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Introduce nonnegative surplus variablesAt the proposed starting basic feasible solution, the basic variables are $x_1,r_1,r_2$ and the nonbasic variables are $x_2,x_3,r_3$. Its simplex dictionary, with objective $z=x_1+x_2+x_3$, isIncrease $x_3$ to decrease $z$. The simplex ratio test gives limits $1/5$ from $x_1$, $1/21$ from $r_1$, and $3/31$ from $r_2$. The smallest is $1/21$, so $x_3$ enters and $r_1$ leaves. After this single pivot the dictionary isAll objective coefficients of nonbasic variables are strictly positive. Thus the simplex method has reached its unique optimum:The feasible dual vector $y=(1/21,0,4/21)$ has the same objective, providing an independent weak duality certificate. Normalization givesThese are all the equilibria: the dual's strict slack in row two forces $p_2=0$, and the primal's strict slack in column two forces $q_2=0$. Equality of the two active row and column payoffs then fixes the displayed probabilities. The value is the first player's expected net loss; the second gains $4/5$.

Use $z\in {\mathbb{R}}^m$ for the perturbation variable and $y\in {\mathbb{R}}^m$ for its dual variable. The full Fenchel conjugate is $f^{\ast }(v,y)={\sup }_{x,z}(⟨v,x⟩+⟨y,z⟩-f(x,z))$. One signed-marginal convention isThe primal problem of convex perturbation duality is ${\inf }_x\phi (x)=p(0)$ and its dual problem of convex perturbation duality is ${\sup }_y\psi (y)=q(0)$. The signed dual marginal $q$ is concave; some conventions instead use $-q$ as a convex marginal. The definitions above fix all signs. Weak duality follows from $f(x,0)+f^{\ast }(0,y)\ge 0$. Also $p^{\ast }(y)=f^{\ast }(0,y)$, so $q(0)=p^{\ast \ast }(0)$.

For a sufficient strong duality condition, assume $f$ is jointly proper convex, $p$ is proper with $p(0)$ finite, and $p$ is finite and continuous in a neighborhood of $0$. More generally $0\in \mathrm{ri}(\mathrm{dom}p)$ suffices in finite dimensions. A supporting subgradient $y^{\ast }\in \partial p(0)$ then exists, andThus the dual is attained with no gap. This condition does not by itself assert attainment of the primal infimum; that needs an additional compactness or coercivity argument.

The same subgradient describes sensitivity analysis in convex perturbation duality: $p(z)\ge p(0)+⟨y^{\ast },z⟩$ bounds the optimum's change under perturbation. When $p$ is finite convex near zero, its one-sided directional derivative is $p^{\prime }(0;d)={\max }_{y\in \partial p(0)}⟨y,d⟩$. If $\partial p(0)=\{y^{\ast }\}$, then $p$ is differentiable there andThese conditions allow first-order sensitivity predictions; without differentiability the subgradient set gives directional bounds. Multipliers can measure the value of relaxing constraints, quantify changes in noise tolerance, and guide parameter choice without resolving every perturbed problem. For the constraint convention in part (b), the noise-budget sensitivity is negative the nonnegative constraint multiplier.

Let $u^{\prime }$ be any constrained minimizer for $\sigma >0$ and let ${\lambda }^{\ast }$ be a dual optimum. Set the common optimal value to $p^{\ast }$. Weak duality and feasibility implyAll inequalities are therefore equalities. In particular, $u^{\prime }$ minimizes $L(\cdot ,{\lambda }^{\ast })$, whose $-{\lambda }^{\ast }\sigma$ term is constant. HenceThis proves the claim for every constrained minimizer, rather than just for the particular one used to establish a saddle point. The multiplier may be zero, and the penalized minimizer then need not be unique.

Conversely, for $\lambda >0$ the quadratic makes the penalized objective coercive and strictly convex, so it has a unique minimizer $u_{\lambda }$. Choose $\boxed{\sigma =\Vert u_{\lambda }-g{\Vert }_2^2}$. If a feasible $u$ had $\mathrm{TV}(u)<\mathrm{TV}(u_{\lambda })$, thencontradicting penalized optimality. Thus $u_{\lambda }$ solves the constrained problem at that budget. This is constrained-penalized equivalence for total variation denoising. It is a correspondence of minimizers and suitable parameters, not a claim that every budget has a unique multiplier or a unique constrained minimizer.

