In a finite extensive-form game with perfect recall, each mixed strategy has a realization-equivalent behavioural strategy, and every behavioural strategy has a realization-equivalent mixed strategy. The latter direction samples all contingent actions independently in advance. For the former, condition the random complete plan on the player's own action and information history leading to an information set; perfect recall makes that own history common to its nodes. Conditional action probabilities then reproduce the terminal path factors. At an information set reached with zero probability under that player's own plan distribution, choose any action distribution. The result does not assert equivalence without perfect recall.[ref]
Extensive games and the problem of information by Harold W. Kuhn. original article, pp. 193–216, perfect-recall equivalence
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Kuhn's theorem can refer to several concepts in different fields, but one of the most prominent is related to game theory and social choice theory, specifically "Kuhn's theorem" regarding extensive form games and backward induction. In the context of game theory, Kuhn's theorem states that in certain types of complete information games represented in extensive form, rational players will make choices that can be predicted based on the backward induction method.