Value of a zero-sum game 2026-10-14
For a finite matrix zero-sum game, the value is the payoff that the maximizing player can guarantee and the minimizing player can prevent the payoff from exceeding, using mixed strategies. The common value of the two displayed optimizations exists by the minimax theorem. A pair of strategies can be verified directly by checking that every pure column pays the row mixture at least and every pure row earns at most against the column mixture.
Weak domination does not exclude equilibrium strategies Created 2026-10-06 Updated 2026-10-07
In the zero-sum game with row payoff matrix , the second row is weakly dominated by the first. Nevertheless second row and first column form a Nash equilibrium: both rows tie against that column, and both columns tie against that row. Weak dominance therefore cannot be used to discard all possible equilibrium strategies without further qualifications.
Zero-sum game Created 2026-09-24 Updated 2026-10-14
In a zero-sum game, the players' payoffs sum to zero at every pure strategy strategy profile. For two players this means : maximizing the column player's payoff is minimizing the row player's. A single payoff matrix therefore specifies a finite two-player matrix game, and independent mixed strategies give expected payoffs and .
Matching pennies and the usual rock paper scissors are two-player zero-sum games. The asymmetric coordination example is not: its total payoff is when choices match and otherwise. Applying a two-player minimax theorem to general bimatrix games would discard this possibility of shared gains. For a two-player zero-sum game, however, optimal mixed strategies guarantee the value of a zero-sum game, and pairing any two opposing optimal strategies gives a Nash equilibrium.