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Interpret $x_r$ as route $r$'s sending rate, $w_r>0$ as its demand weight, and ${\kappa }_r>0$ as its response speed. Resource $j$ sees aggregate load $y_j={\sum }_{s:j\in s}{x}_s$ and returns the resource congestion price ${\mu }_j=p_j(y_j)$. Route $r$ sums these feedback signals to its route congestion price $P_r={\sum }_{j\in r}{\mu }_j$. Its rate increases when $x_r{P}_r<w_r$ and decreases when $x_r{P}_r>w_r$. At equilibrium, each user balances weighted logarithmic utility against the summed resource prices: $x_r{P}_r=w_r$.

Take finite route and resource sets, nonempty routes, positive $w_r,{\kappa }_r$, and initially positive rates. The standard interpretation of increasing prices supplies a price positive somewhere on each route; strictly increasing nonnegative prices automatically do so. More generally, nondecreasing prices suffice provided every route contains at least one resource with a nonzero price function. Define the primal congestion potentialBecause $p_j$ is continuous and nondecreasing, its integral is a convex function. The positive-weight logarithmic sum is strictly concave; subtracting the convex load costs makes $U$ a strictly concave function on the positive orthant. Its gradient satisfiesThus this is gradient flow with diagonal mobility, ascending the utility-minus-cost potential.

We must also prove boundedness and existence of an optimizer. For each route choose a resource on it whose price is positive somewhere. Monotonicity supplies constants $c_r>0,a_r<\infty$ such that this resource's price is at least $c_r$ for loads at least $a_r$. Its integrated cost is therefore at least $c_r{x}_r-d_r$. A resource may be chosen by several routes, but at most $|R|$ times. Since all costs are nonnegative,for a finite constant $D$. Each scalar expression on the right is bounded above and tends to minus infinity as $x_r\to \infty$. Consequently a superlevel set $U(x)\ge U(x(0))$ is bounded. On a bounded set, if any $x_r\downarrow 0$, its logarithmic term tends to minus infinity while the remaining terms are bounded above. The superlevel set therefore stays away from every zero coordinate and is compact inside the positive orthant. The same argument gives an attained maximum $x^{\ast }$; strict concavity makes it unique, and its interior first-order equations giveAlong every trajectory,with equality exactly at $x^{\ast }$. Thus the trajectory remains in its compact superlevel set, exists for all positive time, and $U(x(t))$ increases to a finite limit. The nonnegative dissipation on the right has a finite time integral. It is also uniformly continuous: it is a continuous function on the trapped compact set, and the continuous vector field is bounded there, making $x(t)$ uniformly Lipschitz in time. The result uniformly continuous integrable functions vanish at infinity gives $dU/dt\to 0$. Every subsequential limit is therefore a critical point, hence $x^{\ast }$. Compactness then proves the full convergenceContinuity, rather than differentiability, of the prices is enough. For completeness, square-root coordinates for primal congestion control also establish uniqueness of the underlying trajectories: with $x_r={\kappa }_r{z}_r^2/4$, the system becomes $\dot{z}=\nabla V(z)$ for $V(z)=U(x(z))$. Each resource cost is a convex nondecreasing function composed with a convex quadratic load, while the logarithmic terms remain strictly concave. Hence $V$ is concave, and for two trajectories $\frac{1}{2}\frac{d}{dt}\Vert z-\tilde{z}{\Vert }^2\le 0$ by monotonicity of its gradient. Identical initial data therefore give identical solutions without assuming Lipschitz price functions. If some initial rates are zero, ${\dot{x}}_r={\kappa }_r{w}_r>0$ at that boundary, so the nonnegative physical trajectory enters the positive orthant and the same proof applies from any positive time.

There is a genuine qualification if the word increasing is meant merely nondecreasing without a nontrivial-price assumption. With one route, $w=\kappa =1$ and $p(y)\equiv 0$, the displayed model has $\dot{x}=1$, so $x(t)=x(0)+t$ and no equilibrium. Positive weights, nonempty priced routes, and positive adjustment rates are necessary model assumptions, not consequences of an arbitrary nonnegative continuous price function. Under the standard positive-data, nontrivially priced interpretation, every physical trajectory converges to the unique point proved above.

Each user maintains a transmission rate $x_r$. Resource $j$ measures its aggregate load $y_j={\sum }_{r:j\in r}{x}_r$ and returns the resource congestion price ${\mu }_j=p_j(y_j)$. The user adds these feedback signals to form its route congestion price $c_r={\sum }_{j\in r}{\mu }_j$. Its increase term is the constant ${\kappa }_r{w}_r$, while its decrease term ${\kappa }_r{x}_r{c}_r$ is proportional to both its current rate and the congestion signal. This is a distributed congestion control algorithm: resources need only local loads, and users need only prices along their own routes.

