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Broadly in favour, if “trivial” means transparent once the correct structure has been identified. The value of category theory is often to isolate a universal property that makes a repeated argument automatic.

For example, two objects with the same universal property have unique connecting maps in each direction. Their composites and the identities satisfy the same defining conditions, so uniqueness makes those composites identities. This one argument explains the uniqueness of categorical products, categorical limits, adjoint functors and many other constructions. It also specifies which isomorphism is canonical, a point that an arbitrary objectwise choice would miss.

The Yoneda lemma makes this perspective systematic. A natural transformation out of $\mathcal{C}(c,-)$ is determined by its value at $1_c$. Once that evaluation principle is recognized, questions about representable functors reduce to compositions in the original category. Similarly, the Beck monadicity theorem organizes many free-and-forgetful constructions around monad algebras, reflection of isomorphisms and specified coequalizers. The proof supplies a reusable explanation of why the algebraic structure can be reconstructed from the forgetful functor.

The substantial work lies in finding suitable definitions and verifying their hypotheses. The Freyd general adjoint functor theorem, for instance, needs completeness, local smallness and a solution set; none follows merely from calling a construction natural. The partial-operation tower below even has a monadic length that records how many distinct reconstruction steps are needed. These examples support the view that abstraction clarifies the source of an argument's simplicity. They also show why that simplicity is an achievement requiring proof.

An essay arguing against the claim. A good definition can change which mathematical questions are visible. Nevertheless, I would argue that category theory derives its explanatory force from the interaction between definitions and theorems; there is no sound general ordering in which definitions contribute more than theorems.

The strongest case for the contrary view comes from universal properties. A product in a category is characterized by maps into it, rather than by a particular construction of ordered pairs. The same definition applies to sets, groups, and topological spaces. An adjunction goes further: its natural correspondence of arrows puts free constructions, quotient constructions, and several kinds of completion into a common language. Such definitions remove irrelevant choices and expose relationships that would be difficult to recognize from separate constructions.

But a universal-property definition does not supply an object. The definition of a product in a category says what a product would accomplish; an existence theorem says whether the category actually has one. Even uniqueness up to unique isomorphism is a short proof, not an extra clause to be silently supplied by the word “universal”. Given two products, their universal properties produce maps in both directions, and uniqueness forces the two composites to be identities. This elementary theorem makes the definition usable independently of a chosen construction.

The Yoneda lemma illustrates the distinction especially clearly. A representable functor is a definition, but the lemma proves that its natural transformations into any set-valued functor are determined by one element. Its proof evaluates at the identity and reconstructs the whole transformation by functoriality. Consequently the Yoneda embedding is full and faithful: an object's pattern of incoming arrows recovers its morphisms without loss. That is a substantive explanation of why the chosen definition is powerful. Merely calling a functor representable would not establish it.

Similarly, defining a monadic adjunction gives a precise meaning to recovering structured objects as algebras for a monad. It does not decide whether a given forgetful functor is monadic. The precise monadicity theorem translates that difficult classification into a usable test involving adjoint functors, reflected isomorphisms, and specific coequalizers. For compact Hausdorff spaces, the crucial step is proving that a set-split relation is closed. The definition of a monad alone does not contain this topological argument. The theorem connects the algebraic language to an independently meaningful class of spaces.

There is also a danger in praising definitions without hypotheses. A Cartesian closed category has exponential objects, but a category of structured objects need not be cartesian closed merely because underlying sets have function sets. The correct exponential in a functor category generally involves natural transformations out of representable functors, not pointwise function sets. Its existence and universal property require an argument. Theorems also reveal when tempting definitions cannot support the intended construction.

Definitions provide the vocabulary and select the structures worth studying; proofs establish existence, consequences, and limitations. Category theory makes this partnership unusually explicit because its definitions are often expressed through universal properties. Its distinctive achievement is to turn well-chosen definitions into reusable theorems, rather than to make theorems secondary.

An alternative essay arguing for the claim. In category theory, theorems are indispensable, but a carefully chosen definition often performs the greater act of organization. It identifies what many apparently unrelated constructions have in common and makes whole families of proofs possible. In that explanatory sense, definitions can be the subject's most influential contributions.

Consider a universal property. Describing a product in a category as an object representing pairs of incoming arrows replaces several different concrete constructions by one invariant pattern. The corresponding uniqueness proof is important but short; the lasting insight is that the same pattern is the right question in every category. Once the definition is available, it becomes meaningful to ask which functors preserve products, whether the products exist in a new category, and how they interact with other universal constructions.

An adjunction is an even more striking example. The existence of free groups, free modules, and a Stone-Čech compactification can be proved separately. The definition of an adjunction recognizes their common relation to forgetful functors and explains why arrows out of a free object are determined by arrows out of its generators. It also packages the relation as a monad. A large collection of isolated existence results becomes an instance of a shared structure, with reusable consequences about composition and categorical limits.

