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Imaging in many narrow, usually adjacent wavelength bands. Relative to broad-band multispectral imaging, it can resolve narrower mineral absorption features in spectral reflectance, helping distinguish surface lithologies, at the cost of data volume and often reduced signal per band.

The observable physical and compositional character of rock, including its constituent minerals, texture and grain size. Different lithologies can have distinct spectral reflectance, density and magnetic susceptibility, making geological mapping possible through several independent measurements.

Distinct spectra can give the same colour response for a specified observer and illumination. In a simplified three-cone cell model, equal values of $\int L(\lambda )R(\lambda )S_i(\lambda )d\lambda$ for $i=1,2,3$ need not imply identical spectral reflectance functions $R$. Altering illumination or observer can break the match.

John Locke's primary-secondary quality distinction separates properties such as shape, extension and motion from powers to produce experiences such as colour and taste. On this account a secondary quality is a body's disposition to affect a perceiver through its physical constitution; the disposition should not be confused with the sensation it produces.^[ref]

This distinction can help scientific explanation. A surface's spectral reflectance, the illuminating spectrum, and a visual system's receptor responses jointly affect perceived colour. Altering illumination can change the experience without changing the surface. The lesson is to distinguish an object's physical structure, the surrounding conditions and the observer's response, rather than to assign a colour experience to the object as though no observer or illumination mattered.

A simple absolute contrast between invariant primary properties and observer-dependent secondary properties is less plausible. Special relativity makes measured lengths and durations depend on the inertial frame; appearance of shape also depends on viewing geometry. Dependence on circumstances therefore does not by itself mark a property as unreal. Conversely, a disposition to reflect particular wavelengths or stimulate receptors can be an objective physical relation even though its manifestation requires suitable conditions.

A useful modern version is thus explanatory rather than an unrevisable division of reality. Distinguish independently specified physical variables from response properties defined relative to a system and conditions, then study the mechanism connecting them. The boundary can move with better science. This preserves the insight that experiences require explanation while avoiding the claim that every relational property is merely subjective or that the historical list of primary qualities is final.

A distinction between physical constitution and perceptual response is plausible and scientifically useful. A division into wholly objective primary qualities and wholly unreal secondary qualities is much harder to defend. These are different interpretations of the primary and secondary qualities distinction.

John Locke attributes extension, solidity, shape, number and motion to bodies as primary qualities. Secondary qualities are powers to produce sensations through the constitution of bodies: a body's power to produce a colour experience is distinct from the experience itself. This distinction need not make the power unreal. Nor should the further resemblance thesis, that ideas of primary qualities resemble their causes, be confused with the more modest claim that bodily constitution explains experience.^[ref]

A modern model of colour perception shows what can be retained. For a nonfluorescent surface in fixed viewing geometry, a simplified cone cell response isHere $L$ is the incident spectral irradiance, $R$ the spectral reflectance, and $S_i$ an effective sensitivity for one of three cone cell classes. Neural processing and adaptation also matter, so these responses are not a complete identification of perceived colour. Nevertheless, the model separates the surface, illumination and observer rather than assigning every experienced variation to a changing surface.

It follows that one surface can produce different responses under different illumination. Conversely, distinct spectral reflectance functions can produce the same three responses for a specified illuminant and observer, a case of metamerism. Three weighted integrals do not in general uniquely determine a whole function. Thus identifying experienced colour with one intrinsic surface property loses both the dependence on the observer and the many-to-one character of the response.

The scientific benefits are concrete. A comparison of paints should specify illumination and observer conditions. A measurement intended to characterize a material can instead estimate its spectral reflectance, preserving information that a single colour match discards. In both cases the distinction tells an investigator what to hold fixed and what to vary. It organizes experiments and explains disagreement without requiring that one observer be hallucinating.

However, perceptual variability alone does not distinguish primary qualities from secondary qualities. George Berkeley points out that apparent extension and shape also change with viewpoint and perceiver.^[ref] A circular disc yields different projected shapes at different viewing angles. The stable object is inferred through a model of that variation; it is not simply copied into experience. Primary qualities therefore have no automatic exemption from the interpretative work involved in perception.

Nor is relationality equivalent to subjectivity. In special relativity, measured length depends on an inertial frame, but relations between such measurements are tightly constrained. Conversely, a disposition to affect a specified perceiver under specified conditions can be an objective physical fact. Classifying a property as relational does not settle whether it is real, measurable or explanatory.

