Buy one lower-strike European call option and sell one higher-strike European call option. The initial cost is , so the strategy releases strictly positive cash. Its terminal payoff is
for every stock price. Thus it is an arbitrage: a positive initial receipt accompanies a nonnegative terminal obligation. One may consume the receipt immediately, or hold it in cash to make a zero-initial-capital strategy with strictly positive terminal wealth. This is the vertical-spread arbitrage for increasing call prices.
Buy half a call at each neighboring strike and sell one call at the middle strike. Its cost is
For fixed terminal stock price , the function is convex. Since is the midpoint, the payoff
is nonnegative for every . More explicitly, it is zero outside , equals on , and equals on . The negative cost and nonnegative payoff produce an arbitrage. This is the butterfly-spread arbitrage for nonconvex call prices.
Use positive strikes, the natural real-power domain of this price curve. For any such , the stock-minus-call payoff is
almost surely, since . Therefore the call price must be strictly below the stock price : if , buying stock and selling the call has nonpositive initial cost and strictly positive terminal payoff. Also a negative call price is an immediate arbitrage by buying the call.
For , and raising to the negative power reverses the inequality, giving and . The expression is undefined at . For , strict concavity of the power implies , whence
At , . Every defined case with therefore violates the necessary no-arbitrage bounds. Consequently
This argument does not require a dense family of strikes; even one positive-strike call gives the contradiction. The strict stock-minus-call payoff explains why the borderline is also excluded.
Use zero-interest cash as the one-period numéraire, consistent with the stated expectation-price formula. For , differentiate the proposed call-price curve twice. The first derivative and the candidate density are
This is the power call-curve pricing density. It is strictly positive. Its integral is , and its survival function is . Since and ,
Likewise, integrating the survival function from onwards gives
Thus a market whose terminal stock has this law under an equivalent martingale measure prices the stock at one, every proposed call at , and any integrable claim at . The finite-market fundamental theorem of asset pricing says that an equivalent measure pricing every traded discounted payoff by expectation excludes arbitrage. This proves the intended conclusion when such an equivalent pricing law is part of the model. For example, take the canonical terminal state space with stock equal to its coordinate and physical law equivalent to the positive density .
There is, however, a genuine insufficiency in the literal finite-strike formulation: a finite list of call prices and no-arbitrage alone do not force this pricing law, nor even a continuous terminal distribution. Here is an explicit counterexample. Take , one strike , and two terminal stock values
Give the lower stock value the remaining strictly positive probability and take this as the physical measure too. Direct calculation gives and
so the stock/cash/call market is arbitrage-free. Now let
This bounded nonnegative function is zero at both actual stock values, so almost surely. Yet . Charging that positive amount for the identically zero payoff creates an arbitrage by selling it. In fact no Lebesgue probability density can price every claim correctly on this two-state market.
Therefore the displayed is the intended continuous pricing density, but the promised no-arbitrage extension requires an equivalent pricing measure with this terminal law; a full call curve identifies that law if such a measure exists, but it does not follow from the printed finite-strike hypotheses alone. This is the finite-strike nonidentification of a pricing density. The counterexample and the corrected sufficient hypothesis account for the literal and intended readings separately.

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