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A first-order structure $A$ embeds into a model of $T$ exactly when $A\models T_{\forall }$. For the nontrivial direction apply the compactness theorem to $T\cup \mathrm{Diag}(A)$. If a finite diagram conjunction were inconsistent with $T$, its universal negation after replacing the new constants by variables would belong to $T_{\forall }$ and contradict its truth in $A$.

If a first-order theory had exactly the finite structures in a class containing arbitrarily large members, adjoin constants $c_1,c_2,\dots$ and require them to be pairwise distinct. Every finite fragment has a sufficiently large finite model, while compactness produces an infinite model, a contradiction. In particular, finite groups are not first-order axiomatizable.

A first-order theory has its class of first-order models closed under substructures of a first-order structure exactly when it is equivalent to its universal consequences $T_{\forall }$. If $A\models T_{\forall }$, then $T\cup \mathrm{Diag}(A)$ is consistent. Otherwise a finite logical conjunction $\delta$ of signed diagram of a structure sentences yields a universal consequence $\forall \mathbf{x}\neg \delta (\mathbf{x})$ false in $A$. The compactness theorem gives a first-order model of $T$ containing an embedded copy of $A$, and closure under substructures of a first-order structure implies $A\models T$. The converse is preservation of universal sentences. The diagram of a structure must include negated as well as positive atomic sentences so that the resulting map is an embedding, not just a homomorphism.