The best distinction is consequently functional and revisable: distinguish the experience to be explained from physical properties and relations used to explain it. That retains the scientific benefits of separating constitution, environment and response. It does not establish an immutable list of primary qualities, a simple resemblance relation between experience and object, or a proof of scientific realism.

The distinction supplies a coherent strategy for an empiricist realism, but does not by itself justify that realism. It separates an object's relatively stable physical constitution from its effects on perceivers. The strongest defensible version concerns the explanatory roles of properties, rather than a division between wholly real properties and wholly unreal sensations.

For John Locke, primary qualities include extension, shape, solidity, number and motion; secondary qualities are powers of bodies to produce experiences such as colours and tastes through their constitution. The experienced colour need not resemble the physical cause of that experience. Importantly, a power belonging to a body is not thereby imaginary: the primary and secondary qualities distinction need not deny that an unobserved object has dispositions to affect perceivers.^[ref]

This helps empiricism accommodate perceptual variation without abandoning an external world. A surface can produce different colour experiences under different illumination while keeping approximately the same spectral reflectance. A warm and a cool hand can give different sensations in the same water; this need not mean that the water has two incompatible temperatures. The observer's initial state belongs in the explanation. Controlled changes in illumination, viewing conditions and bodily state allow repeatable predictions about experience. An empiricist can therefore treat physical objects as explanatory sources of regularities in experience, rather than demand that every appearance be copied into the object.

However, this explanatory success does not establish that ideas of primary qualities resemble mind-independent properties. We cannot step outside every perceptual and instrumental relation to compare an experience directly with its alleged original. Moreover, the motion and arrangement of unobserved constituents are themselves theoretical commitments. If empiricism permits only what is immediately given in sensation, the distinction introduces precisely the inference beyond sensation that requires defence. If empiricism permits fallible explanatory inference, scientific realism becomes possible, but the justification comes partly from that additional account of inference.

George Berkeley's challenge is that perceived extension and shape vary with viewpoint and perceiver just as colour does, and that extension cannot be experienced wholly apart from sensible qualities.^[ref] This undermines the simple test “variable appearance means merely secondary”. It does not prove that stable physical properties are absent. An obliquely viewed circular disc can produce an elliptical image; geometrical optics explains the relation between the disc and that image. Variation can be evidence for a systematic relation, rather than evidence against an external cause.

Modern physics also discourages treating Locke's list as an unrevisable inventory. Special relativity makes measured length depend on the relation between an object and an inertial frame; motion was relational even in Principle of Galilean relativity. Neither fact makes the measurements arbitrary. Conversely, spectral reflectance is an objective, measurable property even though perceived colour depends on illumination and the perceiver. Objectivity, relationality, perceptual variability and explanatory fundamentality are distinct issues.

The plausible distinction is consequently between an experience and the physical properties and relations that explain it, with the explanation open to correction. An empiricist realism can use this distinction to explain why appearances change while a world persists. It cannot obtain a proof of the external world, or a privileged catalogue of intrinsic properties, simply by naming some qualities primary. The gain is an empirically disciplined model of perception; its limit is that the realist interpretation still needs an argument.

The visual system must infer relatively stable object properties from images jointly determined by illumination, shape, material and viewpoint. The problem is intrinsically ambiguous; robust performance exploits several constraints and tolerates uncertainty rather than perfectly recovering a unique physical scene from every image.

Even a diffuse model contains a surface-illuminant ambiguity. Ignoring a fixed geometric factor, $N(\lambda )=E(\lambda )R(\lambda )$. For any positive function $g$ that leaves the resulting reflectance physically admissible, define $E^{\prime }=Eg$ and $R^{\prime }=R/g$. Then $E^{\prime }{R}^{\prime }=ER$, so even an observer measuring the complete outgoing spectrum could not distinguish those two explanations from that surface alone. Three cone catches introduce further spectral metamerism. Thus perfect color constancy cannot be obtained by a universal local inversion of three numbers.

For directional optical reflection, an image sample instead depends on an integral such asThe expression sums contributions from incident directions, weighted by the bidirectional reflectance distribution function and projected area. It assumes a local, nonfluorescent optical reflection model and omits emission. A glossy surface therefore reflects aspects of its environment, and moving the observer changes the sampled outgoing direction even if the material is unchanged. Subsurface transport and transmission require further terms or models.

