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The translator of the 1710 English text reproduced in Introduction to the Quadrature of Curves by Isaac Newton.

Standards of mathematical proof changed between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries because both the objects studied and the operations performed on them changed. A finite geometrical construction, an infinite expansion, and an abstract group raise different questions about justification. There was no universal seventeenth-century indifference to rigour followed by its sudden nineteenth-century invention. The more defensible thesis is that successful methods repeatedly exposed unstated assumptions; later work made some of those assumptions into explicit definitions, hypotheses and existence arguments.

Pierre de Fermat's adequality illustrates the distinction between an effective method and its justification. For $F(a)=a(L-a)$, comparing neighbouring expressions givesDividing by $e$ and suppressing the remaining term in $e$ produces $a=L/2$. There is an independent finite verification:Thus the result can be secure even when the general procedure raises a question: why is the increment first nonzero for division and then discarded? In the parabola construction of question 2, the same issue appears in replacing a strict geometrical comparison by adequality and extracting the subtangent. A historical explanation must describe this operation on its own terms rather than silently equate it with a modern derivative.^[ref]

Isaac Newton and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz supplied different languages for the new calculus. Isaac Newton's Introduction to the Quadrature of Curves by Isaac Newton, first published with the 1704 Opticks, presents quantities generated by motion and considers their rates of change. Its mature language of first and last ratios seeks exact relations as increments vanish; it should not be confused with simply asserting that a small error is harmless. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's 1684 Nova methodus pro maximis et minimis by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz presents a calculus of differentials and operational rules. Their common problem was to explain why procedures using vanishing increments establish exact results, while their chosen objects and modes of explanation differed.^[ref][ref]

George Berkeley's The Analyst by George Berkeley (1734) exposes the logical pressure point. For the cube,The finite identity does not become a legal division at $h=0$. The modern repair is to keep $h\ne 0$ throughout the identity and prove that its right-hand side tends to $3x^2$. That limit is different from a quotient evaluated at zero. George Berkeley's criticism therefore concerns the grounds of inference, not whether the established rules often produce correct answers. His theological polemic also reminds us that standards of mathematical proof could be contested outside specialist calculation.^[ref]

The infinite introduced another burden. Joseph Fourier's 1822 use of trigonometric series to represent arbitrary functions greatly extended what calculations in mathematical physics could express. But deriving Fourier coefficients by orthogonality only shows what those coefficients must be if the proposed operations are legitimate. It does not prove convergence, equality with the initial data, or interchange of an integral and an infinite sum. The example of a constant expanded in a Fourier sine series makes a hidden qualification visible: the terms all vanish at the endpoints, even when the assigned data do not. The correct theorem must specify the domain and mode of representation.^[ref]

Peter Gustav Lejeune Dirichlet's 1829 memoir supplies a particularly precise example of changing proof obligations. It criticises a convergence argument of Augustin-Louis Cauchy's which used complex substitution into an arbitrary function and an insufficient comparison between signed series. Peter Gustav Lejeune Dirichlet supplies the instructive pairThe first series converges by the alternating series test; the second diverges because their difference is the harmonic series. Nevertheless $b_n/a_n=1+(-1{)}^n/\sqrt{n}\to 1$. Thus asymptotic equality of terms does not transfer convergence between conditionally convergent signed series. A comparison principle valid for positive terms needs additional justification when cancellation is involved. The example refutes a mode of inference rather than merely correcting a numerical answer.^[ref]

Augustin-Louis Cauchy's own foundations programme is part of this change. The 1821 Cours d'analyse by Augustin-Louis Cauchy makes limits, continuity and series convergence central to elementary reasoning. Yet its Sum theorem of Cauchy also shows why announcing rigour does not make every proof adequate. In modern terminology, continuous functions can have a discontinuous pointwise limit. An explicit series version isEach term is a polynomial and the partial sum is $x-x^{N+1}$. The convergence does not hold in uniform convergence: with $x_N=1-1/N$, the error $x_N^{N+1}$ tends to $e^{-1}$ rather than zero. The modern uniform limit theorem repairs the inference by requiring one bound on the error to work throughout the domain. This example diagnoses the missing control under a pointwise reading; it does not settle every historical interpretation of Augustin-Louis Cauchy's infinitesimal language.^[ref]

The issue is the order of dependence in quantifiers. Pointwise convergence permits the threshold $N$ to depend on both the error tolerance and the point. Uniform convergence requires a threshold depending only on the tolerance. If $f_N$ is continuous near $x_0$ and the convergence is uniform, choose $N$ so that $|f-f_N|<\epsilon /3$ nearby, then use the continuity of this fixed $f_N$ to make $|f_N(x)-f_N(x_0)|<\epsilon /3$. The triangle inequality proves $|f(x)-f(x_0)|<\epsilon$. Writing out this proof reveals what a vague statement that the tail is small leaves unproved.

Another nineteenth-century development concerns the foundations of the real numbers themselves. Richard Dedekind's Continuity and Irrational Numbers by Richard Dedekind (1872) asks for an arithmetical account of the continuity often borrowed from a drawn line. A Dedekind cut separates the rational numbers into lower and upper classes. For instance,defines a gap in the rational numbers corresponding to $\sqrt{2}$. The cut is determined without assuming that a rational number fills it. The extended number system then supports existence theorems that a geometrical picture alone had suggested.^[ref]

This matters for apparently elementary proofs. Suppose $f$ is continuous on $[a,b]$ with $f(a)<0<f(b)$. Repeated bisection constructs nested intervals whose endpoint values have opposite signs and whose lengths tend to zero. To conclude that there is a common limiting point, one needs the completeness of the real numbers. Continuity then forces its value to be zero. Over the rational numbers, $f(q)=q^2-2$ changes sign between $1$ and $2$ but has no rational zero. Thus even a proof that avoids pictures must explain the existence of its limiting object. Richard Dedekind's account makes that requirement an explicit part of the mathematical setting, rather than an intuition about a continuous line.^[ref]

There is a parallel change in algebra. Heinrich Weber's 1882 definition in question 6 describes arbitrary elements through laws of composition. To assess such a definition one proves implications between axioms. The passage's finite set hypothesis implies that cancellative multiplication has an identity element and inverse elements; without that hypothesis, the positive integers under addition supply a counterexample. This is a new kind of proof obligation: one must establish that a proposed abstract definition has the intended consequences, rather than rely on their familiarity in particular numerical or permutation examples.^[ref]

The principal change was towards explicit control of operations, hypotheses and existence. Effective symbolic algorithms persisted, and geometric reasoning remained valuable. What became increasingly demanding was the passage from success in examples to a general claim: an infinitesimal step needed justification, an infinite expansion needed a convergence theorem, a limiting point needed a complete number system, and an abstract definition needed its consequences proved. The examples also prevent a simple progress story: nineteenth-century mathematicians disagreed about admissible reasoning, and a programme devoted to rigour could itself become the object of a successful critique.