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A first-order signature specifies sorts, function symbols with specified input and output sorts, and relation symbols with specified input sorts. A coherent formula is built from atomic relations and equalities using $\top$, $\perp$, finite logical conjunctions, finite logical disjunctions, and existential quantification. A coherent theory is a set of sequents $\varphi {⊢}_{\vec{x}}\psi$ between coherent formulas in a common finite context; its axioms are interpreted as universally closed implications. Neither general negation nor universal quantification is allowed inside coherent formulas.

One complete presentation of coherent logic consists of the following axiom and rule schemes, together with the theory's sequents. All displayed formulas have compatible sorts and contexts, and bound variables can be renamed.

Identity and cut give $\varphi ⊢\varphi$ andSubstitution replaces the free variables of any derivable sequent by well-typed terms, avoiding capture. Contexts can be enlarged by unused variables, and permuted or renamed.

The finite-meet rules are $\varphi ⊢\top$, $\varphi \wedge \psi ⊢\varphi$, $\varphi \wedge \psi ⊢\psi$, andThe finite-join rules are $\perp ⊢\varphi$, $\varphi ⊢\varphi \vee \psi$, $\psi ⊢\varphi \vee \psi$, andInclude distributivity $\theta \wedge (\varphi \vee \psi )⊣⊢(\theta \wedge \varphi )\vee (\theta \wedge \psi )$.

Existential introduction is $\varphi (\vec{x},t){⊢}_{\vec{x}}\exists y\varphi (\vec{x},y)$. Existential elimination iswhere $y$ is absent from $\psi$. Equivalently, the quantifier is left adjoint to weakening along the context projection. Include the Frobenius rule in coherent logicIt can also be derived from the usual coherent natural-deduction rules.

Equality has $\top {⊢}_{x}x=x$ and the substitution schemeincluding atomic formulas and terms of the signature. Symmetry, transitivity and congruence for all functions and relations follow. These schemes impose no unintended inhabitedness axiom on a sort.

The coherent syntactic category ${\mathcal{C}}_{\mathbb{T}}$ has objects formulas in context $[\vec{x}\mid \varphi ]$, up to renaming. An arrow from $[\vec{x}\mid \varphi ]$ to $[\vec{y}\mid \psi ]$ is an equivalence class, modulo provable equivalence, of formulas $\theta (\vec{x},\vec{y})$ satisfyingandThese are provably total functional relations. The identity is the equality graph restricted by $\varphi$. If $\theta$ and $\rho$ are consecutive arrows, their composite is represented by $\exists \vec{y}(\theta \wedge \rho )$. Equality, cut and existential rules give the category laws.

A coherent category has finite limits, pullback-stable regular-epi/mono image factorizations, and finite unions of subobjects stable under pullback. We verify these structures syntactically. The terminal object is the empty-context truth formula. Products conjoin formulas in disjoint contexts; equalizers add equality of the two output tuples. For a functional relation $\theta$, its image in the target is represented by $\exists \vec{x}\theta$. Its factor onto that image is regular epic: two arrows out of the image agreeing on the source agree by existential elimination, and the same argument with the kernel pair gives the coequalizer property. Frobenius makes these image factorizations stable under pullback.

Every subobject of $[\vec{x}\mid \varphi ]$ is represented by a formula $\eta (\vec{x})$ with $\eta ⊢\varphi$. Indeed, take the existential image of a monic functional relation; uniqueness makes its map to that image an isomorphism. Subobject inclusion is exactly provable implication. Finite unions are consequently disjunctions, with bottom as the empty subobject; distributivity and substitution make them pullback-stable. Hence ${\mathcal{C}}_{\mathbb{T}}$ is coherent.

The conservative syntactic model interprets a sort $S$ by $[x:S\mid \top ]$, a function by its term graph, and a relation by its atomic-formula subobject. Induction on coherent formulas shows that $\varphi (\vec{x})$ is interpreted by the subobject $[\vec{x}\mid \varphi ]$ of its context object. It satisfies every theory axiom by construction. Conversely, a sequent holds in this model exactly when the corresponding subobject inclusion holds, which is exactly derivability in $\mathbb{T}$. ThereforeThis is conservativity for coherent sequents, not a claim about non-coherent formulas.

Every countable structure in a countable first-order language has a Scott sentence whose countable models are precisely its isomorphic copies. In particular two countable structures with the same countable infinitary logic sentences are isomorphic. Countability of both structures is essential to the back-and-forth conclusion; the sentence need not exclude uncountable models.

