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The logic $L_{{\omega }_1,\omega }$ extends first-order logic by countable logical conjunctions and logical disjunctions. Each formula has finitely many free variables, and quantifier strings are finite. In a countable first-order language, every countable structure has a Scott sentence in this logic that characterizes its isomorphism class among countable structures.

For a finite relational first-order language, with finitely many constants allowed, the Duplicator wins the $n$-round game exactly when the structures are rank-n equivalent. Game-winning implies rank equivalence in arbitrary languages; the converse needs a finiteness condition and can fail even for an infinite unary vocabulary. Over a finite relational vocabulary, winning every announced finite horizon is equivalent to elementary equivalence.

A structure supplies a nonempty domain and an interpretation of every constant, operation, and relation symbol in its language.

Every countable structure in a countable first-order language has a Scott sentence whose countable models are precisely its isomorphic copies. In particular two countable structures with the same countable infinitary logic sentences are isomorphic. Countability of both structures is essential to the back-and-forth conclusion; the sentence need not exclude uncountable models.

Let $M$ be a nonempty countable structure in a countable first-order language. The countable infinitary logic $L_{{\omega }_1,\omega }$ permits countable logical conjunctions and logical disjunctions, but only finite strings of quantifiers and finitely many free variables in each formula. We construct a Scott formula ${\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{x})$ for every finite tuple $\bar{a}$ from $M$ and every countable ordinal $\alpha$.

At stage zero, let ${\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^0$ be the conjunction of all atomic formulas true of $\bar{a}$ and the negations of all atomic formulas false of $\bar{a}$. Include atomic formulas involving arbitrary terms and constants, not just relation symbols applied directly to variables. There are only countably many such formulas. This complete atomic description ensures that matching tuples determine a partial isomorphism of structures.

At successors putAt a nonzero limit ordinal $\lambda <{\omega }_1$, put ${\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\lambda }={\bigwedge }_{\beta <\lambda }{\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\beta }$. All these are formulas of countable infinitary logic: each indexing set is countable, and the free variables are only the fixed finite tuple. Rename bound variables when necessary. Transfinite induction also shows $M\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{a})$.

For tuples of the same length within $M$, define $\bar{a}{\equiv }_{\alpha }\bar{b}$ by $M\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{b})$. Induction identifies this with the usual symmetric back-and-forth method equivalence: the tuples have the same atomic description at stage zero, and at a successor every one-element extension on either side has a matching extension at the previous stage. Thus these are decreasing equivalence relations, simultaneously for every finite tuple length.

There are only countably many pairs of finite tuples in $M$. A pair can cease to be equivalent at most once. The supremum of the first separation stages of all pairs that separate below ${\omega }_1$ is a countable ordinal. Choose a countable $\alpha$ at least that supremum. No pair can first separate at $\alpha +1$, soThis justifies stabilization without assuming that all tuples stabilize at one predetermined finite stage.

Now form the following Scott sentence, where the case $n=0$ has no displayed variables or quantifiers:It is a sentence of countable infinitary logic, because the family of all finite tuples is countable. The stabilization above and the truth of ${\varphi }_{\varnothing }^{\alpha }$ show $M\models {\sigma }_M$.

Suppose a countable structure $N$ satisfies ${\sigma }_M$. Start with the empty matching tuples, and maintain $N\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{b})$. The corresponding conjunct of ${\sigma }_M$ upgrades this to $N\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha +1}(\bar{b})$. The existential conjuncts extend the match by any specified element of $M$. The universal-disjunction conjunct extends it by any specified element of $N$. The atomic formula information makes a new element on one side match a new element on the other, and makes repeated elements agree with their earlier matches.

Enumerate both structures and alternate these two extension steps, including the least element not yet covered at each step. The union is a bijection preserving and reflecting every atomic formula, hence an isomorphism; for function symbols, eventually include both a tuple and the value of its function term to see explicitly that the function is preserved. For finite structures the same construction stops when both are covered. Conversely every isomorphic copy of $M$ satisfies ${\sigma }_M$, since isomorphisms preserve formulas of countable infinitary logic by induction on their construction. ThereforeIf countable $M,N$ have the same $L_{{\omega }_1,\omega }$ sentences, $N$ satisfies this Scott sentence of $M$ and is isomorphic to $M$. This proves Scott isomorphism theorem.

Take $I=\{0,1\}$ and the proper filter on a set $F=\{I\}$. In the first-order language with unary predicates $P,Q$, let both factors be one-element first-order structures. Set $P$ true and $Q$ false in the first factor, and reverse these truth values in the second.

