A sufficient statistic has a conditional distribution of the data given that does not depend on the parameter. In a dominated family, the factorization criterion for sufficiency states that this is equivalent to for a nonnegative parameter-free . Bayes' formula then gives a posterior distribution proportional to , because cancels from numerator and normalizing denominator. Thus the posterior depends on the data only through .
For the normal sample,
The first term is parameter-free, so the factorization proves sufficiency of . Combining its likelihood with the normal prior and completing the square gives
The prior predictive distribution of the sample mean is obtained from , independent of :
Define the Bayes factor as the marginal likelihood under divided by that under . The common residual factor cancels, so it is the ratio of the densities of under these two hypotheses:
The reverse Bayes factor is its reciprocal. At ,
for a fixed positive . Thus the frequentist test is at its rejection threshold while fixed prior odds give increasingly strong posterior support for the point null. This is the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for a Gaussian point null: the standardized statistic stays fixed, but the observed effect tends to zero and the fixed-scale alternative spreads predictive mass much more widely. There is no logical contradiction, since the procedures compare hypotheses using different calibrations. For the degenerate the hypotheses coincide and .
Substituting the standardized deviation into the Bayes factor approximation gives
This is only a slight preference for the alternative, despite the small p-value. The two procedures measure different things: the p-value sums a tail under the null hypothesis, while the Bayes factor compares probabilities of the observed count under both models. The uniform alternative prior distribution spreads its probability over many success probabilities that fit the observations poorly. Only a narrow range around has large likelihood, and integrating over the whole alternative penalizes this diffuse prediction.
The prefactor makes the distinction especially clear. At a fixed standardized deviation , the p-value stays approximately , whereas eventually grows with . A fixed diffuse alternative can consequently favour the point null even while a conventional test rejects it. This is the same prior-width mechanism illustrated by the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for a Gaussian point null.
For large , the supplied normal-tail approximation gives
Meanwhile,
Since , the posterior point-null probability decays more slowly. Therefore, for sufficiently large ,
This reversal is the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for a Gaussian point null.
Uniform-alternative binomial Bayes factor Created 2026-10-14 Updated 2026-10-25
For a binomial distribution count, compare a point null with the uniform alternative prior distribution on . The alternative Bayesian model evidence is
so the exact Bayes factor favouring the point null is . With standardized deviation , the local normal distribution approximation is . At fixed the frequentist p-value remains approximately constant, while the factor grows like . This demonstrates the prior-width mechanism behind the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox for a Gaussian point null in a discrete sampling model.
For a separate original example, change the point null to and take to have a uniform prior , fixed before the ten Bernoulli trials. Here is drawn once under and shared by all ten trials: they are independent conditional on . For one particular ordered sequence with eight heads and two tails, the Euler beta function gives
Thus the Bayes factor for the uniform alternative against the point null is
The binomial distribution count formulation gives and . Their ratio is again ; these count masses must not be combined with the ordered-sequence masses above. The general formula at the start of this article puts the point null in the numerator, so it equals here.
In contrast, maximum likelihood estimation gives : differentiating the log-likelihood yields , and the endpoints have zero likelihood. Its peak-to-null likelihood ratio is
This peak is chosen after seeing the data, so it is not the Bayes factor of the prespecified . The Bayesian model evidence for averages over its entire uniform prior; it is smaller than the peak. It is also smaller than . Against the same null, a point alternative fixed at would give a Bayes factor about , greater than . An integrated alternative need not outperform a point alternative.
Figure 1.
A uniform-prior average of the likelihood differs from its maximum
. Original calculation for a stipulated ordered sequence with eight heads and two tails. Left: the likelihood function and its uniform prior average , with the point null at and peak at . Right: the average, fixed value, and peak divided by the same null value . Only the first two comparisons use prespecified alternatives; the peak uses a maximum-likelihood estimate. These are calculated model quantities, not measured frequencies. Details.
For a general proper beta distribution prior distribution with , the same ordered-sequence marginal likelihood is . This follows by substituting the normalized prior density into the integral, and shows exactly where the parameter prior distribution changes the Bayes factor. Holding the parameter prior distributions fixed while changing model prior odds leaves that Bayes factor unchanged.