CIA 2010 covert communication websites Expired domain trackers by 
Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16When you Google most of the hit domains, many of them show up on "expired domain trackers", and above all Chinese expired domain trackers for some reason, notably e.g.:This suggests that scraping these lists might be a good starting point to obtaining "all expired domains ever".
- hupo.com: e.g. static.hupo.com/expdomain_myadmin/2012-03-06（国际域名）.txt. Heavily IP throttled. Tor hindered more than helped.Scraping script: ../cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hupo.sh. Scraping does about 1 day every 5 minutes relatively reliably, so about 36 hours / year. Not bad.Results are stored under
tmp/humo/<day>.Check for hit overlap:The hits are very well distributed amongst days and months, at least they did a good job hiding these potential timing fingerprints. This feels very deliberately designed.grep -Fx -f <( jq -r '.[].host' ../media/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hits.json ) cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/tmp/hupo/*There are lots of hits. The data set is very inclusive. Also we understand that it must have been obtains through means other than Web crawling, since it contains so many of the hits.Some of their files are simply missing however unfortunately, e.g. neither of the following exist:webmasterhome.cn did contain that one however: domain.webmasterhome.cn/com/2012-07-01.asp. Hmm. we might have better luck over there then?2018-11-19 is corrupt in a new and wonderful way, with a bunch of trailing zeros:ends in:wget -O hupo-2018-11-19 'http://static.hupo.com/expdomain_myadmin/2018-11-19%EF%BC%88%E5%9B%BD%E9%99%85%E5%9F%9F%E5%90%8D%EF%BC%89.txt hd hupo-2018-11-19000ffff0 74 75 64 69 65 73 2e 63 6f 6d 0d 0a 70 31 63 6f |tudies.com..p1co| 00100000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |................| * 0018a5e0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |.........|More generally, several files contain invalid domain names with non-ASCII characters, e.g. 2013-01-02 contains365<D3>л<FA><C2><CC>.com. Domain names can only contain ASCII charters: stackoverflow.com/questions/1133424/what-are-the-valid-characters-that-can-show-up-in-a-url-host Maybe we should get rid of any such lines as noise.Some files around 2011-09-06 start with an empty line. 2014-01-15 starts with about twenty empty lines. Oh and that last one also has some trash bytes the end<B7><B5><BB><D8>. Beauty. - webmasterhome.cn: e.g. domain.webmasterhome.cn/com/2012-03-06.asp. Appears to contain the exact same data as "static.hupo.com"Also has some randomly missing dates like hupo.com, though different missing ones from hupo, so they complement each other nicely.Some of the URLs are broken and don't inform that with HTTP status code, they just replace the results with some Chinese text 无法找到该页 (The requested page could not be found):Several URLs just return length 0 content, e.g.:It is not fully clear if this is a throttling mechanism, or if the data is just missing entirely.
curl -vvv http://domain.webmasterhome.cn/com/2015-10-31.asp * Trying 125.90.93.11:80... * Connected to domain.webmasterhome.cn (125.90.93.11) port 80 (#0) > GET /com/2015-10-31.asp HTTP/1.1 > Host: domain.webmasterhome.cn > User-Agent: curl/7.88.1 > Accept: */* > < HTTP/1.1 200 OK < Date: Sat, 21 Oct 2023 15:12:23 GMT < Server: Microsoft-IIS/6.0 < X-Powered-By: ASP.NET < Content-Length: 0 < Content-Type: text/html < Set-Cookie: ASPSESSIONIDCSTTTBAD=BGGPAONBOFKMMFIPMOGGHLMJ; path=/ < Cache-control: private < * Connection #0 to host domain.webmasterhome.cn left intactStarting around 2018, the IP limiting became very intense, 30 mins / 1 hour per URL, so we just gave up. Therefore, data from 2018 onwards does not contain webmasterhome.cn data.Starting from2013-05-10the format changes randomly. This also shows us that they just have all the HTML pages as static files on their server. E.g. with:we see:grep -a '<pre' * | s2013-05-09:<pre style='font-family:Verdana, Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; '><strong>2013<C4><EA>05<D4><C2>09<C8>յ<BD><C6>ڹ<FA><BC><CA><D3><F2><C3><FB></strong><br>0-3y.com 2013-05-10:<pre><strong>2013<C4><EA>05<D4><C2>10<C8>յ<BD><C6>ڹ<FA><BC><CA><D3><F2><C3><FB></strong> - justdropped.com: e.g. www.justdropped.com/drops/010112com.html. First known working day:
2006-01-01. Unthrottled. - yoid.com: e.g.: yoid.com/bydate.php?d=2016-06-03&a=a. First known workding day:
2016-06-01.
