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The contrapositive of a logical implication $A\to B$ reverses the direction and applies logical negation to both sides: $\neg B\to \neg A$. In classical propositional logic they are equivalent, so either can be proved in place of the other. The contrapositive of “divisibility by four implies being an even number” says that a number that is not an even number cannot be divisible by four.

In Intuitionistic propositional logic, $A\to B$ still implies its contrapositive: assumptions $A$ and $\neg B$ would yield $B$ and hence a contradiction. The reverse direction is not generally valid. From $\neg B\to \neg A$ and $A$, one obtains only $\neg \neg B$; obtaining $B$ additionally requires double-negation elimination.

The disjunction property says that if ${⊢}_{\mathrm{IPC}}A\vee B$, then ${⊢}_{\mathrm{IPC}}A$ or ${⊢}_{\mathrm{IPC}}B$.

This is the disjunction part of disjunction and existence properties, specialized to Intuitionistic propositional logic.

Logical implication forms the proposition $A\to B$, read “if $A$, then $B$”. In classical propositional logic, it is false exactly when $A$ is true and $B$ is false. Equivalently, it has the same truth table as $\neg A\vee B$, using logical negation and logical disjunction. A false hypothesis makes the logical implication true regardless of its conclusion; thus it asserts neither the hypothesis nor a causal connection.

For example, for every natural number $n$, divisibility by four implies that $n$ is an even number: $n=4k=2(2k)$. At $n=8$, both statements are true. At $n=6$, the hypothesis is false and the conclusion true; at $n=3$, both are false. The only forbidden case is a multiple of four that is not an even number.

In Intuitionistic propositional logic, a proof of $A\to B$ consists of a construction transforming any proof of $A$ into a proof of $B$. The implication introduction rule proves $B$ under a temporary assumption $A$; the modus ponens rule applies the result when $A$ is available. The classical identification with $\neg A\vee B$ is not generally intuitionistically valid.

Mathematical logic studies formal languages, formal proofs, model theory, computability theory, and the foundations of mathematics. It makes the rules of reasoning explicit enough that reasoning itself becomes an object of mathematics. Proof theory studies deductions; model theory studies interpretations in which statements hold.

Three questions organize the subject: is an expression a well-formed first-order formula, is it true in a specified first-order structure, and does it have a formal proof from specified axioms? These questions are distinct. For example, $\exists n(n+n=1)$ is a first-order sentence in an appropriate first-order language; it is false in the natural numbers but true in the rational numbers, with $n=1/2$.

The beauty of mathematical logic is that the same logical connectives and rules of universal quantification and existential quantification organize arguments across mathematics. Classical propositional logic uses two truth values; Intuitionistic propositional logic interprets logical implication through constructions on proofs, without unrestricted law of excluded middle. This proof-based framework is developed in Frank Pfenning, Natural Deduction, sections 1–3.

In the simply typed lambda calculus, types are generated from atomic types by the arrow constructor $A\to B$. A typed lambda term is a lambda term equipped with a derivation of a judgement $\Gamma ⊢t:A$, where the context assigns types to its free variables. The basic typing rules areThe Implicational Curry-Howard correspondence reads atomic types as propositions and $A\to B$ as logical implication. A typed variable is an assumption, abstraction is the implication introduction rule discharging that assumption, and application is the implication elimination rule. Consequently a typed lambda term is a proof in implicational Intuitionistic propositional logic, and a natural deduction proof recursively supplies such a term. For example, $\lambda x.x:A\to A$ expresses implication reflexivity. Products, sums, and the empty type extend the correspondence to conjunction, disjunction, and falsity; pure arrow types give precisely the implicational fragment. Beta reduction removes an introduction followed immediately by its elimination, matching proof simplification.