The system can constrain illumination by comparing surfaces, spatial boundaries and changes over time, while using shape and scene layout to distinguish a shadow from a pigment boundary. Cone-gain adjustment can approximately compensate shared spectral changes but cannot solve every mixture of differently colored lights, interreflections and specular components. A spatial average is unreliable if a scene is genuinely dominated by one colored material. A bright region might be a lamp, a highlight or a high-reflectance object, so “assume the brightest point is white” is not a universal solution.

Material judgments require distinguishing diffuse shading from highlights and transparency or translucency cues. Isamu Motoyoshi and colleagues showed that manipulating image statistics, including luminance-distribution skewness, could influence apparent gloss and lightness in their surface-image conditions.^[ref] Such regularities offer efficient cues. They cannot uniquely specify a material: a histogram-preserving spatial permutation changes spatial organization while retaining the luminance histogram and all its moments. That mathematical ambiguity motivates experiments separating histogram cues from geometric consistency; it does not, by itself, predict every appearance judgment after scrambling.

Juno Kim and colleagues directly tested the relation between highlights and diffuse shading. Manipulating their positional and orientation congruence reduced perceived gloss, including when simple proximity to broad luminance maxima was controlled.^[ref] The visual system therefore uses relationships among image structures, not merely the presence of a few bright pixels. The conclusion concerns the tested images and judgments, rather than a claim that one cue explains every shiny or transparent material.

Temporal information and active viewing help further. A highlight can move differently from a surface marking; multiple views constrain geometry, while familiar object structure and expected illumination supply priors. These strategies can fail under unusual lighting or deliberately misleading images. The system must also decide which differences matter: recognizing a material category, judging gloss and estimating spectral reflectance are related but separable goals.

A band ratio image emphasizes differences in spectral reflectance rather than overall brightness. If two corrected band signals are $L_1=k{\rho }_1$ and $L_2=k{\rho }_2$, with the same multiplicative illumination factor $k$, their ratio is ${\rho }_1/{\rho }_2$: common shading or exposure factors cancel. Materials with different spectral slopes or absorption features can therefore separate more clearly than in either band alone.

The cancellation is approximate. Additive atmospheric path radiance, different angular reflectance responses and different band noise do not cancel, and division by a small denominator amplifies errors. Use calibrated, co-registered bands and mask cloud, deep shadow and invalid pixels before interpreting a ratio as a material or vegetation contrast.

Use calibrated multispectral imaging of reflected sunlight, with visible, near-infrared and short-wave-infrared bands. A satellite records radiance in several passbands for each ground pixel. Perform geometric registration and atmospheric correction to estimate spectral reflectance, then account for illumination differences on slopes and mask cloud, water and dense vegetation. A false-colour composite, diagnostic band ratios or a trained statistical classification can separate surface lithologies; field observations and representative spectra validate any mapped contact.

Different minerals have different absorption features: iron-bearing materials affect visible/near-infrared spectral reflectance, while hydroxyl-bearing clay minerals and carbonate-bearing rocks can differ in short-wave-infrared bands. Adjacent patches with reproducibly different spectra and coherent geological boundaries are candidates for lithological contacts. This is particularly useful in dry, exposed terrain. Vegetation, soil cover, similar rock compositions, weathering and topographic shadow can hide or mimic a contact; a colour boundary alone is insufficient.

Choose spatial resolution appreciably finer than the narrowest unit being mapped, with several pixels across that unit. Approximately $10$–$30\mathrm{m}$ is suitable for regional contacts separated by hundreds of metres; metre-scale units require finer imagery or field work. Sentinel-2 provides $10$–$20\mathrm{m}$ bands useful for this purpose, while the reflected-light multispectral bands of Landsat are typically $30\mathrm{m}$. Broad multispectral passbands distinguish many rock assemblages but cannot resolve every narrow mineral absorption feature; hyperspectral imaging is preferable when those features are essential.

The ratio of reflected to incident radiant flux as a function of wavelength, under specified geometrical and illumination conditions. Unlike a perceived colour, spectral reflectance describes a physical response; perceived colour also depends on the incident spectrum and the observer.

Assignment of observations to categories using measured features and a statistical rule. In geological remote sensing, features can be multispectral pixel values or derived spectral reflectance ratios; known field samples provide training labels and independent observations assess errors. Classification boundaries need not coincide with lithological contacts when illumination or cover dominates the signal.