The reduced product also has one element $a$. Neither $P(a)$ nor $Q(a)$ holds there: their truth sets are $\{0\}$ and $\{1\}$, neither belonging to $F$. ThusLogical disjunction can therefore break the equivalence. A union can belong to a filter on a set without either summand belonging to it; the corresponding union property does hold for an ultrafilter.

Here is the existential common-substructure test for quantifier elimination. Use a first-order language with a constant symbol, as in the applications below, or the usual conventions for empty generated substructures and truth constants. Let $T$ be a first-order theory. Suppose that whenever $\mathcal{M},\mathcal{N}\models T$ have a common substructure $\mathcal{A}$, then, for every quantifier-free formula $\theta (x,\bar{y})$ and every finite tuple $\bar{a}\in A$,The condition is symmetric because it applies also with $\mathcal{M}$ and $\mathcal{N}$ exchanged. The conclusion is quantifier elimination for $T$: for every first-order formula $\phi (\bar{y})$ there is a quantifier-free formula $\psi (\bar{y})$ such thatThe common substructure need not itself satisfy $T$, and witnesses are sought in the whole models, not necessarily in $A$. This test is the QET1 version of the common-substructure test for quantifier elimination.

A torsion-free divisible Abelian group is naturally a vector space over the rational numbers: for $m\in \mathbb{Z}$ and $n>0$, define $(m/n)a$ as the unique $b$ with $nb=ma$. Divisibility supplies existence and torsion-freeness supplies uniqueness.

In the usual group first-order language $\{+,-,0\}$, a model $A$ of the universal part of DAG is a torsion-free group which is Abelian. If the language instead uses only $\{+,0\}$, a substructure can be merely a torsion-free cancellative commutative monoid. Handle this convention by first taking its Grothendieck group $G(A)$: its elements are formal differences $a-b$, withThe cancellative commutative monoid condition makes $A\to G(A)$ injective. If $n(a-b)=0$, then $na=nb$, and torsion-freeness gives $a=b$; hence $G(A)$ is a torsion-free abelian group. In the full group language simply take $G(A)=A$.

For $A\ne \{0\}$ form its rational divisible hullConcretely its elements are fractions $g/n$ with $n>0$, where $g/n=h/m$ if $mg=nh$. The canonical embedding of $A$ into $P$ is injective, and $P$ is nontrivial, divisible, Abelian and torsion-free, so it satisfies DAG.

Let $j:A\to N$ be any structure embedding into a model of DAG. Extend it first to formal differences if necessary. Its unique extension to the rational divisible hull sends $g/n$ to the unique element $b\in N$ with $nb=j(g)$. This is a group homomorphism fixing the given copy of $A$. It is injective: an element mapped to zero has $j(g)=0$, hence $g=0$. Thus every embedding into a DAG model factors through $P$.

The zero case must be treated separately: its rational divisible hull is zero and does not satisfy DAG. Instead choose $P=(\mathbb{Q},+)$. Given any nontrivial DAG model $N$, choose $b\ne 0$; the map $q\mapsto qb$ embeds $P$ into $N$ over zero. Therefore DAG has algebraically prime models, including over the trivial base.

A model companion $T^{\ast }$ of a first-order theory $T$, in the same first-order language, is a model-complete theory with the same universal consequences of a theory as $T$:Equivalently, every model of $T$ embeds into a model of $T^{\ast }$, and every model of $T^{\ast }$ embeds into a model of $T$. The equivalence follows from the diagram embedding criterion for universal theories, which is an application of the compactness theorem. A model companion need not be a syntactic extension of $T$, and uniqueness is understood up to logical equivalence of theories.

A precise countable-language form of the omitting types theorem is the following. Let $T$ be a consistent first-order theory in a countable first-order language, and let $(p_j({\bar{x}}_j){)}_{j\in \mathbb{N}}$ be a countable family of nonprincipal partial types, each in finitely many variables. Then there is a finite or countably infinite model of $T$ omitting all the $p_j$.

A partial type is a set of formulas jointly consistent with $T$. It is principal if there is a formula $\theta (\bar{x})$ such that $T\cup \{\exists \bar{x}\theta \}$ is consistent andFor a complete type, this is exactly being an isolated type. Nonprincipal means that no such formula exists. A model omits $p$ if no tuple in that model satisfies every formula in $p$; different tuples may fail different members of the type. The model in the theorem need not omit each individual formula everywhere.

For parameter types, use the expanded language naming the parameters. Countability then applies to that expanded language, and hence requires a countable parameter set as well. There is no countability restriction in the finite-satisfiability argument of part (a).

