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The probability chain rule makes a sum of sequential predictive log scores equal the log Bayesian model evidence when the forecasts are coherent Bayesian one-step predictions under proper priors. Differences of total scores are therefore log Bayes factors.

For a binomial distribution count, compare a point null $\theta =1/2$ with the uniform alternative prior distribution on $(0,1)$. The alternative Bayesian model evidence isso the exact Bayes factor favouring the point null is $(n+1)\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{n}{y}\right)2^{-n}$. With standardized deviation $z=2(y-n/2)/\sqrt{n}$, the local normal distribution approximation is $B_{01}\approx \sqrt{2n/\pi }{e}^{-z^2/2}$. At fixed $z$ the frequentist p-value remains approximately constant, while the factor grows like $\sqrt{n}$. This demonstrates the prior-width mechanism behind the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for a Gaussian point null in a discrete sampling model.

For positive observations and $m=\max (\beta ,{\max }_j{y}_j)$, the Bayesian model evidence follows by integrating the uniform distribution likelihood against a Pareto distribution prior. For independent groups with shared fixed hyperparameters, these evidences multiply. The resulting hyperparameter log likelihood is $I\log \alpha -{\sum }_i\log (\alpha +n_i)-\alpha {\sum }_i\log (m_i/\beta )$ up to a constant.