Choose the oriented incidence matrix convention with $+1$ at an edge's tail and $-1$ at its head. Let $b_i$ be net supply, so ${\sum }_i{b}_i=0$. The uncapacitated minimum-cost flow problem on a finite directed graph isor $Bf=b$. Negative $b_i$ denotes net demand. Costs may have either sign; the problem can be infeasible or unbounded.

For vertex network dual potentials $\pi$, the optimization Lagrangian isThe infimum over $f\ge 0$ is finite exactly when every network reduced cost $r_{ij}=c_{ij}-{\pi }_i+{\pi }_j$ is nonnegative. Thus the Lagrangian dual problem and complementary slackness areA feasible flow and feasible network dual potentials satisfying these equalities have equal costs and are optimal by weak duality.

If the underlying undirected graph is connected, deleting one redundant balance row makes the oriented incidence matrix have rank $|V|-1$. A set of $|V|-1$ independent edge columns is exactly a spanning tree. Set all non-tree flows to zero, solve the tree balances, and check nonnegativity to obtain a basic feasible solution. Basic tree edges may have zero flow, which is degeneracy in linear programming. Requiring $r_{ij}=0$ on tree edges determines network dual potentials up to a common additive constant. If every non-tree network reduced cost is nonnegative, the tree flow is optimal. This is the basis of the network simplex algorithm. If the graph is disconnected, solve the balances separately in each component; each component must have total net supply zero and uses its own spanning tree.

Introduce nonnegative slack variables $s_1,s_2,s_3$ and start the simplex algorithm at $x=y=z=0$, with slacks $9,8,2$. The objective's largest positive entering coefficient belongs to $y$. Its ratio test is $9/3=3$, $8/2=4$, $2/1=2$, so $s_3$ leaves and $y$ enters.

Solve that pivot row for $y$ and substitute into the other rows and the objective $v$:This is a feasible simplex dictionary at nonbasic variables $x=z=s_3=0$. All their objective coefficients are negative, so no feasible increase can improve the objective. ThusThe negative reduced coefficients also prove uniqueness of this optimum.

The dual linear program, with nonnegative variables $u_1,u_2,u_3$, isThe feasible choice $\boxed{(u_1,u_2,u_3)=(0,0,5)}$ has objective $10$. Weak duality proves that it and the primal point are optimal. Complementary slackness also forces $u_1=u_2=0$ because the first two primal slacks are positive, and then the positive $y$ forces $u_3=5$.

Use a directed bipartite graph with one vertex for each job and one for each agent. Job vertices have supply $1$ and agent vertices demand $1$. An arc from job $i$ to agent $j$ has cost $c_{ij}$ and nonnegative flow $x_{ij}$; an upper bound $1$ may be added, but is already implied by the balances. The minimum-cost flow formulation of the assignment problem isInteger supplies and demands give an integral optimum by integrality of the transportation problem. Its $n$ positive arcs form a perfect matching, hence give one job per agent.

A network simplex algorithm basis for this connected $2n$-vertex network has $2n-1$ tree arcs, whereas an integral assignment has only $n$ positive flows. For $n>1$, at least $n-1$ basic tree arcs therefore carry zero flow. This unavoidable degeneracy in linear programming can cause zero-step pivots, extra bookkeeping and cycling unless an appropriate pivot rule is used. The Hungarian algorithm exploits the assignment structure directly rather than maintaining many zero-flow basic arcs.

Suppose the assignment dual potentials satisfy ${\lambda }_i-{\mu }_j\le c_{ij}$. For every feasible assignment $y$,If the selected assignment $x$ uses only arcs with ${\lambda }_i-{\mu }_j=c_{ij}$, its cost equals this lower bound. Weak duality and complementary slackness certify optimality. The PDF correctly denotes the feasible assignment by $x_{ij}$; the TeX aid mistakenly replaces it with ${\lambda }_{ij}$.