Data comparison:
- 2012-01-01Looking only at the
.com:The lists are quite similar however.- webmastercn has just about ten extra ones than justdropped, the rest is exactly the same
- justdropped has some extra and some missing from hupo
We've made the following pipelines for hupo.com + webmasterhome.cn merging:
./hupo.sh &
./webmastercn.sh &
./justdropped.sh &
wait
./justdropped-post.sh
./hupo-merge.sh
# Export as small Google indexable files in a Git repository.
./hupo-repo.sh
# Export as per year zips for Internet Archive.
./hupo-zip.sh
# Obtain count statistics:
./hupo-wc.shCount unique domains in the repos:
( echo */*/*/* | xargs cat ) | sort -u | wcThe extracted data is present at:Soon after uploading, these repos started getting some interesting traffic, presumably started by security trackers going "bling bling" on certain malicious domain names in their databases:
- archive.org/details/expired-domain-names-by-day
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-* repos:
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2006
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2007
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2008
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2009
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2010
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2011 (~11M)
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2012 (~18M)
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2013 (~28M)
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2014 (~29M)
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2015 (~28M)
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2016
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2017
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2018
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2019
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2020
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2021
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2022
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2023
- github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2024
- GitHub trackers:
- admin-monitor.shiyue.com
- anquan.didichuxing.com
- app.cloudsek.com
- app.flare.io
- app.rainforest.tech
- app.shadowmap.com
- bo.serenety.xmco.fr 8 1
- bts.linecorp.com
- burn2give.vercel.app
- cbs.ctm360.com 17 2
- code6.d1m.cn
- code6-ops.juzifenqi.com
- codefend.devops.cndatacom.com
- dlp-code.airudder.com
- easm.atrust.sangfor.com
- ec2-34-248-93-242.eu-west-1.compute.amazonaws.com
- ecall.beygoo.me 2 1
- eos.vip.vip.com 1 1
- foradar.baimaohui.net 2 1
- fty.beygoo.me
- hive.telefonica.com.br 2 1
- hulrud.tistory.com
- kartos.enthec.com
- soc.futuoa.com
- lullar-com-3.appspot.com
- penetration.houtai.io 2 1
- platform.sec.corp.qihoo.net
- plus.k8s.onemt.co 4 1
- pmp.beygoo.me 2 1
- portal.protectorg.com
- qa-boss.amh-group.com
- saicmotor.saas.cubesec.cn
- scan.huoban.com
- sec.welab-inc.com
- security.ctrip.com 10 3
- siem-gs.int.black-unique.com 2 1
- soc-github.daojia-inc.com
- spigotmc.org 2 1
- tcallzgroup.blueliv.com
- tcthreatcompass05.blueliv.com 4 1
- tix.testsite.woa.com 2 1
- toucan.belcy.com 1 1
- turbo.gwmdevops.com 18 2
- urlscan.watcherlab.com
- zelenka.guru. Looks like a Russian hacker forum.
- LinkedIn profile views:
- "Information Security Specialist at Forcepoint"
Check for overlap of the merge:
grep -Fx -f <( jq -r '.[].host' ../media/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hits.json ) cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/tmp/merge/*Next, we can start searching by keyword with Wayback Machine CDX scanning with Tor parallelization with out helper ../cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hupo-cdx-tor.sh, e.g. to check domains that contain the term "news":produces per-year results for the regex term OK lets:
./hupo-cdx-tor.sh mydir 'news|global' 2011 2019news|global between the years under:tmp/hupo-cdx-tor/mydir/2011
tmp/hupo-cdx-tor/mydir/2012./hupo-cdx-tor.sh out 'news|headline|internationali|mondo|mundo|mondi|iran|today'Other searches that are not dense enough for our patience:
world|global|[^.]infoOMG and a few more. It's amazing.
news search might be producing some golden, golden new hits!!! Going full into this. Hits:- thepyramidnews.com
- echessnews.com
- tickettonews.com
- airuafricanews.com
- vuvuzelanews.com
- dayenews.com
- newsupdatesite.com
- arabicnewsonline.com
- arabicnewsunfiltered.com
- newsandsportscentral.com
- networkofnews.com
- trekkingtoday.com
- financial-crisis-news.com
TODO what does this Chinese forum track? New registrations? Their focus seems to be domain name speculation
Some of the threads contain domain dumps. We haven't yet seen a scrapable URL pattern, but their data goes way back and did have various hits. The forum seems to have started in 2006: club.domain.cn/forum.php?mod=forumdisplay&fid=41&page=10127
club.domain.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=241704 "【国际域名拟删除列表】2007年06月16日" is the earliest list we could find. It is an expired domain list.