A valuable definition also has to distinguish structures rather than merely rename them. An abelian category is not just an additive category with categorical kernels and categorical cokernels: normality of monomorphisms and epimorphisms matters. The additive example with truncated primary torsion shows why those clauses belong in the definition. The definition therefore preserves exactly the structure on which theorems about images and exact sequences depend.

This view does not make proofs dispensable. The Yoneda lemma justifies the use of representable functors, and the precise monadicity theorem tests when a proposed algebraic description is valid. Rather, it argues that the best categorical definitions have unusually broad explanatory reach: they select the invariant structures to which those proofs apply. If “matter more” means providing the reusable framework in which many theorems become instances of one idea, category-theoretic definitions have a strong claim to that role.

I would defend the assertion as a description of what good abstraction achieves, provided it is not taken to mean that finding the abstraction is easy. Category theory makes recurring arguments consequences of a common universal property, instead of requiring a new calculation in every setting.

The Yoneda lemma is an instructive example. A natural transformation from $\mathcal{C}(c,-)$ to a set-valued functor $F$ is determined by its value on $1_c$; naturality forces its value at $u:c\to d$ to be $F(u)$ of that element. Once the right question is asked, the proof is short. Yet the statement explains why representable functors encode objects faithfully, and why a functor can be reconstructed from its elements. The simplicity belongs to the organized argument, not to a claim that these consequences were obvious beforehand.

Likewise, the fact that a right adjoint preserves categorical limits does not need separate proofs for products, equalizers and pullbacks in every example. The adjunction converts a map into the proposed limit into a compatible family of maps, and the natural bijection converts that family back. This one argument explains preservation of many different constructions. It also makes the canonical comparison maps clear, which matters more than merely guessing an isomorphism of the resulting objects.

The monoidal coherence theorem shows a different benefit. Complicated calculations with bracketed tensor products can become transparent because every structural rebracketing is the unique map between its formal source and target. However, the proof that the pentagon and triangle suffice is real work. Suppressing brackets is justified by that proof; it cannot serve as a substitute for it. Abstraction is valuable precisely because it separates an essential compatibility argument from subsequent routine bookkeeping.

There is also a necessary caution. The general adjoint functor theorem requires a solution-set condition; small-limit preservation by itself does not produce a left adjoint. The reverse-ordinal example makes the missing condition concrete. Similarly, the monad of an adjunction need not capture all the structure in the original category: the tower of nested partial unary operation categories has arbitrary finite monadic length, despite its long composites sharing their first induced monad. These examples prevent formal language from hiding a size problem or an unjustified reconstruction claim.

The persuasive interpretation is that abstraction makes the reason for a result visible and reusable. It often turns the final step into a direct consequence of definitions, while leaving the discovery of those definitions and the verification of their hypotheses as substantial mathematics.

Definitions organize category theory, but theorems give that organization mathematical force. I would therefore argue against treating the subject as an exception in which definitions are intrinsically more important than theorems. The distinction is especially misleading here because good categorical definitions are designed to expose hypotheses from which substantial theorems follow.

A category records objects, composable arrows, identities and associative composition. A functor preserves that structure. This language allows one to compare otherwise different mathematical settings, but it does not itself say which constructions exist. For example, the definition of a product in a category is not a recipe for forming a Cartesian product of underlying sets: it requires a universal factorization of pairs of arrows. If two products in a category $(P,p_1,p_2)$ and $(Q,q_1,q_2)$ exist, the universal properties give unique arrows $f:P\to Q$ and $g:Q\to P$ respecting projections. The composites $gf$ and $fg$ respect the same projections as the identities, so uniqueness forces them to be identities. Thus a definition yields a genuine theorem: products in a category are unique up to unique compatible isomorphism. The proof matters because it licenses replacing a construction by any other realization of the same property.

The Yoneda lemma is a more substantial example. For a covariant representable functor $\mathcal{C}(A,-)$ and $X:\mathcal{C}\to \mathbf{Set}$, a natural transformation $t:\mathcal{C}(A,-)\to X$ is determined by $a=t_A(1_A)$. Naturality forcesConversely this formula defines a natural transformation for every $a\in X(A)$. Hence $\mathrm{Nat}(\mathcal{C}(A,-),X)\cong X(A)$. The definition of naturality is indispensable, but the theorem identifies every possible transformation, proves representables detect arrows, and explains why universal objects can be studied through hom-sets. Merely knowing the definition does not supply this conclusion.

Similarly, an adjunction is defined by natural hom-set bijections. The construction of a free abelian group gives $\mathbf{Ab}({\mathbb{Z}}^{(S)},A)\cong \mathbf{Set}(S,UA)$, because a group homomorphism is determined uniquely by its values on the basis. This makes a universal extension problem transparent. But the Freyd general adjoint functor theorem goes further: it turns categorical limit preservation and a solution set into an actual adjoint. Its smallness hypotheses cannot be discarded as bookkeeping. For instance, the underlying-set functor from finite groups to finite sets has no left adjoint at a singleton. A putative universal finite group with universal element of order $m$ could not map that element to a generator of a finite cyclic group of order greater than $m$. The theorem's hypotheses separate existence from attractive notation.

