A subgame perfect equilibrium is a strategy profile inducing a Nash equilibrium in every subgame, including subgames not reached during equilibrium play. A proper subgame starts at a node that forms a singleton information set, includes all its descendants, and does not cut any other information set; one cannot treat indistinguishable nodes as separate games.
The requirement excludes noncredible threats. Suppose an entrant chooses Out, giving both players , or Enter. After Enter, an incumbent chooses Fight with payoffs or Accommodate with payoffs , with entrant payoff first. Out together with a prescribed Fight is a Nash equilibrium: the threat deters entry and the incumbent's off-path action does not change its realized payoff. It is not a subgame perfect equilibrium, because after entry the incumbent prefers to . The subgame-perfect outcome is Enter followed by Accommodate.
In finite perfect-information games, backward induction in games constructs such profiles. More generally, continuation subgames may require solving simultaneous-move games in mixed strategies, as in an all-pay contest. Node-by-node optimization cannot ignore information sets in games of imperfect information.

Ancestors (5)

  1. Game theory
  2. Mathematical optimization
  3. Area of mathematics
  4. Mathematics
  5. Home

Synonyms (1)

Discussion (0) New discussion

There are no discussions about this article yet.

Articles by others on the same topic (1)

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) is a refinement of Nash Equilibrium used in game theory, specifically in the context of extensive-form games, which can be represented by a tree-like structure. In an SPE, the strategy profile is not only a Nash Equilibrium in the game as a whole but also remains a Nash Equilibrium in every subgame of that game.