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Consider successive independent Bernoulli trials with the same success probability $0<p\le 1$. A geometric distribution models waiting for their first success. Two conventions coexist, so always say what is counted. Let $T$ count all trials up to and including the successful trial, and let $F=T-1$ count preceding failures. Their probability mass functions areThe factors describe failures followed by one success; independence permits multiplication. Summing the geometric series verifies that each law has total mass one. Their expected values differ by one, while shifting by a constant leaves the variance unchanged:The positive convention and these moments are also given by Penn State STAT 414.^[ref]

For a constructed retry mechanism with independent attempts and $p=0.3$, success on attempt four has probability $\mathbb{P}(T=4)=0.7^3(0.3)=0.1029$. More than four attempts are needed precisely when the first four fail: $\mathbb{P}(T>4)=0.7^4=0.2401$. The expected values are $\mathbb{E}T=10/3$ and $\mathbb{E}F=7/3$, and the common variance is $70/9\approx 7.7778$. The large spread explains why the average waiting count is not a deadline.

The two probability mass functions have identical heights with different labels: $T=4$ and $F=3$ describe the same event. For $0<p<1$, consecutive masses have ratio $1-p$, explaining the name geometric distribution. The support of a probability distribution is the positive integers for $T$ and the nonnegative integers for $F$. At $p=1$, it collapses to $T=1$ and $F=0$, both with variance zero; interpret an empty product, including $(1-p{)}^0$, as one. These counts concern attempts; converting them into elapsed time requires specifying the time spent per attempt.

The survival function makes the counting convention especially visible. Put $q=1-p$. For nonnegative integers $n$, and for $k\ge 1$,The event $T>n$ requires $n$ failures, whereas $T\ge n$ requires only $n-1$ when $n\ge 1$. For the constructed $p=0.3$ mechanism, $\mathbb{P}(T\ge 4)=0.343$ differs from $\mathbb{P}(T>4)=0.2401$. The geometric success deadline uses the latter tail to control the chance of still waiting.

The striking memorylessness of the geometric distribution says that, for nonnegative integers $m,r$ with $\mathbb{P}(T>m)>0$,After five failures, the conditional probability of requiring more than two additional attempts is still $0.7^2=0.49$. The analogous zero-based identity uses $\mathbb{P}(F\ge m+r\mid F\ge m)=\mathbb{P}(F\ge r)$; keeping the inequalities straight avoids an off-by-one error. This property follows from fresh independent trials with unchanged $p$; learning or changing conditions can destroy it. At $p=0$, success never occurs, so there is no proper finite waiting-count law.

For the positive-integer geometric distribution with success probability $0<p\le 1$, the displayed identity holds for nonnegative integers $m,r$ whenever the conditioning event has positive probability. The first $m$ attempts have failed; future independent attempts use the same success probability. Equivalently, divide the tail $(1-p{)}^{m+r}$ by $(1-p{)}^m$. For a zero-based failures count $F=T-1$, use $\mathbb{P}(F\ge m+r\mid F\ge m)=\mathbb{P}(F\ge r)$. Constant success probability and independence are essential: accumulated wear or learning would require a different model.

The full remaining-count law is unchanged, not only one tail probability. With $0<p<1$, after $m$ failures set $R=T-m$ on the event $T>m$. For $r=1,2,\dots$, its probability mass function under this conditional probability isHere independence makes the future trials unaffected by the observed failures, and the unchanged success probability makes their law identical to the original one. Consequently $\mathbb{E}[T-m\mid T>m]=1/p$, while $\mathbb{E}[T\mid T>m]=m+1/p$. For the constructed $p=0.3$ mechanism, five failures leave a mean of $10/3$ more attempts, making the conditional mean total $25/3$; the five already spent are still counted.

The same mechanism has constant discrete hazard:Thus each reached attempt has the same chance of success. This differs from the decreasing unconditional probability $\mathbb{P}(T=k)$: later success requires surviving earlier attempts. At $p=1$, only conditioning on an event of positive probability is allowed: $T>m$ permits only $m=0$, and $T\ge k$ only $k=1$.

Among proper laws on the positive integers, memorylessness of the geometric distribution also characterizes the geometric distribution. Write $S(n)=\mathbb{P}(T>n)$. The identity gives $S(m+r)=S(m)S(r)$; if $S(m)=0$, both sides vanish anyway. Since $S(0)=1$, induction yields $S(n)=S(1{)}^n$. Properness excludes $S(1)=1$, so setting $p=1-S(1)>0$ recovers the geometric distribution, including $p=1$.^[ref]

The retry example stipulates independent Bernoulli trials with a known constant $p$; it is not evidence that a real retry system behaves this way. Shared changing conditions or adapting attempts can alter the next success probability. Even constant individual success probabilities alone do not imply independence.

For an original contrasting model, uniformly shuffle one success card and three failure cards, then draw by sampling without replacement. Its success position $U$ has the discrete uniform distribution on $\{1,2,3,4\}$. Initially the success probability is $1/4$; after one failure it is $1/3$. In particular,This shows concretely why sampling without replacement need not be independent and why the remaining wait can change. Every draw still has unconditional success probability $1/4$ when all four positions are considered; the relevant discrete hazard changes after failures.