There is a needed distinction in the word increasing. If it permits nondecreasing price functions, the all-zero prices are allowed. Then ${\dot{x}}_r={\kappa }_r{w}_r>0$, so there is no equilibrium. The intended convergence statement holds when each nonempty route meets at least one resource whose price is positive at some load. This is automatic if every price is strictly increasing and nonnegative. We prove it under the more general nondecreasing assumption with this explicit condition, for finite sets of nonempty routes and nonnegative initial rates.

Write $P_j(y)={\int }_0^y{p}_j(u)du$. Each $P_j$ is convex and nondecreasing, and the primal congestion potential isOn positive rates this is strictly concave: the sum of positive-weight logarithms is strictly concave, while the resource term is convex. Its derivatives areConsequently the gradient flow with diagonal mobility satisfieswith equality exactly at an equilibrium.

We must also prove trapping and existence of the equilibrium. For each route choose a resource on it and constants $M_r,c_r^0>0$ such that its price is at least $c_r^0$ beyond load $M_r$. Finiteness gives common constants $M,c>0$. If $X={\max }_r{x}_r$ is large, a resource on a maximizing route has load at least $X$, so the resource penalty is at least $c(X-M)$. With $W={\sum }_r{w}_r$, therefore,Once all rates are bounded above, a rate tending to zero also makes $U\to -\infty$ through its positive-weight logarithm. Thus every nonempty superlevel set of $U$ is compact inside the positive orthant. A maximum exists by restricting to such a superlevel set, and strict concavity makes it unique, say $x^{\ast }$. It is interior and satisfies ${\partial }_{r}U(x^{\ast })=0$, equivalentlyConversely every positive equilibrium is a stationary point of the strictly concave function $U$ and hence is this maximum.

Only continuity of the price functions is given, so it is useful to justify trajectories without silently assuming differentiability. Put $z_r=2\sqrt{x_r/{\kappa }_r}$ and $V(z)=U(({\kappa }_r{z}_r^2/4{)}_r)$. The dynamics become ordinary gradient flow ascent, $\dot{z}=\nabla V(z)$. The function $V$ is strictly concave on the positive orthant: its user terms are $2w_r\log z_r$ plus constants, and each penalty is a convex nondecreasing function $P_j$ composed with the convex load ${\sum }_{r:j\in r}{\kappa }_r{z}_r^2/4$. Hence the supporting-tangent inequalities giveThe squared distance between two solutions is nonincreasing, proving uniqueness even though the vector field need only be continuous.

Nonnegative initial rates enter the positive orthant immediately: along a solution, variation of constants in ${\dot{x}}_r+{\kappa }_r{c}_r(t)x_r={\kappa }_r{w}_r$ expresses $x_r(t)$ as a positive exponential times $x_r(0)$ plus a strictly positive integral. Also ${\dot{x}}_r\le {\kappa }_r{w}_r$, so rates cannot become infinite in finite time. The distance argument applies after any positive time and, by taking that time down to zero, also proves uniqueness for initial zero rates.

For a positive starting time, the increasing $U$ traps the trajectory in a compact superlevel set. Its derivative has finite integral since $U$ is bounded above there. It is uniformly continuous in time, being a continuous function of the state on a compact set with bounded velocity. By uniformly continuous integrable functions vanish at infinity, $\dot{U}(t)\to 0$. Every limit point consequently has ${\partial }_{r}U=0$ for every $r$, since all rates are bounded away from zero. There is only the limit point $x^{\ast }$, soThis establishes global convergence of primal congestion control with the needed nonzero-price condition, and supplies the zero-price counterexample when increasing is read in the weak sense.

For the alternative increasing-supply resource-price dynamics, consider the dual congestion potentialIts domain is ${\mu }_j\ge 0$ with every $c_r>0$. Each integrated supply is strictly convex, because $q_j$ is strictly increasing, and each negative logarithm of a positive linear function is convex. Thus $H$ is strictly convex. Its sublevel sets are bounded: for each $j$, $q_j(1)>0$ gives a linear lower bound on the supply primitive at large ${\mu }_j$, whereas the negative logarithmic terms grow only logarithmically in ${\max }_j{\mu }_j$. A route-price sum tending to zero makes $H\to +\infty$ on a bounded set. A minimum therefore exists in this domain.

