Best response (${\mathrm{BR}}_i({\sigma }_{-i})$)

A best response maximizes a player's expected payoff while the other players' strategies are held fixed. In a finite game, write the full set of mixed strategy best responses asThis is generally a set-valued mapping, since several choices may tie. Every mixture supported on maximizing pure strategies is a best response, and mixing in a strictly worse choice reduces expected payoff.

For example, against $q=3/4$ in matching pennies, the row player's heads and tails expected payoffs are $1/2$ and $-1/2$, so heads is the unique best response. Against $q=1/2$, all mixtures are best responses. In the asymmetric coordination example, against $q=3/4$ the row player gets $9/4$ from $A$ and $1/2$ from $B$, so $A$ is optimal. A Nash equilibrium requires everyone to be a best response simultaneously; one optimal reply alone does not establish it.

A dominant strategy is a best response for every strategy profile of the other players.

A strategy giving at least as large a payoff as every alternative against every opponent strategy profile. Under the convention distinguishing weak dominance from complete payoff equivalence, require a strict advantage somewhere. In a two-action finite game, it suffices to check the opponent's pure strategies: expected payoff differences against an opponent's mixed strategy are weighted averages of those pure-action comparisons.

A strategy profile in which each player uses a dominant strategy. Every such profile is a Nash equilibrium, since each prescribed choice is a best response to the actual opposing choices in particular. The converse fails: a Nash equilibrium only requires a best response to those actual choices. With the weak convention for dominant strategy, ties are allowed; a strictly dominant strategy requires strict improvement over every alternative against every opposing profile.

A strictly dominant strategy gives a strictly greater payoff than every alternative strategy for every strategy profile of the other players.