus for a well-defined strictly increasing function on . Since is a convex set and are affine functions, is a real interval andIf contains , let and . The mixture identity gives for . For , express as a convex combination of and and solve the same identity for ; for , express as a mixture of and . Hence the formula holds on all of , not merely between the chosen anchors. We obtain positive affine uniqueness of affine preference representations:If is constant, the same comparisons force to be constant; choose and the appropriate . If the probability-measure set is empty, the assertion is vacuous. These degenerate cases do not require distinct anchors.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 1 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Indifference means equality of the representing utility values. Since , setApplying the affine function identity gives , so . This proves mixture solvability of affine preferences. The displayed weight is unique because the two endpoint utilities differ.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 44 1 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
An affine function preserves mixtures, soThereforeThe positive mixture weight preserves the strict sign; the common component cancels. This is the independence axiom for lottery preferences for the affine utility on probability measures.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 43 6 ii Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Under the Black-Scholes model pricing measure, write , where . Brownian continuity and immediate crossing on reaching a level make the strict up-crossing time equal almost surely to the hitting time . Its finite-time law has no atom at , so the convention before rather than at expiry does not affect the price.
For truncated discounted Brownian first passage, since payment occurs at the hitting time, discount there, not at expiry. The one-touch option price isSet . The expression under the square root is nonnegative for every real , by this Black-Scholes identity. The discounted density satisfies . Applying part i yields the closed priceThis formula also covers and negative rates. When , one may use , so the two prefactors simplify to and . At the expression is the undiscounted hitting probability, as a consistency check.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 43 6 i Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
For zero drift, the reflection principle gives the known Brownian first-passage time densityTo obtain a general drift, on a fixed finite horizon use the exponential martingale as change-of-measure density. The Novikov condition holds for constant , and the Girsanov theorem says that the coordinate process has drift under the new measure. Thus the hitting law of under that measure is the law of under the original measure. Conditional expectation of at a hitting time bounded by equals its stopped value, by the martingale optional sampling theorem. At this value is . The drifted Brownian first-passage density is obtained by multiplying , giving .
To verify the integrated formula, put and . The identity for the standard normal density givesBoth terms vanish as , so . The distribution has total mass one for and mass for ; in the latter case the remaining probability is an atom at infinity.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 43 5 ii Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
For secant domination for expected utility derivatives, at each sample value set . This is a differentiable concave function, regardless of the sign of . Fix and . For , concavity bounds its derivative between the two outer secant slopes:Because , finiteness of means at each of these four endpoints. Their absolute values divided by therefore give a common integrable bound on . Difference quotients satisfy the same bound by the mean value theorem. The dominated convergence theorem permits differentiation under the expectation, and pointwise continuity of with the same bound gives continuity of the derivative. Hence and . This argument proves absolute integrability of the displayed derivative; no unjustified differentiation assumption is needed.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 43 5 i Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
For , pointwise concavity of the utility function givesTaking expectations is legitimate because all three values are finite. Therefore : is concave. Strict concavity is not required and is not asserted.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 43 3 iii Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Yes: different adapted volatilities can give perfectly correlated terminal prices. The counterexample in part ii already establishes this with one nonconstant volatility. Both can be nonconstant as well. Put and takeThe Doléans-Dade exponential has volatility , bounded between and . The second stock has volatility , also bounded and nonconstant. Their squared volatility difference integrates toThe Novikov condition and boundedness give true square-integrable martingales, and the Itô isometry gives positive variance for each . Yet gives correlation one. The mechanism is positive affine dependence, not equality of the multiplicative volatility coefficients; it also explains the failure of the literal part-ii premise.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 43 3 ii Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
The principle terminal correlation does not identify adapted stock volatility exposes a false printed assertion for the correlation coefficient defined in the introduction. Take , , andThen andHence and are bounded. Both terminal prices have positive finite variance and are perfectly correlated, because one is a positive affine function of the other. Nevertheless on every continuous finite stock path. Equal initial prices fix the means, not the affine slope.
Here is the exact general conclusion and the intended qualified proof. Bounded volatilities make these zero-rate stochastic exponentials true square-integrable martingales. Writing , perfect terminal correlation gives for some . Conditional expectation therefore gives for every . Comparing stochastic integrals, the Itô isometry yieldsThis relation need not imply equality of the volatilities.