Let $M$ be a nonempty countable structure in a countable first-order language. The countable infinitary logic $L_{{\omega }_1,\omega }$ permits countable logical conjunctions and logical disjunctions, but only finite strings of quantifiers and finitely many free variables in each formula. We construct a Scott formula ${\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{x})$ for every finite tuple $\bar{a}$ from $M$ and every countable ordinal $\alpha$.

At stage zero, let ${\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^0$ be the conjunction of all atomic formulas true of $\bar{a}$ and the negations of all atomic formulas false of $\bar{a}$. Include atomic formulas involving arbitrary terms and constants, not just relation symbols applied directly to variables. There are only countably many such formulas. This complete atomic description ensures that matching tuples determine a partial isomorphism of structures.

At successors putAt a nonzero limit ordinal $\lambda <{\omega }_1$, put ${\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\lambda }={\bigwedge }_{\beta <\lambda }{\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\beta }$. All these are formulas of countable infinitary logic: each indexing set is countable, and the free variables are only the fixed finite tuple. Rename bound variables when necessary. Transfinite induction also shows $M\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{a})$.

For tuples of the same length within $M$, define $\bar{a}{\equiv }_{\alpha }\bar{b}$ by $M\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{b})$. Induction identifies this with the usual symmetric back-and-forth method equivalence: the tuples have the same atomic description at stage zero, and at a successor every one-element extension on either side has a matching extension at the previous stage. Thus these are decreasing equivalence relations, simultaneously for every finite tuple length.

There are only countably many pairs of finite tuples in $M$. A pair can cease to be equivalent at most once. The supremum of the first separation stages of all pairs that separate below ${\omega }_1$ is a countable ordinal. Choose a countable $\alpha$ at least that supremum. No pair can first separate at $\alpha +1$, soThis justifies stabilization without assuming that all tuples stabilize at one predetermined finite stage.

Now form the following Scott sentence, where the case $n=0$ has no displayed variables or quantifiers:It is a sentence of countable infinitary logic, because the family of all finite tuples is countable. The stabilization above and the truth of ${\varphi }_{\varnothing }^{\alpha }$ show $M\models {\sigma }_M$.

Suppose a countable structure $N$ satisfies ${\sigma }_M$. Start with the empty matching tuples, and maintain $N\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha }(\bar{b})$. The corresponding conjunct of ${\sigma }_M$ upgrades this to $N\models {\varphi }_{\bar{a}}^{\alpha +1}(\bar{b})$. The existential conjuncts extend the match by any specified element of $M$. The universal-disjunction conjunct extends it by any specified element of $N$. The atomic formula information makes a new element on one side match a new element on the other, and makes repeated elements agree with their earlier matches.

Enumerate both structures and alternate these two extension steps, including the least element not yet covered at each step. The union is a bijection preserving and reflecting every atomic formula, hence an isomorphism; for function symbols, eventually include both a tuple and the value of its function term to see explicitly that the function is preserved. For finite structures the same construction stops when both are covered. Conversely every isomorphic copy of $M$ satisfies ${\sigma }_M$, since isomorphisms preserve formulas of countable infinitary logic by induction on their construction. ThereforeIf countable $M,N$ have the same $L_{{\omega }_1,\omega }$ sentences, $N$ satisfies this Scott sentence of $M$ and is isomorphic to $M$. This proves Scott isomorphism theorem.

Let $R={\prod }_i{\mathcal{M}}_i/F$ be the reduced product by a proper filter on a set. Its underlying equivalence relation is $f\sim g$ when $\{i:f(i)=g(i)\}\in F$. Operations are interpreted coordinatewise, and a relation holds of the classes exactly when its coordinate truth set belongs to $F$.

Evaluation of a first-order term commutes with passage to the quotient, by mathematical induction on terms. Consequently the desired equivalence holds for every atomic formula, including logical equality. For a formula $\theta$ and representatives $\bar{f}$, write $S_{\theta }=\{i:{\mathcal{M}}_i\models \theta (\bar{f}(i))\}$.

For logical conjunction, $S_{\theta \wedge \psi }=S_{\theta }\cap S_{\psi }$. The filter on a set axioms giveThus the induction hypothesis transfers a conjunction in both directions.

For existential quantification, first suppose $R\models \exists y\theta (y,[\bar{f}])$. Choose a representative $g$ of a witness. Induction gives $S_{\theta (g,\bar{f})}\in F$, and this set is contained in $S_{\exists y\theta }$. Upward closure therefore gives $S_{\exists y\theta }\in F$.

