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A mathematician working in probability theory and ergodic theory, whose photographic collection became a foundation of the Oberwolfach Photo Collection.^[ref][ref]

A mathematician whose research includes probability theory, stochastic processes and statistics.^[ref]

Homepage: www.randomservices.org/Siegrist.html

A mathematician.^[ref]

Mathematician associated with the Bellman-Ford algorithm.

Homepage: mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Kutta/

Mathematician.

Biographical record: www2.arnes.si/~sspmgiac/mirk2003/Zbornik.pdf

Identity and discipline: www.math.bgu.ac.il/people/members

Additional identity: mathshistory.st-andrews.ac.uk/Biographies/Livsic/

Homepage: theory.stanford.edu/~megiddo/

A mathematician associated with Rodrigues' formula and the Rodrigues rotation formula.

A mathematician working in computability theory, and the author of Discrete Mathematics: An Open Introduction.^[ref]

A mathematician whose 1926 work introduced a component-merging method for the minimum spanning tree problem, now called Borůvka's algorithm.^[ref]

A mathematician who worked on Fourier series and group theory.^[ref]

The relevant letter is dated 12 April 1615; the paper's 1616 date conflates it with the subsequent restriction of Copernican teaching. Robert Bellarmine addressed Paolo Antonio Foscarini's defence of heliocentrism by distinguishing a useful mathematical supposition from an established account of the world's physical arrangement. That distinction determines the conditions of his limited permission. It is not a general licence to teach the Earth's motion as an already demonstrated fact.^[ref]

First, a mathematician could work conditionally: assume that the Earth moves and the Sun is stationary, and investigate whether the resulting astronomical model accounts for the observed appearances. Successful calculation would establish what follows from those assumptions. It would not, merely by succeeding, demonstrate that the assumptions describe the true causes and arrangement of the heavens. This was a recognizable distinction between mathematical treatment and natural philosophy, although it should not be made into a complete description of what all early modern mathematicians believed. A person might be licensed to use a computational scheme without being authorized to assert its physical truth.

Second, Robert Bellarmine treated interpretation of Scripture as an institutional constraint. His appeal to the Council of Trent and the claimed agreement of earlier commentators meant that an individual investigator could not simply replace the received reading on the strength of an attractive astronomical model. He also rejected the answer that a claim about the Earth was irrelevant to faith just because its subject was not a central Christian doctrine: the authority of the scriptural speaker mattered to him. These are his grounds for caution, not neutral rules of astronomy which every participant was obliged to accept.

Third, he conceded an important conditional. If a genuine demonstration of the Earth's motion were available, apparently contrary scriptural passages would require careful reinterpretation; it would be better to admit that their meaning had not been understood than to deny a demonstrated conclusion. Nevertheless, he denied that such a demonstration had been supplied. Thus the concession does not amount to contemporary acceptance of heliocentrism, and the acceptable hypothetical discourse must be distinguished from this more demanding route to physical affirmation.^[ref]

The distinction had a genuine evidential setting. Galileo Galilei's observations challenged parts of the inherited celestial picture. Bodies accompanying Jupiter showed that not every celestial circuit had the Earth as its immediate centre. The full sequence of phases of Venus was incompatible with the traditional arrangement that always kept Venus on the near side of the Sun. Yet neither observation alone selected a moving Earth: a Tychonic system could have the planets circle the Sun while the Sun circled a stationary Earth. The relevant distinction is between refuting one geocentric model and proving every premise of a particular heliocentric model.^[ref][ref]

The defensible reading is therefore a conditional permission accompanied by a restrictive burden of proof. Robert Bellarmine allowed mathematical use without an absolute assertion, and envisaged reconsidering interpretation if physical demonstration compelled it. He neither declared all mathematical accounts fictional nor recognized an unrestricted freedom to announce new physical truths regardless of theological jurisdiction. The 1615 letter and the later proceedings belong to a developing controversy, rather than one timeless pronouncement about the relation of science and theology.