The terminal proportionality identifies bounded stock volatility criterion repairs the statement. If one additionally assumes equal terminal variances, then and the whole stock paths coincide, so positivity gives almost everywhere and the requested integral is zero. The same repair follows if terminal proportionality is assumed: equal martingale means force , after which the conditional-expectation and Itô isometry argument applies. This proves the intended conclusion under a sufficient additional hypothesis without treating centered correlation as uncentered proportionality.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 43 3 i Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Assume positive deterministic initial stock prices and finite, positive terminal variances, as required to define the correlation coefficient. The explicit stochastic-exponential solutions with constant volatilities giveThe common, possibly random, accumulated interest rate cancels. If , this ratio is a positive constant, so the prices are perfectly correlated.
Conversely, perfect correlation would give almost surely for constants . If , the displayed ratio is a nonconstant variable with a lognormal distribution with full support . If , the ratio would always exceed , and if it would always be below , both impossible. If , the ratio would be constant, also impossible. Therefore , whenever the stated terminal variances exist and are positive. No deterministic-interest assumption is needed. Degenerate terminal prices, for example zero volatilities and deterministic rates, have undefined correlation and must be excluded.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 42 6 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
There is a parity qualification in the printed claim. With the usual strict-majority definition, an even electorate need not have a Condorcet winner. On the axis , the two orders and are both single-peaked preferences, but every pairwise contest is tied. Thus no alternative strictly defeats every other one. We first prove the intended strict-winner result for odd .
Let and order the peaks along the common axis. Their median has at least peaks at or to each side. For any , the voters whose peaks are at or to the right of prefer to by single-peakedness. For any , the corresponding voters on the left prefer . Thus the median peak is the unique Condorcet winner.
The corresponding median voter rule is strategyproof. Fix the other peaks . As one voter reports a peak , the selected median iswhere minimum and maximum refer to the common axis. All attainable outcomes lie between and . If the true peak lies inside this interval, truthful reporting obtains the voter's top. If it lies left of the interval, truthful reporting obtains its left endpoint, which the voter's single-peaked order prefers to every larger attainable outcome. The case right of the interval is symmetric. No report improves the outcome. For one voter the rule simply selects its peak.
There is also a proof that does not depend on knowing the axis. If a voter truly prefers a proposed new winner to the current strict Condorcet winner , that voter already opposes in the contest versus . The strict majority supporting in that contest therefore consists of other voters and is unaffected by its report. Thus cannot become a strict Condorcet winner after a profitable misreport. This proves strategyproofness on the domain of profiles for which the selected strict winner exists, including all admissible odd-electorate single-peaked profiles.
For even , a weak Condorcet winner is guaranteed: every alternative between the two middle peaks weakly defeats each other alternative, allowing ties. With a fixed common axis, consistently choosing the lower median or consistently choosing the upper median gives a single-valued strategyproof rule, by the same interval-clamping argument for an order statistic. Arbitrary tie selection is not asserted to have this property. The corrected conclusion is therefore a unique strict winner and its strategyproof selection for odd electorates; a weak winner with a specified median rule for even electorates.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 42 6 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem concerns a deterministic social choice function on all profiles of strict preferences over a finite set of at least three alternatives. If it is onto and strategyproof, it is a dictatorship in social choice: one fixed voter always obtains its top alternative. Equivalently, every onto nondictatorial rule on this unrestricted domain is manipulable. Dictatorships themselves are strategyproof. We prove the implication for two voters.
First derive the rank-raising monotonicity lemma. If changing one report changes the selected alternative from to , strategyproofness in the old profile requires in the old order, while strategyproofness in the new profile requires in the new order. Therefore a change that never lowers the selected relative to any formerly lower alternative cannot change the outcome.
Onto-ness now implies unanimity. For every , some profile selects it. Raise to first place in each voter's order; the preceding lemma keeps the outcome at . Moreover the outcome cannot be when both voters rank some above : starting from such an outcome, raise to second place directly below in each order. These changes never lower relative to anything, so would preserve at a profile unanimously topping , a contradiction. Thus the rule respects unanimous pairwise preference.
For each pair , promote that pair to the first two places in each report, preserving the voter's order between them. Both dominate every outsider unanimously, so the outcome is or . The result depends only on the two voters' comparisons of , not on the lower alternatives: changing a tail cannot reverse the choice between two alternatives whose relative order did not change, since one direction of that change would be a profitable report. These binary choices define a complete strict social relation satisfying pairwise unanimity and independence from other comparisons.
