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Broadly in favour, if “trivial” means transparent once the correct structure has been identified. The value of category theory is often to isolate a universal property that makes a repeated argument automatic.

For example, two objects with the same universal property have unique connecting maps in each direction. Their composites and the identities satisfy the same defining conditions, so uniqueness makes those composites identities. This one argument explains the uniqueness of categorical products, categorical limits, adjoint functors and many other constructions. It also specifies which isomorphism is canonical, a point that an arbitrary objectwise choice would miss.

The Yoneda lemma makes this perspective systematic. A natural transformation out of $\mathcal{C}(c,-)$ is determined by its value at $1_c$. Once that evaluation principle is recognized, questions about representable functors reduce to compositions in the original category. Similarly, the Beck monadicity theorem organizes many free-and-forgetful constructions around monad algebras, reflection of isomorphisms and specified coequalizers. The proof supplies a reusable explanation of why the algebraic structure can be reconstructed from the forgetful functor.

The substantial work lies in finding suitable definitions and verifying their hypotheses. The Freyd general adjoint functor theorem, for instance, needs completeness, local smallness and a solution set; none follows merely from calling a construction natural. The partial-operation tower below even has a monadic length that records how many distinct reconstruction steps are needed. These examples support the view that abstraction clarifies the source of an argument's simplicity. They also show why that simplicity is an achievement requiring proof.

An essay arguing against the claim. A good definition can change which mathematical questions are visible. Nevertheless, I would argue that category theory derives its explanatory force from the interaction between definitions and theorems; there is no sound general ordering in which definitions contribute more than theorems.

The strongest case for the contrary view comes from universal properties. A product in a category is characterized by maps into it, rather than by a particular construction of ordered pairs. The same definition applies to sets, groups, and topological spaces. An adjunction goes further: its natural correspondence of arrows puts free constructions, quotient constructions, and several kinds of completion into a common language. Such definitions remove irrelevant choices and expose relationships that would be difficult to recognize from separate constructions.

But a universal-property definition does not supply an object. The definition of a product in a category says what a product would accomplish; an existence theorem says whether the category actually has one. Even uniqueness up to unique isomorphism is a short proof, not an extra clause to be silently supplied by the word “universal”. Given two products, their universal properties produce maps in both directions, and uniqueness forces the two composites to be identities. This elementary theorem makes the definition usable independently of a chosen construction.

The Yoneda lemma illustrates the distinction especially clearly. A representable functor is a definition, but the lemma proves that its natural transformations into any set-valued functor are determined by one element. Its proof evaluates at the identity and reconstructs the whole transformation by functoriality. Consequently the Yoneda embedding is full and faithful: an object's pattern of incoming arrows recovers its morphisms without loss. That is a substantive explanation of why the chosen definition is powerful. Merely calling a functor representable would not establish it.

Similarly, defining a monadic adjunction gives a precise meaning to recovering structured objects as algebras for a monad. It does not decide whether a given forgetful functor is monadic. The precise monadicity theorem translates that difficult classification into a usable test involving adjoint functors, reflected isomorphisms, and specific coequalizers. For compact Hausdorff spaces, the crucial step is proving that a set-split relation is closed. The definition of a monad alone does not contain this topological argument. The theorem connects the algebraic language to an independently meaningful class of spaces.

There is also a danger in praising definitions without hypotheses. A Cartesian closed category has exponential objects, but a category of structured objects need not be cartesian closed merely because underlying sets have function sets. The correct exponential in a functor category generally involves natural transformations out of representable functors, not pointwise function sets. Its existence and universal property require an argument. Theorems also reveal when tempting definitions cannot support the intended construction.

Definitions provide the vocabulary and select the structures worth studying; proofs establish existence, consequences, and limitations. Category theory makes this partnership unusually explicit because its definitions are often expressed through universal properties. Its distinctive achievement is to turn well-chosen definitions into reusable theorems, rather than to make theorems secondary.

An alternative essay arguing for the claim. In category theory, theorems are indispensable, but a carefully chosen definition often performs the greater act of organization. It identifies what many apparently unrelated constructions have in common and makes whole families of proofs possible. In that explanatory sense, definitions can be the subject's most influential contributions.

Consider a universal property. Describing a product in a category as an object representing pairs of incoming arrows replaces several different concrete constructions by one invariant pattern. The corresponding uniqueness proof is important but short; the lasting insight is that the same pattern is the right question in every category. Once the definition is available, it becomes meaningful to ask which functors preserve products, whether the products exist in a new category, and how they interact with other universal constructions.

An adjunction is an even more striking example. The existence of free groups, free modules, and a Stone-Čech compactification can be proved separately. The definition of an adjunction recognizes their common relation to forgetful functors and explains why arrows out of a free object are determined by arrows out of its generators. It also packages the relation as a monad. A large collection of isolated existence results becomes an instance of a shared structure, with reusable consequences about composition and categorical limits.

A valuable definition also has to distinguish structures rather than merely rename them. An abelian category is not just an additive category with categorical kernels and categorical cokernels: normality of monomorphisms and epimorphisms matters. The additive example with truncated primary torsion shows why those clauses belong in the definition. The definition therefore preserves exactly the structure on which theorems about images and exact sequences depend.

This view does not make proofs dispensable. The Yoneda lemma justifies the use of representable functors, and the precise monadicity theorem tests when a proposed algebraic description is valid. Rather, it argues that the best categorical definitions have unusually broad explanatory reach: they select the invariant structures to which those proofs apply. If “matter more” means providing the reusable framework in which many theorems become instances of one idea, category-theoretic definitions have a strong claim to that role.