A Church numeral iswhere $f^{n}x$ means $n$ repetitions of application. At base type $A$, it has type $C_A=(A\to A)\to A\to A$. The following Church numeral arithmetic terms use left-associated application:Their concise conclusions areFor successor, the initial $f$ adds one application. For addition, the inner $nfx$ supplies $n$ applications and $mf$ supplies $m$ more. For multiplication, the repeated operation $nf$ applies $f$ $n$ times, and $m$ repetitions give $mn$. For exponentiation, $\overline{n}$ iterates the operation $\overline{m}$ on $f$: each iteration replaces a function $g$ by its $m$-fold iterate, yielding $f^{m^n}$. Zero iterations give $f$, so this encoding takes $m^0=1$, including $0^0=1$. The explicit outer $f,x$ abstractions make the result the standard Church numeral even at exponent zero, without needing eta equivalence.

Successor, addition, and multiplication operate on the same $C_A$. The displayed exponentiation term has type $C_A\to C_{A\to A}\to C_A$: its exponent iterates an operation on functions. Thus the numeral syntax admits several type instances; one should not force every occurrence into one fixed monomorphic Church type.

The Y combinator is the fixed-point combinatorFor $X_g=(\lambda x.g(xx))(\lambda x.g(xx))$, beta reduction gives $Yg{\to }_{\beta }{X}_g{\to }_{\beta }g{X}_g$. Since $X_g{\equiv }_{\beta }Yg$, we obtain $Yg{\equiv }_{\beta }g(Yg)$. This allows a recursive program body to receive a representation of itself.

Here the computation is in the untyped lambda calculus. The self-application $xx$ would require a simple type satisfying $A=A\to B$, impossible for finite simple types. Accordingly $Y$ is not a typed lambda term of the simply typed system. The Strong normalization theorem for simply typed lambda calculus also rules out a universal divergent fixed-point operator there.

To obtain a lambda representation of partial computable functions, encode machine configurations as finite data using Church numerals, Church pairs, and Church Booleans. Initial configuration, one transition, the halting test, and output extraction are primitive recursive functions, represented by lambda terms through the initial functions, composition, and lambda definition of primitive recursion by pair iteration. If these representations are $\mathsf{Init}$, $\mathsf{Next}$, $\mathsf{Halt}$, and $\mathsf{Out}$, defineUse normal-order beta reduction so the Church Boolean halting test selects one branch without evaluating the unused recursive branch. A halting computation follows finitely many transitions and returns the Church numeral of the output. A nonhalting computation forces successive tests forever and has no head normal form; by normal-order normalization theorem, it cannot be beta equivalent to a Church numeral. Thus every partial computable function is represented, with divergence preserved; every total computable function is the halting special case. This explains the role of $Y$ in computational universality while keeping the typed proof interpretation precise.

Under the Curry-Howard correspondence, Intuitionistic propositional logic propositions are types and proofs are typed terms. Assumptions correspond to typed variables. The logical implication $A\to B$ corresponds to the function type, logical conjunction $A\wedge B$ to the product type, logical disjunction $A\vee B$ to the sum type, logical truth to the unit type, and logical falsity to the empty type.

The rules of natural deduction become term constructors. Implication introduction sends a derivation of $B$ from a variable $x:A$ to the abstraction $\lambda x.M:A\to B$, while implication elimination becomes application $MN$. Pairing and projection implement conjunction, and injections with case analysis implement disjunction. Under this correspondence, normalization of proofs is computation by beta reduction in the simply typed lambda calculus.

No. Although $\neg (\varphi \to \neg \psi )$ is classically equivalent to $\varphi \wedge \psi$, the reverse implication $\neg (\varphi \to \neg \psi )\to \varphi \wedge \psi$ is not intuitionistically valid, as part e shows. More generally, the standard normal-form separation theorem for the implicational fragment with falsity says that no formula built uniformly from $\varphi ,\psi ,\to ,\perp$ has both the pairing introduction rule and the two projection elimination rules of conjunction. Hence conjunction is not definable from implication and falsity in Intuitionistic propositional logic.

Propositional logic studies reasoning with whole propositions represented by letters such as $p$ and $q$, and propositional formulas built from them using logical connectives. The classical two-valued, truth-functional presentation below assigns each primitive proposition either true or false: each compound value depends only on its component values. This is classical propositional logic; other systems, including Intuitionistic propositional logic, have different semantics and rules.

