Past exam of the philosophy of space-time and philosophy of quantum mechanics paper of Parts A and B of the physics course of the University of Oxford / 2019 / 8

The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox begins with correlations enabling certain predictions about one system from alternative measurements on a separated partner. Its EPR criterion of reality promotes certainty without disturbance to a sufficient condition for an element of reality. Together with a locality premise, the alternative position and momentum predictions motivate simultaneously real quantities not represented by one standard quantum state. The intended conclusion is incompleteness, not a mathematical inconsistency of the predictions.^[ref]

Niels Bohr challenges the inference from absence of mechanical disturbance to a context-independent assignment of reality. He accepts that there is no mechanical disturbance of the distant system at the relevant stage. His response invokes the experimental conditions defining the possible predictions: arrangements establishing a spatial reference and arrangements enabling a momentum balance are complementary. On this view, changing the local measurement changes the whole phenomenon to which a definite property attribution belongs. It does not remotely kick the other particle. His diaphragm discussion illustrates why specifying the apparatus and its reference frame is part of the physical claim.^[ref]

A spin singlet state gives a clean reconstruction. Its state isHere $|0_x⟩=|+⟩$ and $|1_x⟩=|-⟩$; the minus sign is an irrelevant overall quantum phase. Measuring the first spin along either axis predicts the other's same-axis outcome with certainty. But the two alternative local quantum measurements define different conditional ensembles. Averaging over the unread outcome leaves the distant reduced density matrix $I/2$ in both cases. The contrast between conditional prediction and the unchanged distant marginal is quantum steering together with quantum no-signalling.

This explains how consistent quantum predictions can coexist with the absence of an operational remote disturbance. It also identifies what a Bohrian rejection of the EPR inference amounts to: certainty in alternative contexts does not license combining the corresponding property attributions into one context-independent account. Merely invoking the Heisenberg uncertainty principle would not suffice, since EPR specifically argued that locality permits the attribution before any incompatible distant measurements are jointly attempted.

The reply is satisfactory as an articulation of quantum complementarity, but not a demonstration that the EPR locality premise and completeness are jointly sustainable. The critic can distinguish a change in our permissible predictions from a change in the distant physical condition. If the latter really is unchanged, why must the alternative predictions not reveal pre-existing properties? Bohr's contextual standard rejects that demand rather than deriving its impossibility from neutral premises. Later Bell inequalities sharpen the issue: quantum no-signalling does not imply Bell local causality. A satisfactory contemporary account should acknowledge this difference, rather than crediting Bohr with a proof of Bell-local completeness or interpreting his reply as faster-than-light mechanical influence.

Quantum mechanics is compatible with quantum no-signalling, but its full correlations are incompatible with Bell local causality under the usual additional assumptions. The answer depends on which locality condition is meant. A local operational prohibition on controllable faster-than-light communication is weaker than a causal explanation of correlations by a complete shared past.

Let $a,b\in \{-1,1\}$ be outcomes, $x,y$ local settings and $\lambda$ a complete relevant past specification. Bell factorization and measurement independence demandNeither assumes deterministic response. Put $A_x(\lambda )={\sum }_{a}ap(a|x,\lambda )$ and similarly $B_y$, so $|A_x|,|B_y|\le 1$. Pointwise,Averaging with the same $\rho$ for all settings gives the CHSH inequality $|E_{00}+E_{01}+E_{10}-E_{11}|\le 2$. For a spin singlet state, $E(\mathbf{a},\mathbf{b})=-\mathbf{a}\cdot \mathbf{b}$. Choose ${\mathbf{a}}_0=\hat{z}$, ${\mathbf{a}}_1=\hat{x}$, ${\mathbf{b}}_0=(\hat{z}+\hat{x})/\sqrt{2}$, ${\mathbf{b}}_1=(\hat{z}-\hat{x})/\sqrt{2}$; the magnitude becomes $2\sqrt{2}$. Thus the assumptions cannot all be maintained.^[ref]

There is nevertheless no signalling contradiction. If a local unread measurement has Kraus operators $M_a$ with ${\sum }_a{M}_a^{†}{M}_a=I$, thenThe equality follows by testing both sides against any distant observable and using cyclicity of the trace. Distant conditional states can differ after selecting $a$, but communicating that selection needs an ordinary message. The microcausality condition in quantum field theory similarly ensures commutation of spacelike-separated local observables; it does not make the vacuum or other entangled quantum states Bell-factorizable.

One can preserve different notions of locality by changing premises. Bohmian mechanics retains unique outcomes but its guidance equation is nonlocal for entangled systems; quantum equilibrium equivariance preserves the equilibrium distribution which masks that dependence from signalling. The many-worlds interpretation can combine local interaction equations with no unique global outcome, but a claim of locality must explain its branch-relative correlations; it has not thereby constructed the above Bell-local single-outcome model. The measurement-independence loophole, including suitable retrocausal or correlated-setting models, drops the shared setting-independent $\rho$ premise. Such models are logical possibilities, not demonstrations that the ordinary locality assumptions survive unchanged.

The justified answer is therefore conditional rather than an unqualified yes or no. Operational locality is retained by the quantum formalism. A theory reproducing all its correlations cannot retain Bell factorization, independent settings and the ordinary joint-outcome framework together. Neither denial of hidden variables nor an appeal to relativity alone removes the probabilistic contradiction.