The derivatives areIf a used resource had ${\mu }_j=0$ at the minimum, then $q_j(0)=0$ but $y_j>0$, so increasing that coordinate would strictly lower $H$. Therefore the minimizer has strictly positive prices at every used resource. An unused resource has its unique minimizing price zero. At used resources its equations areThe multiplicative dynamics are ${\dot{\mu }}_j=-{\kappa }_j{\mu }_j{\partial }_{j}H$. On strictly positive used-resource prices, equilibrium is equivalent to these equations, and strict convexity proves existence and uniqueness of the positive equilibrium. No full-row-rank assumption on $A$ is needed here: the strictly increasing individual supplies already give strict convexity.

If zero prices at used resources are allowed, the unqualified uniqueness assertion is false because of boundary equilibria of multiplicative resource prices. For one unit-weight route using two resources and $q_1(u)=q_2(u)=u$, all three price vectorsare equilibria. At $(1,0)$ the user rate is one; the first resource has demand equal to supply, while the second has zero derivative because its price is zero. The last two vectors do not minimize $H$. Thus the positive-price domain, or a boundary rule preventing a used resource from remaining at zero price, is essential.

Finally, the primal and dual equilibrium equations agree when $q_j$ and $p_j$ are inverse functions on the relevant ranges. For example, continuous strictly increasing prices with $p_j(0)=0$ and $p_j(y)\to \infty$ have inverses satisfying the stated supply assumptions. Then ${\mu }_j=p_j(y_j)$ is equivalent to $y_j=q_j({\mu }_j)$, while both systems have $x_r=w_r/c_r$. With inverse price and supply functions, the two equilibria describe the same rates and prices. Without this relation they need not agree: for one route and one resource with $w=1$, $p(y)=y$ and $q(\mu )=2\mu$, the primal equilibrium is $(x,\mu )=(1,1)$ while the dual equilibrium is $(\sqrt{2},1/\sqrt{2})$.

Let $x^{\ast }$ maximize SYSTEM. Under the usual positive-capacity, nonempty-route assumptions, the feasible set is compact, contains a positive point, and has a Slater condition point. Strict concavity makes the optimum unique. The condition $U_r^{\prime }(0)=\infty$ forces $x_r^{\ast }>0$: moving from any optimum with a zero component slightly toward a positive feasible point gives an infinite positive directional derivative in that component and only finite losses in the positive components.

By the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, there are link Lagrange multipliers $p_j^{\ast }\ge 0$ withSet the route congestion price $y_r^{\ast }=(A^T{p}^{\ast }{)}_r=U_r^{\prime }(x_r^{\ast })$ and chooseThen $x_r^{\ast }={\nu }_r^{\ast }{e}^{-y_r^{\ast }}$, as required. For USER with fixed $y_r^{\ast }$, the substitution $x={\nu }_r{e}^{-y_r^{\ast }}$ is a bijection of the nonnegative half-line, and its objective becomes $U_r(x)-y_r^{\ast }x$. This is a strictly concave function whose derivative vanishes at $x_r^{\ast }$, so its unique maximizer is $x_r^{\ast }$ and the corresponding USER optimizer is ${\nu }_r^{\ast }$.

For NETWORK at ${\nu }^{\ast }$, its objective derivative at $x^{\ast }$ isThus $x^{\ast },p^{\ast }$ obey its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, with the same feasibility and complementary slackness. The NETWORK objective is a strictly concave function, so $x^{\ast }$ is also its unique maximizer. The triple $(x^{\ast },y^{\ast },{\nu }^{\ast })$ solves all three problems simultaneously. This is a user-network decomposition of concave utility maximization.

Write $p_r=(A^T\mu {)}_r$ for a route congestion price and $y_j=(Ax{)}_j$ for resource demand. A route with weighted logarithmic utility $w_r\log x_r$ chooses $x_r=w_r/p_r$, since its marginal utility equals its route congestion price. Each resource raises its price when $y_j>C_j$ and lowers it when $y_j<C_j$; ${\kappa }_j$ controls the speed. This is a multiplicative resource-price dynamics model of supply-demand feedback.

For a well-defined finite network, assume positive capacities, nonempty routes, and strictly positive initial resource congestion prices. The relevant rank condition is full row rank, $\mathrm{rank}A=|J|$. Zero initial prices are invariant under the printed differential equation, so the unrestricted phrase “all trajectories” needs a qualification; a concrete counterexample is given below.

Define $g(\mu )=Ax(\mu )-C$. On the domain $\mu \ge 0$ with $p_r>0$, direct differentiation givesThus $V$ is a concave function, and it is a strictly concave function when $A$ has full row rank. It has a maximum: as $\Vert \mu {\Vert }_1\to \infty$, its negative linear capacity term dominates its logarithmic terms, while on bounded sets $V\to -\infty$ if any route congestion price approaches zero. A maximizing price vector ${\mu }^{\ast }$ therefore exists with every $p_r^{\ast }>0$, though some individual resource congestion prices may be zero. The Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions areThey express feasibility and complementary slackness: positively priced resources are fully used, and an underused resource has zero price. Full row rank gives uniqueness of this maximizing price vector.