Conversely, suppose $A=S_{\exists y\theta }\in F$. For each $i\in A$, choose a coordinate witness $g(i)$, and choose an arbitrary element of $M_i$ outside $A$. These simultaneous choices use the axiom of choice, as does the usual product construction. Then $A\subseteq S_{\theta (g,\bar{f})}$, so that truth set belongs to $F$. Induction gives $R\models \theta ([g],[\bar{f}])$, providing the required witness. Thereforefor every primitive positive formula. The exam's tame formulas are exactly this fragment, built using logical conjunction and existential quantification. No ultrafilter dichotomy was used.

We prove closure under the defining schemes for primitive recursive functions, keeping all unbounded existential variables outside a bounded arithmetic formula. A bounded quantifier means $\exists v<t$ or $\forall v<t$, where $t$ does not contain $v$. All formulas are interpreted in the standard natural numbers.

First we need a finite sequence code using only the permitted language of ordered rings. Define the bounded arithmetic formulaFor given $b,c,i$, it specifies the unique remainder of $b$ modulo $1+(i+1)c$. In particular the quotient and remainder variables are bounded by arithmetic terms; division is not a new language symbol.

Every finite list $a_0,\dots ,a_n$ can be coded by some pair $b,c$. Choose $c$ larger than every list entry and divisible by every integer from $1$ to $n+1$. The moduli $m_i=1+(i+1)c$ are pairwise coprime. Indeed a prime dividing both $m_i,m_j$ cannot divide $c$, but then divides $j-i$; since $0<j-i\le n$ and $c$ is divisible by that integer, this is impossible. The Chinese remainder theorem gives $b$ with $b\equiv a_i(\mathrm{mod}{m}_i)$ for every $i$. Since $a_i<c<m_i$, each $B(b,c,i,a_i)$ holds. This is Gödel beta-function sequence coding. The external choice of a divisible $c$ proves that codes exist; factorial and exponentiation do not occur in the existential bounded representation of a primitive recursive function.

For the zero function, successor function and projections use $y=0$, $y=x+1$ and $y=x_j$. These formulas need no auxiliary variables. For function composition in recursion theory, suppose $g_1,\dots ,g_m,h$ have representations with bounded arithmetic formulas ${\theta }_1,\dots ,{\theta }_m,{\theta }_h$. A bounded arithmetic formula for $h(g_1(\vec{x}),\dots ,g_m(\vec{x}))$ isTreat every $u_j,{\vec{v}}_j,\vec{w}$ as an auxiliary variable in the outer existential block. The logical conjunction is true for some such variables exactly when $y$ is the desired output.

Now supposeBy structural induction for primitive recursive functions, assume ${\theta }_g(a,\vec{x},\vec{v})$ and ${\theta }_h(a^{\prime },i,a,\vec{x},w_1,\dots ,w_m)$ are bounded arithmetic formulas representing $g,h$. We code the values $f(0,\vec{x}),\dots ,f(n,\vec{x})$ with $b,c$. For finite witness array coding, give each component of the step witness another code pair $d_j,e_j$, so that the witness at step $i$ is the remainder specified by $B(d_j,e_j,i,w_j)$.

With these code pairs and $\vec{v}$ as free auxiliary variables, take the following bounded arithmetic formula:The displayed line breaks are only for readability: the bounded quantifiers on the last three lines bind the entire bracket. If $m=0$, their empty block and logical conjunction are omitted. Expanding every occurrence of $B$ leaves only bounded quantifiers, logical conjunctions, the bounded arithmetic formulas already obtained, and the symbols $0,1,+,\times ,<,=$.

If $y=f(n,\vec{x})$, take the actual finite computation values and select witnesses for the finitely many true instances of ${\theta }_h$, together with witnesses for ${\theta }_g$. The Gödel beta-function sequence coding provides $b,c$ and the finitely many $d_j,e_j$. These make $\varphi$ true. Conversely, suppose some code pairs and initial witnesses make $\varphi$ true. The unique remainders of $b$ give values $a_0,\dots ,a_n$. The initial clause makes $a_0=g(\vec{x})$. Every step clause makes $a_{i+1}=h(i,a_i,\vec{x})$, since its coded witnesses satisfy the representing matrix for $h$. Induction on $i$ gives $a_i=f(i,\vec{x})$, and the final remainder clause gives $y=a_n$. This argument includes $n=0$, when the step condition is empty.

