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Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Quantum information 1 d Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
The map sends to , to , and to . These output columns are mutually orthogonal, with squared norms . ConsequentlyandNecessity follows from preserving the norm of ; sufficiency follows because the three columns are then an orthonormal basis. Merely requiring would establish invertibility but not unitarity. This is the weighted permutation unitarity criterion.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Quantum information 1 c Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
Swap the first two computational vectors and fix the third:This permutation matrix has orthonormal columns; equivalently, and , proving unitarity. Its first column gives , as required. A unitary must also specify what happens to the rest of the basis, which is why a single outer product alone would not suffice.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Quantum information 1 a Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
For the three given qutrit vectors, and . Taking the complex conjugate in the bra is essential. Their squared norms are , andThus they are an orthonormal set of three vectors in the three-dimensional inner product space . Such a set is linearly independent and spans the space, so it is an orthonormal basis.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 3 g Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
There is exactly one such nontrivial game for every : the unanimity game requiring every player. PutIt is a simple cooperative game, and permuting players preserves every coalition value. Thus it has the required symmetry of players in a cooperative game. It is also a convex cooperative game: if both are winning, all four terms in the supermodular inequality have value ; if exactly one is winning, their union is and their intersection loses, giving equality ; if neither wins, the right-hand side is zero and the inequality follows from nonnegativity. For the same definition gives the sole player value .
To prove uniqueness, first establish that convex simple games are unanimity games. If are winning coalitions, the supermodular inequality givesso their intersection is also winning. The family of winning coalitions is finite and nonempty. Its intersection is therefore winning and nonempty, since the empty coalition loses. Every winning coalition contains , and monotonicity makes every superset of winning. Hence .
If were a proper nonempty subset of , take and , and let . Then contains and wins, whereas loses. This violates symmetry of players in a cooperative game, which requires those two coalition values to agree. Thus , proving the claimed count. The “nontrivial” convention excludes the identically zero game; if that degenerate game were also called simple, it would supply one additional symmetric convex example.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 3 f Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
A loop-free induced subgraph game is a convex cooperative game if and only if every edge weight is nonnegative. Necessity follows by applying the supermodular inequality to and . Since both singleton values and the empty value are zero,
Conversely, direct cancellation of common edge contributions gives, for any coalitions ,Every summand is nonnegative, proving that is a supermodular set function and hence convexity. Equivalently, a player's marginal contribution to is , which cannot decrease as grows. This establishes the convexity criterion for an induced subgraph game directly.[ref]
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 3 e Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
No. Two positive self-loops and one negative edge give a simple cooperative game with an empty core of a cooperative game. Give players loop weights , put , and give every other loop and edge weight zero. For a coalition ,Thus a coalition wins exactly when it contains player or player . This is monotone, has values in , and satisfies . Extra players for any do not alter any coalition value.
The core singleton inequalities would require , and for every other player, while efficiency requires . These requirements are inconsistent. Equivalently, the two disjoint winning singleton coalitions leave no veto player. Signed weights are essential to this particular representation and are permitted in the induced subgraph game model.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 3 d Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
Yes; without self-loops, such a nontrivial simple cooperative game has exactly one positive edge, of weight . For each pair,because singleton and loop contributions are zero. Summing all edge weights gives , so precisely one unordered pair has weight , and all other pairs have weight zero.
Thus the winning coalitions are exactly those containing both and . For any , setThis payoff vector is efficient, since . Every winning coalition receives and every losing coalition receives a nonnegative total, so all inequalities hold. Hence it belongs to the core of a cooperative game.
In fact these are all core allocations. Singleton conditions require , and the winning pair requires ; efficiency then forces equality and zero payoffs outside the pair. The endpoints are both veto players, consistent with the general characterization of the core of a simple cooperative game.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 3 c Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
No representation exists, even allowing arbitrary signed weights and self-loops. Every singleton coalition loses, so each loop weight must be . Every two-player coalition wins, which then forcesThe represented grand-coalition value would consequently becontradicting its required value . The obstruction is the additive edge representation, not a restriction that weights be nonnegative: the singleton and pair values already determine every relevant weight.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 3 b Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
An induced subgraph game is a transferable utility game represented by a weighted undirected graph with one vertex per player; a coalition's value is the sum of the edge weights in its induced subgraph. With no self-loops,where each unordered pair is counted once and an absent edge has weight zero. Weights may have either sign. In an induced subgraph game with self-loops, write the loop weight at as and add , counting each loop once. In particular, when loops are allowed and is zero otherwise.[ref]
On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts by Xiaotie Deng and Christos Papadimitriou. §1, printed p. 258: weighted induced-subgraph representation; the self-loop extension is stated explicitly here
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 3 a Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
A simple cooperative game is a transferable utility game withA coalition of value is a winning coalition; a value- coalition loses. The displayed definition uses the usual monotone, nontrivial convention: the empty coalition loses and the grand coalition wins.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 2 e Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
Every subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is Pareto optimal under the stated consecutive-friend and bonus conditions. Partition the choosing order into blocks: a single student without a friend, or two friends who choose consecutively. Their slots in the choosing order are adjacent; the proof must separately establish when their allocated rooms will be adjacent.