The Hungarian algorithm maintains feasible assignment dual potentials and a matching in a graph of zero reduced cost edges, where $r_{ij}=c_{ij}-{\lambda }_i+{\mu }_j\ge 0$. Search for an augmenting path in a matching in this equality graph. If there is none, let $S$ be the reachable jobs and $T$ the reachable agents in the alternating search from unmatched jobs. Every agent in $T$ is matched to a job in $S$. SetReduced costs from $S$ to its complement decrease by $\Delta$, those from outside $S$ into $T$ increase, and the remaining ones do not change. Thus feasibility and current matching equalities are preserved, while at least one new equality edge appears. Continue until an augmenting path in a matching increases the matching size. A perfect matching in the equality graph then has the same value as the dual linear program and is optimal.

For the example, start with the row minima $\lambda =(10,50,50)$ and $\mu =(0,0,0)$. The reduced cost matrix isMatch job $1$ to agent $1$. Searching from both unmatched jobs gives $S=\{1,2,3\}$ and $T=\{1\}$; the minimum cost to an agent outside $T$ is $\Delta =10$. Update to $\lambda =(20,60,60)$ and $\mu =(10,0,0)$:The new equality edge $(2,3)$ augments the matching. From unmatched job $3$, the next alternating search reaches agent $1$ and its matched job $1$, giving $S=\{1,3\}$ and $T=\{1\}$. Now $\Delta =15$. The updated feasible assignment dual potentials and reduced costs areThe augmenting path in a matching $J_3\to A_1\to J_1\to A_2$ uses job $3$ to agent $1$, the reversed matched edge to job $1$, then the new edge to agent $2$. It gives the optimal assignmentThe dual linear program value is $35+60+75-25=145$, an independent optimality certificate.

For the same multiplier convention, the Lagrangian dual problem isFor every feasible $x$ and every $\lambda$, the equality constraint implies $q(\lambda )\le L(x,\lambda )=f(x)$. Taking first the infimum over feasible $x$ and then the supremum over $\lambda$ proves weak duality:The inequalities remain meaningful with the usual extended-value conventions, including $q(\lambda )=-\infty$ when the Lagrangian is unbounded below. Equality of optimum values, or their attainment, does not follow from weak duality. If the sufficient pair in part (a) exists, it attains equality, since $q({\lambda }^{\ast })=L(x^{\ast },{\lambda }^{\ast })=f(x^{\ast })$.

Introduce slack variables $s_1,s_2,s_3$. In the initial simplex algorithm dictionary, $x_2$ has the largest positive objective coefficient. The ratio test givesso $x_2$ enters and $s_3$ leaves. Solving the third constraint for $x_2$ givesThe objective becomesEvery reduced cost is now nonpositive, so the simplex optimality criterion givesThe other two slacks both equal one.

The dual linear program isThe vectoris dual feasible and has objective value $12$. By weak duality, it and the displayed primal point are optimal; they also satisfy complementary slackness.

For the equality constraint, the Lagrangian and dual function areand the Lagrangian dual problem is ${\sup }_{z\in {\mathbb{R}}^m}q(z)$. Weak duality says $q(z)\le p^{\ast }$ for every $z$. Strong duality means the dual supremum equals the primal infimum, usually with a dual maximizer. A sufficient convex constraint qualification is that $f$ be proper, closed and convex and that some $x\in \mathrm{ri}(\mathrm{dom}f)$ satisfy $Ax=b$.

Introduce nonnegative dual variables $y$ and $z$ for the two constraints. The dual of a minimization linear program in inequality form isIndeed, if $x$ and $(y,z)$ are feasible, thenwhich is weak duality.

The dual from part (a) isThe point $(y,z)=(1,2)$ is dual feasible and has value $29$. The primal pointis feasible and also has objective valueBy weak duality, neither point can be improved, soThe strict dual inequalities for $x_2$ and $x_4$, together with complementary slackness, force $x_2=x_4=0$ at any optimum; the two tight primal constraints then force $x_1=7$ and $x_3=4$. Thus the displayed minimizer is unique.

Associate a nonnegative Lagrange multiplier ${\lambda }_i$ with each inequality. The Lagrangian dual problem begins withIts infimum over $x\in {\mathbb{R}}^n$ is finite exactly when $A^T\lambda +c=0$, in which case it equals $-b^T\lambda$. The dual linear program is consequentlyFor any primal-feasible $x$ and dual-feasible $\lambda$,which proves weak duality. Strong duality means equality of the two optimal values. The stated strict feasibility is the Slater condition; together with finiteness of the primal optimum it gives strong duality and an attained dual optimum ${\lambda }^{\ast }$.