Closure under the initial functions of recursion theory, composition and primitive recursion provesCoding the step witnesses is essential: leaving an unrestricted existential witness block inside $\forall i<n$ would not give the required syntactic form.

A theory is recursively axiomatizable when it has an effective enumeration of axioms, equivalently when its deductive closure is computably enumerable. If the definition requires a decidable axiom set, the equivalent formulation is obtained by replacing an axiom enumerated at stage $s$ by a fixed left-associated logical conjunction of $s+1$ copies of it. To recognize a proposed padded axiom, inspect its finitely many possible decompositions into repeated conjuncts and check the corresponding finite enumeration stages. The padding preserves logical equivalence, so the resulting decidable axiom set generates the same theory. In either convention, enumerate formal proofs using the finite sets of axioms seen so far. This effectively enumerates every theorem.

Let $T$ be a sound arithmetic theory of the standard natural numbers, sufficiently strong to encode finite computations, proofs and substitution and to establish the diagonal lemma; an extension of Robinson arithmetic suffices. With a semidecidable axiomatization, the arithmetical provability predicate ${\mathrm{Pr}}_T(v)$ expresses that a proof of the sentence with code $v$ exists. A proof certificate can include enumeration stages for its axioms, so this predicate is arithmetically expressible even when the given axiom set is only computably enumerable.

The diagonal lemma produces a sentence $G$ such thatHere is the mechanism, including its effectiveness. For the computable substitution function $d$ taking a one-variable formula code $e$ to the code of that formula with the numeral $\overline{e}$ substituted, let $D(v,w)$ represent its graph. Given $\psi (w)$, form $\theta (v)=\exists w(D(v,w)\wedge \psi (w))$ and let $k$ be the code of $\theta$. The sentence $\theta (\overline{k})$ has code $d(k)$. Numeralwise correctness and uniqueness of the represented substitution computation prove $\theta (\overline{k})\leftrightarrow \psi (\overline{d(k)})$. This constructs a fixed point effectively from the code of $\psi$. Applying it to $\psi =\neg {\mathrm{Pr}}_T$ gives $G$.

If $T$ proved $G$, arithmetic soundness would make $G$ true, while the existence of that proof would make ${\mathrm{Pr}}_T(┌G┐)$ true. The displayed equivalence would then make $G$ false, a contradiction. Thus $T$ does not prove $G$. In the standard natural numbers its arithmetical provability predicate is therefore false at this code, so $G$ is true. Arithmetic soundness now rules out a proof of $\neg G$ as well. Hence $T$ is incomplete: neither $G$ nor $\neg G$ is a theorem, and $G$ is true.

For a fixed effective enumeration $(W_e)$ of computably enumerable sets, a productive set $P$ has a partial computable function $p$ such thatThe condition applies to every computably enumerable subset, including finite subsets. No condition is imposed on $p(e)$ when the inclusion fails.

Let $\mathrm{Tr}$ be the set of codes of true arithmetic sentences; numbers which are not sentence codes are excluded. Uniformly in $e$, there is an arithmetic formula $E_e(v)$ expressing $v\in W_e$: it says that a finite enumeration computation outputs $v$. Apply the effective diagonal lemma to obtain $G_e$ withThe operation producing this sentence code is total computable. Suppose $W_e\subseteq \mathrm{Tr}$. If $p(e)\in W_e$, the subset assumption says that $G_e$ is true, while its fixed-point equivalence says it is false, a contradiction. Thus $p(e)\notin W_e$. The same equivalence now says $G_e$ is true, so $p(e)\in \mathrm{Tr}$. We have provedTherefore arithmetic truth is a productive set. This proves productivity of arithmetic truth. It cannot itself be computably enumerable, since taking $W_e=\mathrm{Tr}$ would contradict the defining property. Applying the productive procedure to the enumerable theorem set of a sound arithmetic theory also gives a true sentence outside that theory. The productive construction does not require the enumerable subset of truths to be a theory or to be deductively closed.

Use relative constructible level recognition. The finite coding conditions matter here: merely writing “every set is relatively constructible” inside an arbitrary transitive set does not ensure that its computations are correct.

Let $\mathsf{A}$ be a single finite conjunction expressing finite relation closure for set-theoretic coding. Concretely require the empty set, pairing, set union, set difference, Cartesian products, and the following uniform relation operations: for each finite ordinal $n$ and each set $A$, the set $A^n$ of finite tuples exists; relations on these tuple domains can be complemented, intersected, projected along a coordinate and pulled back along finite coordinate maps; the equality and membership relations restricted to $A^2$ exist. These are finitely many first-order closure assertions with $n$ quantified, not an axiom schema. Each operation is specified by its usual elementwise membership equivalence. Transitivity makes the operations correct externally. Finite tuple domains are also correct: every individual finite tuple is already present by pairing and union.