Normalization of a probability distribution and the geometric series give $1=A/(1-\rho )$, so $A=1-\rho$. For a nonnegative integer $n$, the strict tail starts at $n+1$:For nonnegative integers $n>m$, the event $\{N>n\}$ is contained in $\{N>m\}$. ThereforeThis is the memorylessness of the geometric distribution with the zero-based counting convention. Keeping strict versus non-strict inequalities explicit is essential: $N-m-1$, conditional on $N>m$, has the original distribution of $N$.

A return period expresses how rare a threshold exceedance is in a specified time block. Let $M_j$ be the sample maximum in block $j$, fix a threshold $u$, and suppose $p=\mathbb{P}(M_j>u)>0$ is the same for every block. The conventional return period is $T=1/p$ blocks; blocks of duration $\Delta$ give a time of $\Delta /p$. Thus an annual exceedance probability $p=0.01$ means a 100-year return period. This names a frequency scale, not a schedule or a guarantee of one exceedance in each century. The annual convention and the misleading “once every 100 years” interpretation are discussed in USGS: the 100-year flood.

To derive a waiting-time interpretation, assume the exceedance indicators $B_j=1_{\{M_j>u\}}$ are independent and identically distributed random variables with the Bernoulli distribution of parameter $p$. Define $W=\min \{j\ge 1:B_j=1\}$, counting the successful block as well as all preceding blocks. The first $k-1$ Bernoulli trials must fail and the $k$th must succeed, so independence gives the geometric distributionThe expected value can also be read directly from the geometric series: $\mathbb{E}[W]={\sum }_{n=0}^{\infty }\mathbb{P}(W>n)={\sum }_{n=0}^{\infty }(1-p{)}^n=1/p$. This counts blocks from the starting boundary, not the exact time of an exceedance within its block. Counting only failed blocks instead would give expected value $T-1$. The waiting law and its memorylessness of the geometric distribution are developed in Kyle Siegrist, Random Services: the geometric distribution.

For a horizon of $n$ complete years, at least one exceedance is the complement of no exceedances. Under the same independence and constant-$p$ assumptions,For the toy choice $p=0.01$, this gives $9.6\%$ in 10 years, $26.0\%$ in 30 years, $39.5\%$ in 50 years, and $63.4\%$ in 100 years. Even after 100 years there is a $36.6\%$ chance of no exceedance. These numbers are exact model calculations rounded to one decimal place, not measured frequencies. The median waiting count is 69 years, since $1-0.99^{68}<1/2\le 1-0.99^{69}$; the expected value is 100 years. A mean and a median answer different questions.

The exceedance count $N_n={\sum }_{j=1}^n{B}_j$ has the binomial distribution under independence, with expected value $np$. Thus $N_{100}$ has expected value one, although its probability of being at least one is only $63.4\%$: some realizations contribute several exceedances. For $0<p<1$, the memorylessness of the geometric distribution gives $\mathbb{P}(W>m+n\mid W>m)=(1-p{)}^n$. A long quiet spell does not make the next independent year's exceedance overdue, and an exceedance this year does not force a quiet interval. Two specified consecutive years both exceed with probability $p^2=0.0001$ in this toy model.

A reproducible tabletop experiment makes the assumptions tangible. Put 100 identical slips numbered 1 to 100 in a bag; after thoroughly mixing, draw one and record whether it is 100. Replace the slip and mix again before every draw. Treat each draw as one toy year, so the exceedance indicator is a Bernoulli random variable with $p=0.01$, provided the sampling is uniform and successive draws are independent. Repeat complete 30-draw runs and record the fraction containing at least one 100; separately repeat runs stopped at the first 100 and record their waiting counts. The first fraction targets $1-0.99^{30}$; the waiting-count histogram targets $0.99^{k-1}(0.01)$. Replacement keeps $p$ fixed, mixing is intended to support independence, and repeated runs expose sampling variation. This is a proposed demonstration of the toy model; no experimental results are asserted here.

Stationarity supports a time-invariant annual probability distribution, but does not imply independence. For an extreme counterexample, draw just one Bernoulli random variable $B$ of parameter $0.01$ and set $B_j=B$ for every year. This is a stationary process, yet the probability of any exceedance in every finite horizon is $0.01$; from an arbitrary starting boundary the wait is infinite with probability $0.99$. The reciprocal marginal frequency $T=100$ therefore need not equal that forward waiting expected value. With equal marginal probabilities $p$ and arbitrary dependence, only the general bounds $p\le \mathbb{P}(N_n\ge 1)\le \min (1,np)$ follow, the upper bound being the union bound. Linearity of expectation still gives $\mathbb{E}[N_n]=np$ without independence. Mere zero correlation does not restore the product formula; even pairwise independence does not imply joint independence. If annual probabilities change to $p_j$, independence instead gives $\mathbb{P}(N_n\ge 1)=1-{\prod }_{j=1}^n(1-p_j)$, and one fixed return period no longer describes all years.