Some hits:
- club.domain.cn/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=709388 contains
alljohnny.comThe thread title is "2009.5.04". The post date 2009-04-30Breadcrumb nav: 域名论坛 > 域名增值交易区 > 国际域名专栏 (domain name forum > area for domain names increasing in value > international domais)
CIA 2010 covert communication websites "Mass Deface III" pastebin by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16pastebin.com/CTXnhjeS dated mega early on Sep 30th, 2012 by CYBERTAZIEX.
This source was found by Oleg Shakirov.
This pastebin contained a few new hits, in addition to some pre-existing ones. Most of the hits them seem to be linked to the IP 72.34.53.174, which presumably is a major part of the fingerprint found by CYBERTAZIEX, though unsurprisingly methodology is unclear. As documented, the domains appear to be linked to a "Condor hosting" provider, but it is hard to find any information about it online.
From the title, it would seem that someone hacked into Condor and defaced all of its sites, including unknowingly some CIA ones which is LOL.
Ciro Santilli checked every single non-subdomain domain in the list.
Other files under the same account: pastebin.com/u/cybertaziex did not seem of interest.
The author's real name appears to be Deni Suwandi: twitter.com/denz_999 from Indonesia, but all accounts appear to be inactive, otherwise we'd ping him to ask for more info about the list.
www.zone-h.com lists some of the domains. They also seem to have intended to have snapshots of the defaces but we can't see them which is sad:
- www.zone-h.com/mirror/id/18994983 Inspecting the source we see an image zonehmirrors.org/defaced/2013/01/14/vypconsulting.com//tmp/sejeal.jpg "Sejeal" "Memorial of Gaza Martyrs". Sejeal defacements are mentioned e.g. at:
- www.zone-h.com/mirror/id/18410811 inspecting source we find: zonehmirrors.org/defaced/2012/09/30/ambrisbooks.com/ which lists the team:
alljohnny.com had a hit: ipinf.ru/domains/alljohnny.com/, and so Ciro started looking around... and a good number of other things have hits.Not all of them, definitely less data than viewdns.info.
But they do reverse IP, and they show which nearby reverse IPs have hits on the same page, for free, which is great!
Shame their ordering is purely alphabetical, doesn't properly order the IPs so it is a bit of a pain, but we can handle it.
OMG, Russians!!!
In this section we document the outcomes of more detailed inspection of both the communication mechanisms (JavaScript, JAR, swf) and HTML that might help to better fingerprint the websites.
CIA 2010 covert communication websites Communication mechanism by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16There are four main types of communication mechanisms found:These have short single word names with some meaning linked to their website.
- There is also one known instance where a .zip extension was used! web.archive.org/web/20131101104829*/http://plugged-into-news.net/weatherbug.zip as:
<applet codebase="/web/20101229222144oe_/http://plugged-into-news.net/" archive="/web/20101229222144oe_/http://plugged-into-news.net/weatherbug.zip"JAR is the most common comms, and one of the most distinctive, making it a great fingerprint. - JavaScript file. There are two subtypes:
- JavaScript with SHAs. Rare. Likely older. Way more fingerprintable.
- JavaScript without SHAs. They have all been obfuscated slightly different and compressed. But the file sizes are all very similar from 8kB to 10kB, and they all look similar, so visually it is very easy to detect a match with good likelyhood.
- Adobe Flash swf file. In all instances found so far, the name of the SWF matches the name of the second level domain exactly, e.g.:While this is somewhat of a fingerprint, it is worth noting that is was a relatively commonly used pattern. But it is also the rarest of the mechanisms. This is a at a dissonance with the rest of the web, which circa 2010 already had way more SWF than JAR apparently.
http://tee-shot.net/tee-shot.swfSome of the SWF websites have archives for empty/servletpages:which makes us think that it is a part of the SWF system../bailsnboots.com/20110201234509/servlet/teammate/index.html ./currentcommunique.com/20110130162713/servlet/summer/index.html ./mynepalnews.com/20110204095758/servlet/SnoopServlet/index.html ./mynepalnews.com/20110204095403/servlet/release/index.html ./www.hassannews.net/20101230175421/servlet/jordan/index.html ./zerosandonesnews.com/20110209084339/servlet/technews/index.html - CGI comms
Because the communication mechanisms are so crucial, they tend to be less varied, and serve as very good fingerprints. It is not ludicrous, e.g. identical files, but one look at a few and you will know the others.
