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The probability chain rule makes a sum of sequential predictive log scores equal the log Bayesian model evidence when the forecasts are coherent Bayesian one-step predictions under proper priors. Differences of total scores are therefore log Bayes factors.

For two exhaustive mutually exclusive models of positive prior probability, prior odds compare their probabilities before observing the data. They must be distinguished from the parameter prior distributions within those models. A Bayes factor multiplies these prior odds to produce posterior odds.

A statistician whose work includes Bayes factors.

Homepage: www.stat.cmu.edu/~kass/

For suitable nested models whose common nuisance parameters have matching priors, the Savage-Dickey density ratio expresses a Bayes factor as posterior density divided by prior density at the nested parameter value.

For a binomial distribution count, compare a point null $\theta =1/2$ with the uniform alternative prior distribution on $(0,1)$. The alternative Bayesian model evidence isso the exact Bayes factor favouring the point null is $(n+1)\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{n}{y}\right)2^{-n}$. With standardized deviation $z=2(y-n/2)/\sqrt{n}$, the local normal distribution approximation is $B_{01}\approx \sqrt{2n/\pi }{e}^{-z^2/2}$. At fixed $z$ the frequentist p-value remains approximately constant, while the factor grows like $\sqrt{n}$. This demonstrates the prior-width mechanism behind the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for a Gaussian point null in a discrete sampling model.

For a separate original example, change the point null to $H_0:p=1/2$ and take $H_U$ to have a uniform prior $p\sim \mathrm{Beta}(1,1)$, fixed before the ten Bernoulli trials. Here $p$ is drawn once under $H_U$ and shared by all ten trials: they are independent conditional on $p$. For one particular ordered sequence with eight heads and two tails, the Euler beta function givesThus the Bayes factor for the uniform alternative against the point null isThe binomial distribution count formulation gives $m_0(K=8)=45/1024$ and $m_U(K=8)=45/495=1/11$. Their ratio is again $1024/495$; these count masses must not be combined with the ordered-sequence masses above. The general $B_{01}$ formula at the start of this article puts the point null in the numerator, so it equals $B_{0U}$ here.

In contrast, maximum likelihood estimation gives $\hat{p}=0.8$: differentiating the log-likelihood yields $8/p-2/(1-p)=0$, and the endpoints have zero likelihood. Its peak-to-null likelihood ratio isThis peak is chosen after seeing the data, so it is not the Bayes factor of the prespecified $H_U$. The Bayesian model evidence for $H_U$ averages $L(p)$ over its entire uniform prior; it is smaller than the peak. It is also smaller than $L(0.7)=0.7^{8}0.3^2\approx 0.00518832$. Against the same $p=0.5$ null, a point alternative fixed at $p=0.7$ would give a Bayes factor about $5.31284$, greater than $2.06869$. An integrated alternative need not outperform a point alternative.

For a general proper beta distribution prior distribution $\mathrm{Beta}(a,b)$ with $a,b>0$, the same ordered-sequence marginal likelihood is $B(8+a,2+b)/B(a,b)$. This follows by substituting the normalized prior density into the integral, and shows exactly where the parameter prior distribution changes the Bayes factor. Holding the parameter prior distributions fixed while changing model prior odds leaves that Bayes factor unchanged.