This relation is transitive. To see why, suppose its choices on some triple form a directed cycle. Put those three alternatives first in both reports, preserving their individual relative orders. Unanimity excludes all outsiders, so the rule chooses one of the three, say . Promoting with either other member to the first two positions does not lower and therefore preserves its selection. Thus must win both its binary comparisons, contradicting the cycle. A complete strict relation with no directed three-cycle is transitive. Also the original social choice is its top: for any original selected , promoting and any preserves , so it wins every binary comparison.
It remains to prove two-voter dictatorship for this binary relation. Choose any conflict between . Suppose voter 1 prefers to , voter 2 prefers to , and the social relation follows voter 1. Say voter 1 wins this ordered comparison. For any third alternative , consider the two profile patternswith other alternatives below the triple. In pattern I, the social relation has by independence and by unanimity, hence . This proves that voter 1 wins the conflict against . In pattern II, it has by unanimity and by independence, hence , proving that voter 1 also wins against .
Thus winning against implies winning against every third and every such against . Applying the implication to against gives against , and then to against gives against . The implication therefore supplies both directions of all pairs involving the original alternatives and any new one. For an arbitrary ordered pair distinct from a fixed base alternative , use the already obtained win of against and the third alternative to get the win of against . Hence voter 1 wins every conflict. Unanimous comparisons also follow its preference, so the social relation is always voter 1's full order, and the social choice is its top.
If the initially chosen conflict follows voter 2, swap the voter roles in the same argument. We have therefore proved every onto two-voter strategyproof rule with at least three alternatives is dictatorial. This two-voter dictatorship from binary choice proof establishes the required special case without assuming the general theorem's conclusion.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 42 5 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
For three players, the predecessor-set weights are for sizes zero and two, and for size one. ThusTherefore the Shapley value is , whose coordinates sum to .
For the nucleolus, use imputations , , , . The excess of is . Thus the smallest possible largest excess is at least . It is attained when , , and : the remaining proper-coalition excesses then areall at most , while . Conversely, a largest excess of forces and precisely this interval for .
On this first-stage face the top excess is fixed. The next largest excess is , because the other varying excesses are nonpositive and is fixed. Its unique minimum is zero at . No further lexicographic tie remains. Hence the nucleolus is . Its proper-coalition excesses, sorted decreasingly, are .
Finally, a core allocation would require and , whose sum contradicts the efficient total . Thus the core of a cooperative game is empty. The game is not superadditive, so neither core nonemptiness nor individual rationality of the Shapley value should be presumed. Under the distinct prenucleolus convention the answer would be . Balancing and gives a first-stage maximum of and forces . The remaining first-stage constraints restrict to . The next largest complaints are and , balanced at , with . This is not an imputation and is not the nucleolus under the definition in (a).
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 42 5 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
Put for . Under the bijection , the weights satisfy and . ConsequentlySubtracting proves the alternative Shapley value expressionFor the dual coalitional game , its marginal contribution at predecessor set isThe same weight-preserving complement bijection therefore gives , and both equal the displayed expression. The Shapley value is invariant under coalitional duality. This Shapley self-duality calculation complements within , not within without accounting for the distinguished player.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2012 iii Paper 42 5 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-07
For a transferable utility game with , an efficient allocation satisfies . An imputation is efficient and individually rational, . Write and define the excess of a coalition as .
The core of a cooperative game isIt consists of allocations immune to a coalition's blocking: no coalition can obtain more for its members by leaving. The singleton inequalities imply individual rationality. The core may be empty.
The nucleolus, when the imputation set is nonempty, is the unique imputation that lexicographically minimizes the list of coalition excesses arranged from largest to smallest. It first minimizes the largest complaint, then the second largest among ties, and so on. Including the empty and grand coalitions adds constant zeros and does not change the solution. Minimization on efficient allocations without individual rationality instead defines the prenucleolus, a different convention that matters for this paper's game.
The Shapley value is the average marginal contribution of each player over all uniformly ordered player arrivals:Exactly orderings have as the predecessor set of . This is an average-contribution fairness rule, rather than a blocking-stability condition; it need not be individually rational for an arbitrary game.
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