These conditions make satisfaction for a set structure absolute. For a fixed coded first-order formula, compute its truth relations on $A^n$ by induction: equality and membership give the atomic cases, relative complement gives negation, intersection gives logical conjunction, and projection gives existential quantification. All required truth tables exist by $\mathsf{A}$ and agree with the actual ones. Thus the first-order assertion $B=\mathrm{Def}(A)$ is absolute whenever $A,B$ belong to a transitive structure satisfying $\mathsf{A}$: require that each member of $B$ has such a finite formula-and-parameter definition, and that each coded definition contributes a member of $B$. Codes are finite objects; no truth predicate for the ambient universe is being used.

Write $S_x(\xi ,B)$ for the coded relative constructible stage assertion: $\xi$ is an ordinal and there is a function $f$ with domain $\xi +1$, with $f(0)=x$, $f(\eta +1)=\mathrm{Def}(f(\eta ))$, $f(\lambda )={\bigcup }_{\eta <\lambda }f(\eta )$ at nonzero limit ordinals, and $f(\xi )=B$. Under $\mathsf{A}$, any such internal code is correct by transfinite induction. Restrictions of a code to shorter domains exist by the relation operations. Define the one-free-variable first-order formulaAll displayed abbreviations expand into first-order formulas of the membership language.

Suppose $M$ is transitive, $X\in M$, and $M\models \Phi (X)$. Let $I$ be the externally defined set of indices of stage codes in $M$. It contains $0$, is downward closed by restricting codes, and has no largest member by the last conjunct. Thus $I$ is a nonzero limit ordinal $\alpha$. Correctness of stage codes gives $L_{\xi }(X)\in M$ for $\xi <\alpha$, hence $L_{\xi }(X)\subseteq M$ by transitivity. Conversely the exhaustion conjunct puts every $y\in M$ in some such level. Therefore

For the converse, every $L_{\alpha }(X)$ with nonzero limit $\alpha$ satisfies $\mathsf{A}$: each listed operation on parameters from one level is definable at finitely many later levels, still below $\alpha$. Moreover stage histories appear below every limit constructible level. Here is the essential limit step of that lemma. If the histories $f_{\eta }$ for $\eta <\lambda$ are available in $L_{\lambda }(X)$, the correct predicate $S_X$ defines their graph of endpoints as a subset of $L_{\lambda }(X)$. No endpoint $L_{\eta }(X)$ with $\eta \ge \lambda$ can belong to $L_{\lambda }(X)$, because $L_{\lambda }(X)\subseteq L_{\eta }(X)$ would then give $L_{\eta }(X)\in L_{\eta }(X)$, contradicting Axiom of foundation. The defined graph therefore has domain exactly $\lambda$. Adjoining its final pair $(\lambda ,L_{\lambda }(X))$ takes finitely many more stages. Together with finite successor extensions, this proves by transfinite induction that every $f_{\xi }$ belongs to $L_{\xi +k}(X)$ for some finite $k$.

Thus all histories for $\xi <\alpha$ belong to $L_{\alpha }(X)$. Exhaustion follows from continuity, and $\xi +1<\alpha$ supplies a larger represented stage. Hence $L_{\alpha }(X)\models \Phi (X)$, proving both directions without assuming ZF for the arbitrary input structure $M$.

Use standard notation for forcing: $q\le p$ means that $q$ is stronger. A generic filter is nonempty, upward closed and downward directed, and meets every dense subset of a forcing order in the ground model. Names below are forcing names in $M$, with pairs ordered as $(\text{name},\text{condition})$.

The semantic forcing relation isHere ${\tau }^K=\mathrm{val}(\tau ,K)$ is the evaluation of a forcing name. Countability of $M$ supplies such generic filters through every condition by the Rasiowa–Sikorski lemma.

Define the syntactic forcing relation by mutual well-founded recursion on the forcing names for the atomic cases, then induction on the first-order formula. Its membership clause isFor equality, first abbreviateand set $p{⊩}^{\ast }\sigma =\tau$ exactly when both inclusions hold. Each recursive call lowers the rank of at least one forcing name without raising the other. This makes the mutual recursion well-founded.