Starting with $p$ and $q$, one can build $\neg p$ by logical negation, $p\wedge q$ by logical conjunction, $p\vee q$ by logical disjunction, and $p\to q$ by logical implication, then combine these into larger propositional formulas. Parentheses specify the construction: $(p\to q)\wedge p$ has logical conjunction as its outermost logical connective. Primitive propositions have no internal structure in this language; a first-order formula can additionally describe objects and quantify over them. The formation rules are given in forall x: Calgary, chapter 6.

The following truth table shows the four basic logical connectives. Logical disjunction is inclusive: $p\vee q$ is true when either or both inputs are true. Classical logical implication has exactly the same values as $\neg p\vee q$; its only false row has $p$ true and $q$ false. These truth conditions are specified in forall x: Calgary, chapter 9.

Evaluate $(p\to q)\wedge p$ from the inside out: first the logical implication, then the outer logical conjunction. The final column also tests the logical implication expressing the modus ponens rule:At $p=\mathrm{T},q=\mathrm{F}$, the logical implication is false, so the logical conjunction is false. The abstract syntax tree below separates the construction of the propositional formula from the values propagated through it. Both occurrences of $p$ receive the same value from the Boolean valuation. With the opposite assignment $p=\mathrm{F},q=\mathrm{T}$, the logical implication is true but the logical conjunction is still false because its second input $p$ is false. Recursive evaluation and exhaustive truth tables are explained in forall x: Calgary, chapter 11.

The last column is always true: $((p\to q)\wedge p)\to q$ is a tautology. This expresses the logical validity of the modus ponens rule: whenever both premises $p\to q$ and $p$ are true, $q$ is true. It does not say the premises are true under every Boolean valuation; their logical conjunction is true only on the first row. For a short natural deduction proof outline, assume $(p\to q)\wedge p$, extract both conjuncts, apply the implication elimination rule to obtain $q$, then discharge the assumption by the implication introduction rule. See forall x: Calgary, sections 17.3–17.5.

Three tests answer different questions: Boolean satisfiability requires at least one true row, a tautology requires every row true, and a contradiction has every row false. Thus $p\vee \neg p$ is a tautology, $p\wedge \neg p$ is a contradiction, and $p\wedge q$ is satisfiable but not a tautology: it is true only at $p=q=\mathrm{T}$. See forall x: Calgary, sections 12.1–12.4.

Propositional logic is useful because an inference pattern can be checked once and reused for many choices of propositions. Its beauty is that a finite truth table completely settles classical truth-functional questions about a fixed propositional formula. But logical validity does not verify real atomic claims. If $p$ means “the switch is closed” and $q$ means “the lamp is lit”, a valid use of the modus ponens rule still requires establishing its premises about the apparatus; the truth table supplies neither an observation nor a causal explanation. See forall x: Calgary, chapter 2 and chapter 10.

A truth table lists a propositional formula's value for every Boolean valuation of its distinct primitive propositions. With $k$ primitive propositions, there are $2^k$ rows: each independently receives T or F. Evaluate compound columns from their subexpressions using the classical rules for logical connectives. This is exhaustive checking, so a formula true on every row is valid in classical propositional logic.

For a computed example over the natural numbers, let $A(n)$ mean that $n$ is an even number and $B(n)$ mean $n>2$. The choices $n=4,2,3,1$ realize respectively $(A,B)=(\mathrm{T},\mathrm{T}),(\mathrm{T},\mathrm{F}),(\mathrm{F},\mathrm{T}),(\mathrm{F},\mathrm{F})$: all four possible inputs.

The logical implication $A\to B$ and its contrapositive agree on every row; the converse implication $B\to A$ differs on two rows. A truth table therefore checks equivalence or supplies a counterexample. Classical truth conditions are given in forall x: Calgary, section 31.2. These two-valued truth tables do not characterize validity in Intuitionistic propositional logic.