We've come across a few shallow and stylistically similar websites on suspicious ranges with this pattern.
No JS/JAR/SWF comms, but rather a subdomain, and an HTTPS page with .cgi extension that leads to a login page. Some names seen for this subdomain:
The question is, is this part of some legitimate tooling that created such patterns? And if so which? Or are they actual hits with a new comms mechanism not previously seen?
The fact that:suggests to Ciro that they are an actual hit.
- hits of this type are so dense in the suspicious ranges
- they are so stylistically similar between on another
- citizenlabs specifically mentioned a "CGI" comms method
In particular, the
secure and ssl ones are overused, and together with some heuristics allowed us to find our first two non Reuters ranges! Section "secure subdomain search on 2013 DNS Census"Some currently known URLsIf we could do a crawl search for
- backstage.musical-fortune.net/cgi-bin/backstage.cgi
- clients.smart-travel-consultant.com/cgi-bin/clients.cgi
- members.it-proonline.com/cgi-bin/members.cgi
- members.metanewsdaily.com/cgi-bin/ABC.cgi
- miembros.todosperuahora.com/cgi-bin/business.cgi
- secure.altworldnews.com/cgi-bin/desk.cgi
- secure.driversinternationalgolf.com/cgi-bin/drivers.cgi
- secure.freshtechonline.com/cgi-bin/tech.cgi
- secure.globalnewsbulletin.com/cgi-bin/index.cgi
- secure.negativeaperture.com/cgi-bin/canon.cgi
- secure.riskandrewardnews.com/cgi-bin/worldwide.cgi
- secure.theworld-news.net/cgi-bin/news.cgi
- secure.topbillingsite.com/cgi-bin/main.cgi
- secure.worldnewsandent.com/cgi-bin/news.cgi
- ssl.beyondnetworknews.com/cgi-bin/local.cgi
- ssl.newtechfrontier.com/cgi-bin/tech.cgi
- www.businessexchangetoday.com/cgi-bin/business.cgi
- heal.conquermstoday.com (path unknown)
secure.*com/cgi-bin/*.cgi that might be a good enough fingerprint, maybe even *.*com/cgi-bin/*.cgi. Edit: it is not perfect, but we kind of did it: Section "secure subdomain search on 2013 DNS Census".Later on, we've also come across some stylistic hits in IP ranges with apparent slight variations of the CGI comms pattern:
Since these are so rare, it is still a bit hard to classify them for sure, but they are of great interest no doubt, as as we start to notice these patterns more tend to come if it is a thing.
The CGI comms websites contain the only occurrence of HTTPS, so it might open up the door for a certificate fingerprint as proposed by user joelcollinsdc at: news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36280801!
crt.sh appears to be a good way to look into this:They all appear to use either of:
- backstage.musical-fortune.net:
- clients.smart-travel-consultant.com
- members.it-proonline.com
- members.metanewsdaily.com
- miembros.todosperuahora.com
- secure.altworldnews.com
- secure.driversinternationalgolf.com
- secure.freshtechonline.com
- secure.globalnewsbulletin.com
- secure.negativeaperture.com
- secure.riskandrewardnews.com
- secure.theworld-news.net
- secure.topbillingsite.com
- secure.worldnewsandent.com
- ssl.beyondnetworknews.com
- ssl.newtechfrontier.com
- www.businessexchangetoday.com
- heal.conquermstoday.com
- Go Daddy
- Thawte DV SSL CA
- Starfield Technologies, Inc.
crt.sh/?q=globalnewsbulletin.com has a hit to: crt.sh/?id=774803. With login we can see: search.censys.io/certificates/5078bce356a8f8590205ae45350b27f58f4ac04478ed47a389a55b539065cee8. Issued by www.thawte.com/repository/index.html. No hits for certificates with same public key: search.censys.io/search?resource=certificates&q=parsed.subject_key_info.fingerprint_sha256%3A+714b4a3e8b2f555d230a92c943ced4f34b709b39ed590a6a230e520c273705af or any other "same" queries though.