For a basis of connectives consisting of logical conjunction, negation and existential quantification, the remaining clauses areThe last line is the existential clause of syntactic forcing; witnesses need only occur densely, rather than be forced by $p$ itself with one preselected name. Other connectives are defined by logical abbreviations. The recursion gives a definable relation inside $M$ for each fixed first-order formula, with quantification over the class of its names. If $\mathbb{P}$ has no greatest element, use canonical forcing names $\check{a}=\{(\check{b},p):b\in a,p\in \mathbb{P}\}$, which still evaluate to $a$. It also proves monotonicity: strengthening a condition preserves what it forces. The forcing theorem identifies the two relations and supplies the truth lemma.

The countable form of the omitting types theorem is as follows. Let $L$ be a countable first-order language and $T$ a consistent first-order theory in $L$. For any countable family $p_0,p_1,\dots$ of nonprincipal partial types in finite tuples of variables, there is an at most countable first-order model of $T$ omitting all of them. Nonprincipality means that no $T$-consistent first-order formula $\theta (\mathbf{x})$ entails every member of the type modulo $T$. A complete first-order theory with nonisolated complete types is the usual special case; neither an uncountable language nor an arbitrary uncountable family is covered by this statement.

Use the Godel completeness theorem to pass between consistency and the existence of a first-order model. Adjoin a countable stock $C$ of new constants. Construct finite conditions ${\Gamma }_s$ with $T\cup {\Gamma }_s$ consistent, interleaving three countable lists of requirements: decide each $L(C)$-sentence; provide a fresh constant witness for each existential sentence; and, for each $p_i$ and each tuple $\mathbf{t}$ of closed terms of its arity, add $\neg \psi (\mathbf{t})$ for some $\psi \in p_i$. Sentence decisions preserve consistency by choosing a consistent sign. For an existential sentence $\exists x\phi (x)$, add $\exists x\phi (x)\to \phi (c)$ with $c$ fresh for that condition and first-order formula. This is consistent: any first-order model of the old condition can interpret $c$ as a witness if one exists, and otherwise arbitrarily in the nonempty domain.

The omission step is the key Henkin omission extension lemma. Let $\sigma (\mathbf{c})$ be the logical conjunction of the current finite condition, listing every new constant occurring either there or in $\mathbf{t}$. If adding $\neg \psi (\mathbf{t})$ were inconsistent for every $\psi \in p_i$, then $T$ would entail $\sigma (\mathbf{c})\to \psi (\mathbf{t}(\mathbf{c}))$ for each such $\psi$. Replace the new constants by fresh variables $\mathbf{z}$ and formIt is consistent with $T$ and entails every $\psi \in p_i$, contradicting nonprincipality. Hence some omission extension is consistent. The construction need not be computable; countability merely permits all these requirements to be scheduled.

Let $T^{\ast }$ be the deductive closure of $T\cup {\bigcup }_s{\Gamma }_s$. It is consistent by the finite character of formal proofs, complete by sentence decisions, and has the Henkin witness property. Its term model consists of closed terms modulo provable logical equality and has at most countably many elements. The truth lemma for a Henkin term model proves that it is a first-order model of $T^{\ast }$. Every tuple in it is represented by closed terms, whose scheduled omission requirement supplies a negated member of each corresponding type. Thus

A universal sentence has the form $\forall \mathbf{x}\psi (\mathbf{x})$ with quantifier-free $\psi$, including an empty quantifier block. Embeddings preserve and reflect quantifier-free truth, so universal sentences pass to substructures of a first-order structure. For the converse Łoś-Tarski preservation theorem, let $T_{\forall }$ be all universal consequences of an arbitrary first-order theory $T$, and take $A\models T_{\forall }$. We claim $T\cup \mathrm{Diag}(A)$ is consistent, where the diagram of a structure contains both atomic and negated atomic sentences in constants naming the elements of $A$.

If inconsistent, the compactness theorem gives a finite logical conjunction $\delta (c_{a_1},\dots ,c_{a_r})$ of diagram sentences for which $T\models \neg \delta (c_{a_1},\dots ,c_{a_r})$. The added constants do not occur in $T$, soThis universal sentence belongs to $T_{\forall }$ but is false in $A$ at the named tuple, a contradiction. The compactness theorem therefore produces $B\models T$ containing an isomorphic embedded copy of $A$. The signed diagram ensures a genuine substructure of a first-order structure: functions are preserved, constants are included and relations are preserved and reflected. If the first-order model class of $T$ is closed under substructures of a first-order structure, this copy, and hence $A$, is a first-order model of $T$. We have provedNo countability assumption is needed for this second argument. An inconsistent first-order theory is covered as well, with a universally false axiom and an empty first-order model class.

