Scientific change is a serious threat to indiscriminate scientific realism, but not a deductive refutation of every realist position. A defensible realism must identify which claims deserve belief, at what precision and within which domain, rather than merely promise that mature theories are “approximately true”.
Scientific realism includes the claim that a mind-independent world exists and the stronger epistemic claim that scientific inquiry gives warranted knowledge of at least some unobservable aspects of it. Theory replacement directly challenges the latter inference, not the bare existence of an external world. Disagreement between successive descriptions does not imply that neither describes anything real.
The historical objection is nevertheless substantial. A theory can make successful predictions while its central interpretation is later rejected. The luminiferous aether illustrates the risk of identifying successful wave optics with the literal truth of a particular mechanical medium. If earlier scientists had impressive evidence and still endorsed dispensable theoretical entities, why suppose that comparable evidence now guarantees our own entire interpretation? Laudan presses this challenge against the connection between success, reference and approximate truth.[ref]
One reply distinguishes literal truth from controlled approximation. In special relativity, the kinetic energy of a massive particle is
(1)
The Taylor expansion for gives
(2)
Thus the classical kinetic energy is recovered in a specified regime, with a leading relative correction of . It would be wrong to conclude that Newtonian mechanics is globally true, or that all its physical concepts survive unchanged. It would be equally wrong to infer that its low-speed predictions were accidental. The survival of a quantitatively controlled relation is a more discriminating claim than survival of every piece of ontology.
John Worrall's structural realism makes preservation of mathematical relations central, using the transition from Augustin Fresnel's optics to electromagnetism as a key example.[ref] This explains why a theory might retain a real achievement while abandoning its proposed mechanism. However, structure cannot mean just any equations with some empirical fit: the realist must identify the relevant physical interpretation, domain and counterfactual content. Otherwise the view risks saying little beyond empirical adequacy.
A related selective response commits to elements that carry a theory's tested successes, while treating speculative additions more cautiously. Its strongest evidence is convergence across independent experiments, robustness under changes in modelling assumptions, and success on predictions not used to tune the theory. For example, support for a stable electron electric charge need not amount to belief in every current claim about the ultimate nature of an electron. But selectivity must be defensible before a later replacement occurs; choosing surviving components only in hindsight cannot vindicate past realist confidence.
The anti-realist can still explain scientific success by demanding empirical fit and retaining successful models, without inferring truth about unobservables. That response blocks any simple argument that realism is logically compulsory. Conversely, pointing to historical failures does not establish that every presently supported claim will fail. Such an inference would need a justified comparison class, a measure of success and an account of how testing has changed.
The appropriate conclusion is discriminating fallibilism. Changes threaten claims of finality and blanket trust in a theory's full ontology. They can also reveal stable, independently tested relations and improve our understanding of their limits. Scientific realism survives as a qualified position only if it makes those distinctions explicit and remains willing to revise the very commitments it currently regards as best supported.

Ancestors (11)

  1. 8
  2. 2022
  3. Past exam of the philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford
  4. Philosophy of science supplementary subject of the University of Oxford
  5. Supplementary subject of the physics course of the University of Oxford
  6. Physics course of the University of Oxford
  7. Undergraduate course of the University of Oxford
  8. Course of the University of Oxford
  9. University of Oxford
  10. List of universities
  11. Home

View article source

Discussion (0)

New discussion

There are no discussions about this article yet.

Articles by others on the same topic (0)

There are currently no matching articles.
See all articles in the same topic Create my own version