To prove convergence, rather than merely monotonicity of $V$, use the relative-entropy Lyapunov function for resource priceswhere a summand with ${\mu }_j^{\ast }=0$ means ${\mu }_j/{\kappa }_j$. Every summand is nonnegative and vanishes only at its reference price. Along a positive-price trajectory,The last equality follows by substituting $x_r=w_r/p_r$, and complementary slackness removes ${\mu }^{\ast T}g({\mu }^{\ast })$.

A sublevel set of $L$ bounds every price from above and bounds every coordinate with ${\mu }_j^{\ast }>0$ away from zero. Each route contains at least one such coordinate, because $p_r^{\ast }>0$. All route congestion prices consequently remain bounded away from zero, so the vector field is regular on the resulting compact set. Positive coordinates cannot hit zero in finite time, since their equations have the form ${\dot{\mu }}_j={\mu }_j$ times a bounded function. These bounds also give global existence.

The LaSalle invariance principle now applies. Equality in $\dot{L}\le 0$ requires $A^T\mu =A^T{\mu }^{\ast }$ and ${\mu }_j{g}_j({\mu }^{\ast })=0$. Then $x=x^{\ast }$ and $g=g^{\ast }$, so every such point is an equilibrium satisfying the same Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions. If $A$ has full row rank, $A^T$ is injective, making this set the singleton ${\mu }^{\ast }$. Thusfor every strictly positive initial price vector. This proves full-row-rank convergence of multiplicative resource prices.

If $A$ is row-rank deficient, all maximizing price vectors still have the same route-price vector: otherwise strict concavity of ${\sum }_r{w}_r\log p_r$ makes their midpoint improve $V$. Consequently the limiting rates are unique, while individual prices may not be. Positive-price trajectories actually converge to a single point in that possibly non-singleton equilibrium set. To see this, choose any subsequential limit $\bar{\mu }$ in it, and form the same $L$ with reference $\bar{\mu }$. It is nonincreasing, and along the chosen subsequence it tends to zero. Hence it tends to zero on the whole trajectory, forcing $\mu (t)\to \bar{\mu }$.

For example, two identical unit-capacity resources serving one route of weight one have $A=(1,1{)}^T$. With ${\kappa }_1={\kappa }_2=1$, $p={\mu }_1+{\mu }_2$ obeys $\dot{p}=1-p$, while ${\mu }_1/{\mu }_2$ is constant. The equilibrium prices can be any nonnegative pair with sum one, and positive initial values select the limiting split; the route rate always tends to one. Rank deficiency can, but need not, cause price nonuniqueness. This example also shows why full column rank alone is insufficient.

Finally, the zero-price qualification is essential even for an invertible matrix. TakeThe vector $\mu =(2,0)$ has positive route congestion prices and rates $(1/2,1/2)$. Resource one is balanced, but resource two is overloaded; its zero price keeps its derivative zero. This is a boundary equilibrium of multiplicative price dynamics, distinct from the optimizing equilibriumTherefore full row rank gives the unique optimizing equilibrium and convergence from strictly positive prices; it does not give uniqueness of every equilibrium on the nonnegative orthant.

A resource congestion price signals scarcity at a capacity-constrained link. Under multiplicative resource-price dynamics, its increase indicates excess demand and its decrease indicates spare capacity. A route pays the sum of these prices, its route congestion price. A zero resource congestion price at an optimum satisfies complementary slackness with possible spare capacity.

Maximize a sum of increasing strictly concave utilities $U_r(x_r)$ subject to $Ax\le C$, $x\ge 0$. Suppose capacities are positive, every route is nonempty, and $U_r^{\prime }(0)=\infty$. At its unique positive optimizer $x^{\ast }$, the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions give nonnegative resource congestion prices $p^{\ast }$ and route congestion prices $y_r^{\ast }=U_r^{\prime }(x_r^{\ast })$. Choosing ${\nu }_r^{\ast }=x_r^{\ast }{e}^{y_r^{\ast }}$ makes each user maximize $U_r({\nu }_r{e}^{-y_r^{\ast }})-y_r^{\ast }{\nu }_r{e}^{-y_r^{\ast }}$ at ${\nu }_r^{\ast }$. It also makes $x^{\ast }$ maximize the entropy maximization for loss-network occupancy objective, since its gradient is $\log ({\nu }_r^{\ast }/x_r^{\ast })=(A^T{p}^{\ast }{)}_r$. Thus user and network optima implement the same system optimum.