Let's try another one for secure.altworldnews.com: search.censys.io/certificates/e88f8db87414401fd00728db39a7698d874dbe1ae9d88b01c675105fabf69b94. Nope, no direct mega hits here either.
CIA 2010 covert communication websites JavaScript reverse engineering by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16There are two types of JavaScript found so far. The ones with SHA and the ones without. There are only 2 examples of JS with SHA:Both files start with precisely the same string:
- iraniangoals.com: web.archive.org/web/20110202091909/http://iraniangoals.com/journal.js Commented at: iraniangoals.com JavaScript reverse engineering
- iranfootballsource.com: web.archive.org/web/20110202091901/http://iranfootballsource.com/futbol.js
- kukrinews.com: web.archive.org/web/20100513094909/http://kukrinews.com/news.js
- todaysnewsandweather-ru.com: web.archive.org/web/20110207094735/http://todaysnewsandweather-ru.com/blacksea.js
var ms="\u062F\u0631\u064A\u0627\u0641\u062A\u06CC",lc="\u062A\u0647\u064A\u0647 \u0645\u062A\u0646",mn="\u0628\u0631\u062F\u0627\u0632\u0634 \u062F\u0631 \u062C\u0631\u064A\u0627\u0646 \u0627\u0633\u062A...\u0644\u0637\u0641\u0627 \u0635\u0628\u0631 \u0643\u0646\u064A\u062F",lt="\u062A\u0647\u064A\u0647 \u0645\u062A\u0646",ne="\u067E\u0627\u0633\u062E",kf="\u062E\u0631\u0648\u062C",mb="\u062D\u0630\u0641",mv="\u062F\u0631\u064A\u0627\u0641\u062A\u06CC",nt="\u0627\u0631\u0633\u0627\u0644",ig="\u062B\u0628\u062A \u063A\u0644\u0637. \u062C\u0647\u062A \u062A\u062C\u062F\u064A\u062F \u062B\u0628\u062A \u0635\u0641\u062D\u0647 \u0631\u0627 \u0628\u0627\u0632\u0622\u0648\u0631\u06CC \u06A9\u0646\u064A\u062F",hs="\u063A\u064A\u0631 \u0642\u0627\u0628\u0644 \u0627\u062C\u0631\u0627. \u062E\u0637\u0627 \u062F\u0631 \u0627\u062A\u0651\u0635\u0627\u0644",ji="\u063A\u064A\u0631 \u0642\u0627\u0628\u0644 \u0627\u062C\u0631\u0627. \u062E\u0637\u0627 \u062F\u0631 \u0627\u062A\u0651\u0635\u0627\u0644",ie="\u063A\u064A\u0631 \u0642\u0627\u0628\u0644 \u0627\u062C\u0631\u0627. \u062E\u0637\u0627 \u062F\u0631 \u0627\u062A\u0651\u0635\u0627\u0644",gc="\u0633\u0648\u0627\u0631 \u06A9\u0631\u062F\u0646 \u062A\u06A9\u0645\u064A\u0644 \u0634\u062F",gz="\u0645\u0637\u0645\u0626\u0646\u064A\u062F \u06A9\u0647 \u0645\u064A\u062E\u0648\u0627\u0647\u064A\u062F \u067E\u064A\u0627\u0645 \u0631\u0627 \u062D\u0630\u0641 \u06A9\u0646\u064A\u062F\u061F"Good fingerprint present in all of them:
throw new Error("B64 D.1");};if(at[1]==-1){throw new Error("B64 D.2");};if(at[2]==-1){if(f<ay.length){throw new Error("B64 D.3");};dg=2;}else if(at[3]==-1){if(f<ay.length){throw new Error("B64 D.4") CIA 2010 covert communication websites Google searches for known domains and IPs by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16Googling most domains gives only very few results, and most of them are just useless lists of expired domains. Skipping those for now.
Googling
"dedrickonline.com" has a git at www.webwiki.de/dedrickonline.com# Furthermore, it also contains the IP address "65.61.127.174" under the "Technik" tab!Unfortunately that website appears to be split by language? E.g. the English version does not contain it: www.webwiki.com/dedrickonline.com, which would make searching a bit harder, but still doable.
IP search did work! www.webwiki.de/65.61.127.174
But doesn't often/ever work unfortunately for others.
