Shapley wages in an entrepreneur-worker game 2026-10-14
An entrepreneur is indispensable and a coalition containing the entrepreneur and of workers earns ; a coalition without the entrepreneur earns zero. A worker's marginal contribution is nonzero only when the entrepreneur precedes them. The probability that the entrepreneur and exactly other workers precede that worker is , giving the displayed common Shapley value wage. The entrepreneur receives . Convex nondecreasing makes all marginal contributions increase with predecessor sets, so the whole Shapley value allocation belongs to the core.
Simple cooperative game 2026-10-06
A simple cooperative game is a monotone transferable utility game in which each coalition either loses, with value zero, or wins, with value one. In the usual nontrivial convention the empty coalition loses and the grand coalition wins. The Shapley value is then the probability that a player changes a losing coalition into a winning one when players enter in uniformly random order.
On three players, let exactly when contains player 1 and at least one of players 2 and 3, and zero otherwise. This simple cooperative game is superadditive: disjoint coalitions cannot both contain player 1, so at most one can have value one. Its core of a cooperative game is exactly , since singleton nonnegativity and the two winning-pair constraints force the other two coordinates to zero. In a random player ordering, player 1 is pivotal unless it comes first, whereas each other player is pivotal in just one of the six orders. Thus its Shapley value is , outside the core: coalition receives only . Convex cooperative games have the stronger property that their Shapley value belongs to the core of a convex game.