Use the first-order language with one constant $c$, take $\mathcal{M}=(\mathbb{N},c=0)$ with equality only, and let $A=\varnothing$. SetThis complete type contains $x=c$ and is isolated by that formula. In any first-order structure, at most one element can satisfy $x=c$. In every $\mathcal{N}\equiv \mathcal{M}$, its interpretation of $c$ realizes $P$, by elementary equivalence. Hence no elementarily equivalent model has infinitely many realizations of $P$. An algebraic type can have a fixed finite number of realizations in every model.

The countable form of the omitting types theorem is as follows. Let $L$ be a countable first-order language and $T$ a consistent first-order theory in $L$. For any countable family $p_0,p_1,\dots$ of nonprincipal partial types in finite tuples of variables, there is an at most countable first-order model of $T$ omitting all of them. Nonprincipality means that no $T$-consistent first-order formula $\theta (\mathbf{x})$ entails every member of the type modulo $T$. A complete first-order theory with nonisolated complete types is the usual special case; neither an uncountable language nor an arbitrary uncountable family is covered by this statement.

Use the Godel completeness theorem to pass between consistency and the existence of a first-order model. Adjoin a countable stock $C$ of new constants. Construct finite conditions ${\Gamma }_s$ with $T\cup {\Gamma }_s$ consistent, interleaving three countable lists of requirements: decide each $L(C)$-sentence; provide a fresh constant witness for each existential sentence; and, for each $p_i$ and each tuple $\mathbf{t}$ of closed terms of its arity, add $\neg \psi (\mathbf{t})$ for some $\psi \in p_i$. Sentence decisions preserve consistency by choosing a consistent sign. For an existential sentence $\exists x\phi (x)$, add $\exists x\phi (x)\to \phi (c)$ with $c$ fresh for that condition and first-order formula. This is consistent: any first-order model of the old condition can interpret $c$ as a witness if one exists, and otherwise arbitrarily in the nonempty domain.

The omission step is the key Henkin omission extension lemma. Let $\sigma (\mathbf{c})$ be the logical conjunction of the current finite condition, listing every new constant occurring either there or in $\mathbf{t}$. If adding $\neg \psi (\mathbf{t})$ were inconsistent for every $\psi \in p_i$, then $T$ would entail $\sigma (\mathbf{c})\to \psi (\mathbf{t}(\mathbf{c}))$ for each such $\psi$. Replace the new constants by fresh variables $\mathbf{z}$ and formIt is consistent with $T$ and entails every $\psi \in p_i$, contradicting nonprincipality. Hence some omission extension is consistent. The construction need not be computable; countability merely permits all these requirements to be scheduled.

Let $T^{\ast }$ be the deductive closure of $T\cup {\bigcup }_s{\Gamma }_s$. It is consistent by the finite character of formal proofs, complete by sentence decisions, and has the Henkin witness property. Its term model consists of closed terms modulo provable logical equality and has at most countably many elements. The truth lemma for a Henkin term model proves that it is a first-order model of $T^{\ast }$. Every tuple in it is represented by closed terms, whose scheduled omission requirement supplies a negated member of each corresponding type. Thus

A universal sentence has the form $\forall \mathbf{x}\psi (\mathbf{x})$ with quantifier-free $\psi$, including an empty quantifier block. Embeddings preserve and reflect quantifier-free truth, so universal sentences pass to substructures of a first-order structure. For the converse Łoś-Tarski preservation theorem, let $T_{\forall }$ be all universal consequences of an arbitrary first-order theory $T$, and take $A\models T_{\forall }$. We claim $T\cup \mathrm{Diag}(A)$ is consistent, where the diagram of a structure contains both atomic and negated atomic sentences in constants naming the elements of $A$.

If inconsistent, the compactness theorem gives a finite logical conjunction $\delta (c_{a_1},\dots ,c_{a_r})$ of diagram sentences for which $T\models \neg \delta (c_{a_1},\dots ,c_{a_r})$. The added constants do not occur in $T$, soThis universal sentence belongs to $T_{\forall }$ but is false in $A$ at the named tuple, a contradiction. The compactness theorem therefore produces $B\models T$ containing an isomorphic embedded copy of $A$. The signed diagram ensures a genuine substructure of a first-order structure: functions are preserved, constants are included and relations are preserved and reflected. If the first-order model class of $T$ is closed under substructures of a first-order structure, this copy, and hence $A$, is a first-order model of $T$. We have provedNo countability assumption is needed for this second argument. An inconsistent first-order theory is covered as well, with a universally false axiom and an empty first-order model class.

Use the following form of the omitting types theorem. Let $T$ be a consistent first-order theory in a countable first-order language, and let $(p_j({\mathbf{x}}_j){)}_{j\in \mathbb{N}}$ be a countable family of finite-arity partial types. Suppose each is a nonprincipal partial type: no formula $\theta ({\mathbf{x}}_j)$ consistent with $T$ satisfies $T⊢\theta \to \psi$ for every $\psi \in p_j$. Then $T$ has a countable model omitting all the $p_j$.