Use the Gödel-Gentzen negative translation, writing $A^N$ for the translated first-order formula. On atomic formulas $P$, including logical equality, put $P^N=\neg \neg P$, and put ${\perp }^N=\perp$. Extend recursively byLogical negation abbreviates logical implication to logical falsity, so $(\neg A{)}^N=\neg A^N$. The displayed logical disjunction and existential clauses are intuitionistically equivalent to the usual negative clauses $\neg (\neg A^N\wedge \neg B^N)$ and $\neg \forall x\neg A^N$, respectively. Thus these clauses specify the same negative interpretation. Translation commutes with capture-avoiding substitution of terms for free variables.

First prove by structural induction the stability of a formula under double negation:Every double logical negation is stable, since intuitionistic first-order logic proves $\neg \neg \neg \neg C\to \neg \neg C$; logical falsity is stable as well. Stability passes to logical conjunction by obtaining double logical negation of each component. For a logical implication $C\to D$ with stable $D$, assume $\neg \neg (C\to D)$ and $C$. An assumption $\neg D$ would give $\neg (C\to D)$, a contradiction, so $\neg \neg D$ and then $D$. For a universal first-order formula, $\neg \neg \forall xC(x)$ implies $\neg \neg C(y)$ for arbitrary fresh $y$; use stability pointwise and generalize. Logical disjunction and existential translations are already double negations. This proves all cases.

Now regard classical first-order natural deduction as intuitionistic natural deduction plus unrestricted double-negation elimination, and induct on a classical derivation. The rules for logical conjunction, logical implication, universal quantification and logical falsity translate directly. Logical disjunction introduction gives $A^N\vee B^N$ and then its double logical negation. For logical disjunction elimination, the translated premise is $\neg \neg (A^N\vee B^N)$ and the two translated branches yield the stable conclusion $C^N$. Assuming $\neg C^N$ makes each branch contradictory, giving $\neg A^N$ and $\neg B^N$, hence $\neg (A^N\vee B^N)$, which contradicts the premise. We have $\neg \neg C^N$ and remove it by stability.

Existential introduction likewise adds a double logical negation to the ordinary witness introduction. In existential elimination, the witness branch $A^N(y)⊢C^N$ has the original fresh-variable condition. Assuming $\neg C^N$ makes that branch give $\neg A^N(y)$; generalization gives $\forall y\neg A^N(y)$ and therefore $\neg \exists y{A}^N(y)$, contradicting the translated premise. Again stability supplies $C^N$. The universal-rule side conditions are preserved because the translation introduces no new free variables.

For logical equality, reflexivity gives $t=t$ and then its double logical negation. For substitution, from $\neg \neg (s=t)$ and $A^N(s)$, temporarily assume $\neg A^N(t)$. An assumption $s=t$ would transport $A^N(s)$ to $A^N(t)$ by intuitionistic logical equality substitution, so it gives a contradiction and hence $\neg (s=t)$. The first premise contradicts this. Thus $\neg \neg A^N(t)$ holds and stability gives $A^N(t)$. Finally a classical double-negation elimination step translates precisely to $\neg \neg A^N\to A^N$, already proved. Every rule is therefore covered, giving negative translation of a classical proof:In particular a classical thesis has an intuitionistic, constructive translated proof. If nonlogical assumptions are present, they must be translated too.

In classical logic, double-negation elimination gives $P^N\leftrightarrow P$ on atoms. Structural induction propagates equivalence through logical conjunction, logical implication and both quantifiers, and removes the added double negations on logical disjunction and existence. Therefore

Under the Curry-Howard correspondence, Intuitionistic propositional logic propositions are types and proofs are typed terms. Assumptions correspond to typed variables. The logical implication $A\to B$ corresponds to the function type, logical conjunction $A\wedge B$ to the product type, logical disjunction $A\vee B$ to the sum type, logical truth to the unit type, and logical falsity to the empty type.

The rules of natural deduction become term constructors. Implication introduction sends a derivation of $B$ from a variable $x:A$ to the abstraction $\lambda x.M:A\to B$, while implication elimination becomes application $MN$. Pairing and projection implement conjunction, and injections with case analysis implement disjunction. Under this correspondence, normalization of proofs is computation by beta reduction in the simply typed lambda calculus.