The monoidal coherence theorem offers another example. A monoidal category has associativity and unit isomorphisms satisfying the pentagon identity for a monoidal category and triangle identity for a monoidal category. Coherence proves that every formal reassociation and unit insertion produces the same structural map. This is what justifies calculating without displaying all parentheses; it is not true merely because one has named an associator. Nor does it identify arbitrary additional maps, such as distinct braidings.

Finally, the opposite category construction shows how a definition can economize on proofs: reversing arrows takes products in a category to coproducts in a category, initial objects to terminal objects and monads to comonads. Yet this economy works because theorems and their proofs are invariant under the reversal. The subject is powerful precisely when definitions isolate reusable structure and theorems establish its consequences. Separating their importance obscures that partnership.

Theorems matter at least as much as definitions: they show when a categorical description captures actual mathematical structure. Definitions in category theory are exceptionally economical, but economy alone does not explain their applications.

An adjunction compresses a universal mapping property into natural hom-set bijections. The free-group adjunction, for example, records that assigning images to generators extends uniquely to a homomorphism. That is a useful definition, but proving that a free group exists and satisfies this property still requires mathematics. The definition organizes that proof rather than replaces it.

The Yoneda lemma offers a sharper example. A representable functor is easy to define; the theorem identifying natural transformations out of it with elements of another functor gives the definition its computational force. The representation of a set-valued functor as a colimit of representables is then a substantive consequence, and the theorem that filtered colimits commute with finite limits turns it into a criterion for finite-limit preservation. None of these conclusions follows merely from choosing attractive terminology.

Likewise a monad packages operations and their compatibility, while the Eilenberg-Moore category defines the corresponding algebras. The Beck monadicity theorem answers a different question: whether a given category is really recovered by that algebraic description. Applying it to compact Hausdorff spaces needs a topological argument about closed quotient relations. The definitions would not by themselves predict or justify the result.

Finally, abelian categories put kernels in a category, cokernels in a category and exactness into a setting where homological arguments can be reused. Some consequences, such as image factorization, become short because strong structural content has deliberately been included in the definition. Yet left derived functors, long exact sequences and the detection of projective objects supply information about obstructions to exactness which the terminology alone cannot provide.

Definitions and theorems therefore play complementary roles. A good definition states what should be invariant across examples; a theorem proves which constructions preserve it, which examples satisfy it, and what can be deduced from it. Category theory makes that partnership unusually visible, rather than making proofs less important.

The Yoneda embedding is an exact representation of a category, but does not by itself reduce the subject to the study of arbitrary functor categories. There are both a size issue and a structure issue.

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a locally small category and set $yA=\mathcal{A}(-,A)$. For a categorical presheaf $P:{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{op}}\to \mathbf{Set}$, a natural transformation $\theta :yA\to P$ is determined by $x={\theta }_A(1_A)$. Indeed, naturality along $f:B\to A$ forcesConversely this formula defines a natural transformation for each $x\in P(A)$, since functoriality gives naturality along every $g:C\to B$. Taking $P=y{A}^{\prime }$ givesThus the Yoneda embedding is full and faithful, and $\mathcal{A}$ is equivalent to its full subcategory of representable presheaves. The indexing category in the usual version is ${\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{op}}$, not necessarily a small category chosen independently of $\mathcal{A}$.

Local smallness makes the values $\mathcal{A}(B,A)$ sets; it does not make the collection of objects a set. For a large indexing category, the collection of natural transformations between arbitrary set-valued functors can itself be a proper class. For example, take the discrete category on the class of ordinals and the constant two-element functor. Its endomorphisms include an independently chosen function $\{0,1\}\to \{0,1\}$ at each ordinal. A small functor category cannot encode this collection without changing universes. The Yoneda lemma remains meaningful when the source is representable because the displayed bijection identifies its natural transformations with a set. It does not make the entire large functor category locally small.

Even for a small category, the representable image is usually a very special part of its presheaf category. If $\mathcal{A}$ is the terminal category, its presheaf category is $\mathbf{Set}$, but its representable image consists only of a singleton. The presheaf category has all small categorical limits and colimits, whereas an arbitrary full subcategory need have almost none. The Yoneda embedding preserves existing limits because representable functors preserve limits. It generally does not preserve colimits. For example, the coproduct of two singleton sets in category of finite sets is a two-element set, but evaluating the proposed presheaf coproduct at a two-element set givesThe pointwise coproduct therefore leaves the representable image. Identifying which presheaves are representable, and which ambient constructions return to the original category, is precisely substantive category theory.

The representation is nonetheless powerful. The Yoneda lemma replaces a morphism by all its probes, converts a universal property into a representation of a functor, and makes the presheaf category a natural place to add formal colimits. A small presheaf category is the free free cocompletion under small colimits: every presheaf is a colimit of representables indexed by its category of elements. But this is a controlled enlargement of the category, not an identification of its original objects with all functors. The stronger conclusion in the proposed assertion therefore does not follow from the full-faithfulness statement.