For the proof, add countably many fresh constants and perform a Henkin construction. Enumerate three kinds of tasks: deciding each sentence, providing a fresh constant witness for each existential sentence, and making every constant tuple omit each $p_j$ of the corresponding arity. Starting with the empty set, keep a finite set ${\Gamma }_s$ such that $T\cup {\Gamma }_s$ is consistent. A sentence can be decided in one of its two ways while preserving consistency. For an existential sentence, add $\exists x\alpha (x)\to \alpha (c)$ with $c$ fresh; inconsistency would contradict freshness and the existential sentence itself.

For an omission task at a tuple $\mathbf{c}$, let $\gamma$ be the conjunction of ${\Gamma }_s$. Replace its constants by variables, identify the occurrences of the tuple's constants with the corresponding variables $\mathbf{x}$, and existentially quantify the other variables. If the tuple repeats a constant, include the corresponding equalities between its variables. This gives $\theta (\mathbf{x})$ with $T\cup \{\exists \mathbf{x}\theta \}$ consistent. Nonprincipality supplies $\psi \in p_j$ such thatis consistent. Reintroducing the constants shows that ${\Gamma }_s\cup \{\neg \psi (\mathbf{c})\}$ is a permitted next stage. Thus each constant tuple will fail some formula of each prescribed type.

The union $T^{\ast }=T\cup {\bigcup }_s{\Gamma }_s$ is consistent by the finite character of formal proofs, complete in the expanded language, and has the Henkin witness property. Its term model has closed terms modulo provable equality as elements, and satisfies the truth lemma for a Henkin term model, proved by induction on formulas. It is countable. Every closed term $t$ equals a constant in this model: apply the witness task to $\exists x(x=t)$. Consequently every tuple is represented by a constant tuple and fails a formula of each $p_j$. This proves simultaneous omission.

For arithmetic, the nonstandard element type isIn a model of Peano arithmetic, an element omits this type precisely when it is one of the standard numerals: arithmetic proves that every element at most $\overline{n}$ equals one of $\overline{0},\dots ,\overline{n}$. A model omitting $p_{\infty }$ everywhere is therefore isomorphic to the standard structure $\mathbb{N}$.

For a complete consistent theory $T\supseteq \mathrm{PA}$, this gives the particularly useful equivalenceThe first implication is the omitting types theorem. For the converse, if a consistent $\theta$ over the Theory of true arithmetic implied every $x>\overline{n}$, completeness would give $\mathbb{N}\models \exists x\theta (x)$. A standard witness $m$ contradicts the implication $\theta \to x>\overline{m}$.

Completeness matters in this formulation. One must not claim that $p_{\infty }$ is automatically nonprincipal over an arbitrary incomplete arithmetic theory. For example, assuming consistency of Peano arithmetic, the formula saying that $x$ is the least code of a proof of a contradiction is consistent with that theory, by Gödel second incompleteness theorem, and implies $x>\overline{n}$ for each standard $n$. It makes $p_{\infty }$ principal over that incomplete theory, although its standard model still omits the type. The theorem is a sufficient omission criterion, not a necessary one for arbitrary partial types over incomplete theories.

For a first-order theory $T$ in a first-order language $L$, a complete $n$-type is a maximal $T$-consistent set $p(x_1,\dots ,x_n)$ of formulas whose free variables lie among $x_1,\dots ,x_n$. Equivalently, it chooses exactly one of $\phi$ and $\neg \phi$ for every such formula while remaining consistent with $T$.

An isolated type $p$ is isolated by a formula $\theta (\bar{x})$ when $T\cup \{\exists \bar{x}\theta (\bar{x})\}$ is consistent andfor every $\phi \in p$. The type is an omitted type in an $L$-structure $M$ when no tuple $\bar{a}\in M^n$ satisfies every formula in $p$.

The omitting types theorem states that if $T$ is a consistent theory in a countable language and $(p_i{)}_{i\in \mathbb{N}}$ is a countable family of nonisolated finite-arity types, then $T$ has a countable model omitting every $p_i$.

Every countable structure in a countable first-order language has a Scott sentence. Hence countable structures satisfying the same sentences of countable infinitary logic are isomorphic. The proof uses Scott formulas, stabilization on the countable set of finite tuples, and the back-and-forth method.

A Scott sentence for a countable structure is a sentence of countable infinitary logic satisfied, among countable structures in the same first-order language, exactly by its isomorphic copies. It may also have uncountable models. Scott formulas and stabilized back-and-forth method equivalences give its construction.