Let be the rooms remaining before a friend block, with leader and follower . Because and , each friend strictly prefers every adjacent-to-friend allocation to every nonadjacent one. After leader takes room with an available adjacent room, follower therefore takes their uniquely highest-valued room among the available neighbors of . The leader consequently knows they will receive the adjacency bonus.
If contains at least one pair of adjacent rooms, let be its nonisolated rooms: the rooms having an available neighbor. Leader must choose from , because choosing there guarantees utility greater than , whereas an isolated choice gives at most . Since the bonus is then fixed and room values are distinct, the leader chooses their unique maximum-value room in . The follower chooses their unique best neighbor. Later students cannot change either allocated room, so later play cannot alter these two students' utilities.
If contains no adjacent pair, neither friend can obtain the bonus under any allocation of rooms from . Both simply choose their uniquely most valuable remaining room in turn. Removing rooms cannot create a new physical adjacency, so no hidden later move can change that conclusion. A one-student block likewise chooses their unique best available room.
Now compare the equilibrium assignment with any proposed Pareto improvement . Induct over these blocks, assuming earlier blocks' rooms are already fixed. Thus and have the same remaining set at the present block. A lone student's room must stay fixed by strict preferences.
For a friend block obtaining adjacency in , both students must retain adjacency in : losing a bonus larger than cannot be compensated by any room-value increase. The leader's room in must therefore belong to . It cannot differ from the unique highest-valued room the leader selected there without reducing that leader's utility. Once the leader's room is fixed, the follower likewise must retain the uniquely best available neighbor. If has no adjacent pair, both rooms stay fixed by the ordinary strict-ranking argument.
Thus every block's rooms are unchanged. The only assignment weakly improving all students is itself, so no strict improvement is possible. This proves Pareto efficiency of serial dictatorship with consecutive friends. The proof applies to every subgame perfect equilibrium, since the required choices at each block are strict best responses determined by the available rooms.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 2 d Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
No. Strict room values do not remove the allocation externalities generated by friends. Consider the following new instance, with the same friendship pairs and and friendship bonus for each student:Each row is strictly ranked and every room value is positive. In picking order , backward induction gives the following continuations. Room numbers in a tuple are listed in student order.To check 's incentives behind these continuations, the resulting utilities for their available choices, in ascending room order, are respectively , , and . Student 's own best responses determine those figures, and again takes the remaining room. All comparisons selecting these continuations are strict.
Hence chooses and the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome isBut the feasible assignmentstrictly improves and and leaves unchanged. Thus is not Pareto optimal. This is compatible with equilibrium: a Pareto improvement can require several players' actions to change. If alone takes , the later best responses lead to , not to ; anticipating that reaction gives only .
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 2 c Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
The equilibrium assignment is , with utility vector . Apply backward induction to the finite perfect-information game, accounting for the two friendship pairs in every terminal assignment. Student receives the last room and has no remaining choice. Given the first two rooms, chooses the remaining room maximizing their own room value plus if adjacent to .
The following complete third-stage comparisons summarize the continuations. The utility in the last column is 's resulting utility, after makes the indicated best response.
| room | room | Optimal room | Resulting |
|---|---|---|---|
| or | |||
For example, after takes and takes , student compares , giving , with , giving . Choosing also gives the adjacency bonus, making . The last room is adjacent to 's .
The table makes choose after first-stage choices , respectively. Their resulting consequences for are , and either or . Thus strictly prefers , proving the displayed outcome.
There is an off-path tie for after , so the entire subgame perfect equilibrium strategy profile need not be unique. Either choice, or any mixture of them, gives at most after choosing , below . The equilibrium assignment on the played path is therefore unaffected by this tie. Specifying these optimal continuations at every history, including the unplayed ones, supplies a subgame perfect equilibrium rather than merely a proposed path.
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 2 b Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
No: arbitrary ties can produce an assignment that is not Pareto optimal. A two-student counterexample suffices. Give the first student value for both rooms; give the second student value for and for . If the first student breaks the tie by taking , the second must take , and the utility vector is .
Past exam of the computer science course of the University of Oxford 2020 Computational game theory 2 a Solution by
Codex 0 2026-10-25
The assignment is Pareto optimal. Write for the room selected by the th student. Suppose another assignment makes every student at least as well off. The first student already selected their uniquely most valuable room, so . Once the rooms of students are fixed, the rooms available to student in the original serial dictatorship are exactly the rooms that remain after those fixed assignments. Student chose the unique maximum among them, so weak improvement requires .
Mathematical induction fixes every student's room. Thus and nobody can be strictly better off, contradicting the definition of a Pareto improvement. Strict room rankings and the absence of allocation externalities are the essential assumptions: a student's utility is determined solely by their own room.[ref]
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