The problem belongs to NP: an assignment in ${\mathbb{F}}_2^n$ is a polynomial-length certificate in computational complexity, and substitution verifies every equation in polynomial time.

For NP-hardness, reduce the Circuit satisfiability problem. Introduce one variable in ${\mathbb{F}}_2$ for every wire of a Boolean circuit. A logical negation gate $w=\neg u$ is enforced by $w=1-u$, and a logical conjunction gate $w=u\wedge v$ is enforced by $w=uv$. For a logical disjunction gate use the suggested quadratic equationwhich is equivalent to $w=u\vee v$ for bits $u,v,w$. Add the linear equation $w_{\mathrm{out}}=1$ for the designated output wire.

The construction introduces one variable and one equation per wire or gate, so it is a polynomial-time many-one reduction. A satisfying circuit input extends uniquely through its gates to a solution of the equations, and any solution gives a consistent accepting circuit computation. Since circuit satisfiability is NP-complete, quadratic-equation satisfiability over F2 is therefore

A primitive positive formula is generated from atomic formulas using only logical conjunction and existential quantification. It can be put in the form $\exists \bar{y}{\bigwedge }_j{\theta }_j(\bar{x},\bar{y})$ with each ${\theta }_j$ atomic. The exam terminology tame formula refers to this fragment. Its reduced product transfer needs only filter intersection and upward closure, together with coordinatewise choices of witnesses.

Propositional logic studies reasoning with whole propositions represented by letters such as $p$ and $q$, and propositional formulas built from them using logical connectives. The classical two-valued, truth-functional presentation below assigns each primitive proposition either true or false: each compound value depends only on its component values. This is classical propositional logic; other systems, including Intuitionistic propositional logic, have different semantics and rules.

Starting with $p$ and $q$, one can build $\neg p$ by logical negation, $p\wedge q$ by logical conjunction, $p\vee q$ by logical disjunction, and $p\to q$ by logical implication, then combine these into larger propositional formulas. Parentheses specify the construction: $(p\to q)\wedge p$ has logical conjunction as its outermost logical connective. Primitive propositions have no internal structure in this language; a first-order formula can additionally describe objects and quantify over them. The formation rules are given in forall x: Calgary, chapter 6.

The following truth table shows the four basic logical connectives. Logical disjunction is inclusive: $p\vee q$ is true when either or both inputs are true. Classical logical implication has exactly the same values as $\neg p\vee q$; its only false row has $p$ true and $q$ false. These truth conditions are specified in forall x: Calgary, chapter 9.

Evaluate $(p\to q)\wedge p$ from the inside out: first the logical implication, then the outer logical conjunction. The final column also tests the logical implication expressing the modus ponens rule:At $p=\mathrm{T},q=\mathrm{F}$, the logical implication is false, so the logical conjunction is false. The abstract syntax tree below separates the construction of the propositional formula from the values propagated through it. Both occurrences of $p$ receive the same value from the Boolean valuation. With the opposite assignment $p=\mathrm{F},q=\mathrm{T}$, the logical implication is true but the logical conjunction is still false because its second input $p$ is false. Recursive evaluation and exhaustive truth tables are explained in forall x: Calgary, chapter 11.

The last column is always true: $((p\to q)\wedge p)\to q$ is a tautology. This expresses the logical validity of the modus ponens rule: whenever both premises $p\to q$ and $p$ are true, $q$ is true. It does not say the premises are true under every Boolean valuation; their logical conjunction is true only on the first row. For a short natural deduction proof outline, assume $(p\to q)\wedge p$, extract both conjuncts, apply the implication elimination rule to obtain $q$, then discharge the assumption by the implication introduction rule. See forall x: Calgary, sections 17.3–17.5.

Three tests answer different questions: Boolean satisfiability requires at least one true row, a tautology requires every row true, and a contradiction has every row false. Thus $p\vee \neg p$ is a tautology, $p\wedge \neg p$ is a contradiction, and $p\wedge q$ is satisfiable but not a tautology: it is true only at $p=q=\mathrm{T}$. See forall x: Calgary, sections 12.1–12.4.

Propositional logic is useful because an inference pattern can be checked once and reused for many choices of propositions. Its beauty is that a finite truth table completely settles classical truth-functional questions about a fixed propositional formula. But logical validity does not verify real atomic claims. If $p$ means “the switch is closed” and $q$ means “the lamp is lit”, a valid use of the modus ponens rule still requires establishing its premises about the apparatus; the truth table supplies neither an observation nor a causal explanation. See forall x: Calgary, chapter 2 and chapter 10.