Searching on github.com: github.com/DrWhax/cia-website-comms by Jurre van Bergen from September 2022 contains some of the links to some of the ones reported by Reuters including some of their JARs, presumably for reversing purposees. Pinged him at: github.com/DrWhax/cia-website-comms/issues/1
Some less-trivial breakthroughs:
- finding 2013 DNS Census
- CGI comms characterization
- secure subdomain search on 2013 DNS Census let to a few hits
- 2013 DNS Census virtual host cleanup heuristic keyword searches was massive and led to many new ranges
CIA 2010 covert communication websites secure subdomain search on 2013 DNS Census by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16Grepping the 2013 DNS Census first by overused CGI comms subdomains
secure. and ssl. leaves 200k lines. Grepping for the overused "news" led to hits:- secure.worldnewsandent.com,2012-02-13T21:28:15,208.254.40.117
- ssl.beyondnetworknews.com,2012-02-13T20:10:13,66.104.175.40
Also tried but failed:
sports:- secure.motorsportdealers.com,2012-04-10T20:19:09,64.73.117.38 web.archive.org/web/20110501000000*/motorsportdealers.com
OK, after the initial successes in New results: only one...
secure., we went a bit more data intensive:- took all
secure.*ssl.*URLs in the 2013 DNS Census, 70k entries - cleaned up a bit, e.g. only
.comor.net. this left only, 30k entries only - lopped over all of them in archive CDX: Wayback Machine CDX scanning, searching for those that also end in
.cgiweb.archive.org/cdx/search/cdx?url=$domain&matchType=domain&filter=urlkey:.*.cgi&to=20140101000000. Took an afternoon, but no rate limit block. - this leaves about 1000, so we loop over all of them manually on web archive with a script, and opened any that had the pattern of very vew hits between 2010 and 2013 only, and on those check for visual/thematic style match. Careful not to make more than 15 requests per minute or else 5 min blacklist!
- 208.254.42.205 secure.driversinternationalgolf.com,2012-02-13T10:42:20,
After 2013 DNS Census virtual host cleanup heuristic keyword searches we later understood why there were so few hits here: the 2013 DNS Census didn't capture the
secure. subdomains of many domains it had for some reason. Shame, because if it had, this method would have yielded many more results.
Pinned article: Introduction to the OurBigBook Project
Welcome to the OurBigBook Project! Our goal is to create the perfect publishing platform for STEM subjects, and get university-level students to write the best free STEM tutorials ever.
Everyone is welcome to create an account and play with the site: ourbigbook.com/go/register. We belive that students themselves can write amazing tutorials, but teachers are welcome too. You can write about anything you want, it doesn't have to be STEM or even educational. Silly test content is very welcome and you won't be penalized in any way. Just keep it legal!
Intro to OurBigBook
. Source. We have two killer features:
- topics: topics group articles by different users with the same title, e.g. here is the topic for the "Fundamental Theorem of Calculus" ourbigbook.com/go/topic/fundamental-theorem-of-calculusArticles of different users are sorted by upvote within each article page. This feature is a bit like:
- a Wikipedia where each user can have their own version of each article
- a Q&A website like Stack Overflow, where multiple people can give their views on a given topic, and the best ones are sorted by upvote. Except you don't need to wait for someone to ask first, and any topic goes, no matter how narrow or broad
This feature makes it possible for readers to find better explanations of any topic created by other writers. And it allows writers to create an explanation in a place that readers might actually find it.
Figure 1. Screenshot of the "Derivative" topic page. View it live at: ourbigbook.com/go/topic/derivativeVideo 2. OurBigBook Web topics demo. Source. - local editing: you can store all your personal knowledge base content locally in a plaintext markup format that can be edited locally and published either:This way you can be sure that even if OurBigBook.com were to go down one day (which we have no plans to do as it is quite cheap to host!), your content will still be perfectly readable as a static site.
- to OurBigBook.com to get awesome multi-user features like topics and likes
- as HTML files to a static website, which you can host yourself for free on many external providers like GitHub Pages, and remain in full control
Figure 3. Visual Studio Code extension installation.
Figure 4. Visual Studio Code extension tree navigation.
Figure 5. Web editor. You can also edit articles on the Web editor without installing anything locally.Video 3. Edit locally and publish demo. Source. This shows editing OurBigBook Markup and publishing it using the Visual Studio Code extension.Video 4. OurBigBook Visual Studio Code extension editing and navigation demo. Source. 
- Infinitely deep tables of contents:
All our software is open source and hosted at: github.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook
Further documentation can be found at: docs.ourbigbook.com
Feel free to reach our to us for any help or suggestions: docs.ourbigbook.com/#contact