A credibility premium estimates a risk's expected future claims by combining its own observed experience with a collective or prior mean. In its basic form , the credibility factor is the weight assigned to individual experience. Larger credibility places less weight on pooling with the population. The amounts below are pure expected-claim premiums; no additional expense or profit loading is specified.
Under squared-error loss, the posterior risk for estimating the unknown conditional mean by is
Hence the Bayes estimator under squared error loss is the posterior mean. In the equal-year model, conditional independence makes the likelihood proportional to . Combining it with the normal prior and completing the square gives
Because , the required estimator is ; it also equals the predictive mean . The normal-normal credibility expression is
This is exact Bayesian credibility, not merely the best linear approximation to a possibly nonlinear posterior mean.
For unequal life counts use the usual exposure model: individual-life losses are conditionally independent with variance , and the annual totals are conditionally independent given the same . Then
The dot denotes the stipulated normal approximation. The positive exposures are known. Define total past exposure and its experience mean by
The normal log-likelihood has quadratic term . With the prior , normal-normal conjugacy with unequal exposures gives posterior variance and mean
Therefore the estimated pure premium per life for year has the normal-normal credibility with unequal exposures form
It is also an exact normal-model Bühlmann–Straub credibility estimate. The individual experience is exposure-weighted: the unweighted mean of the yearly per-life observations would generally discard the different precisions.
For positive , differentiation gives
Thus increasing the prior variance increases credibility, because greater between-risk heterogeneity makes the collective mean less representative of this risk. Increasing the individual process variance decreases credibility, because a fixed amount of observed experience becomes noisier. The future exposure supplies no new observation, so it does not enter . It only scales the total premium:
The independent-life variance scaling is part of the usual exposure interpretation. Without it, a known variance for one life does not determine the variance of a total: a common pairwise conditional covariance would add to . Similarly, cross-year conditional dependence would change the joint likelihood. Those assumptions are implicit in applying the standard credibility model to the final paragraph.
Let the Bühlmann–Straub model structural parameters be
Here is the variance of hypothetical means and is the expected process variance. Assume the structural second moments are finite and the exposures are positive, as required by this least-squares problem. Write . Conditional independence separates the squared prediction error into squared conditional bias and conditional variance. The law of total expectation gives
Indeed, conditional on , the prediction has mean and variance ; there are no cross-covariances because the annual observations are conditionally independent.
For fixed slope coefficients the optimal intercept is . For fixed sum , the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality gives
with equality when . Thus the remaining minimization is the scalar quadratic
Differentiation gives . In the nondegenerate case , the quadratic is strictly convex and the equality condition determines the unique slope coefficients. The Bühlmann–Straub credibility factor and premium are therefore
and
This derives the Bühlmann–Straub credibility estimate from its minimization criterion. Increasing exposure increases the weight on experience; increasing process noise decreases it. No exposure for year appears because the estimate concerns the expected claim per car, not the variance of next year's observed average.
The degenerate cases have a direct interpretation. If and , the unknown conditional mean is the known constant , so take . If and , each observation already equals almost surely, so gives exact prediction. If both vanish, all observations and the target equal almost surely; use the constant predictor rather than the undefined ratio .
In the approximate normal model, , , , and . Substitution into the derived credibility estimate gives
We now derive, rather than assume, the Bayes estimator under squared error loss. For positive , the likelihood and normal distribution prior give a posterior density proportional to
The coefficient of is , and the coefficient in the linear term is . Completing the square proves the normal-normal conjugacy with unequal exposures formula
with
For any decision , the posterior quadratic loss is
Its unique minimizer is the posterior mean . Hence the Bayesian and credibility estimates coincide exactly in this normal model:
The reason is that the posterior mean is already affine in the observations, so restricting prediction to affine functions loses nothing. In the general Bühlmann–Straub model, the posterior mean need not be affine; the credibility estimate is then only the best affine squared-error predictor. The zero-variance limits of the normal formulas agree with the degenerate cases above.