In a second-price sealed-bid auction, fix the other players' bids and let $a$ be their highest bid. A player of valuation $v$ who wins pays $a$, obtaining quasilinear utility $v-a$; losing gives zero. If $v>a$, winning is optimal and bidding $v$ wins. If $v<a$, losing is optimal and bidding $v$ loses. If $v=a$, winning and losing both give zero, regardless of the fixed tie-breaking rule. Thus truthful bidding is a dominant strategy. In particular the profile in which every bidder bids its valuation is a Nash equilibrium, for every valuation profile, not merely on average.

A symmetric independent private values model gives each bidder a private valuation determined by its own type. The types are independent draws from a common distribution, and the bidders have identical roles and preferences. In the standard bidding calculation bidders are risk-neutral with quasilinear utility: they maximize expected valuation minus payment. Strategies map each bidder's privately observed value to a bid. Equilibrium in this incomplete-information setting means a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Take $n\ge 2$ with independent uniform values on $[0,1]$. In a first-price sealed-bid auction, if all players bid their valuations, a type $v$ earns zero whenever it wins and zero whenever it loses. But for $v>0$, bidding $v/2$ instead yields positive expected utilityTherefore truthful first-price bidding is not an equilibrium.

For the candidate uniform private-value first-price bidding equilibrium, put $\alpha =(n-1)/n$ and suppose every opponent bids $\alpha$ times its valuation. For a deviation $b\in [0,\alpha ]$, winning means that every opposing value is less than $b/\alpha$. Independence gives winning probability $(b/\alpha {)}^{n-1}$, so the type-$v$ expected utility isFor $b>0$ its derivative isFor $v>0$ it is positive before $b=\alpha v$ and negative after; for $v=0$, every positive bid has nonpositive utility and zero is optimal. Thus the maximum on $[0,\alpha ]$ is $b=\alpha v$. A bid above $\alpha$ wins with probability one but gives $v-b\le v-\alpha$, which is no better than the already considered endpoint $b=\alpha$, hence no better than $b=\alpha v$. Ties have probability zero under the continuous opposing distributions. All admissible deviations are therefore covered.

Each bidder's best response is the proposed rule, provingIts conditional expected utility is $u(v,\alpha v)=v^n/n$. With only one bidder, bidding zero is optimal and agrees with the same formal rule; the derivative argument is needed only for $n\ge 2$.

Label the two intermediate vertices $1,2$. The four outer edges have capacity $M$ and the middle edge has capacity one. The cut separating $s$ from the other vertices has capacity $2M$, and the two paths $s\to 1\to t$ and $s\to 2\to t$ can each carry $M$. Thus the maximum flow is $2M$.

A fast run of the Ford-Fulkerson algorithm chooses those two direct paths and augments by $M$ on each: it terminates in two augmentations. One augmentation cannot suffice, because every initial path has bottleneck at most $M$.

For a run with $M+1$ augmentations, first choose $s\to 1\to 2\to t$ and augment by one. The middle edge then has net flow $1$ from $1$ to $2$. Its reverse residual capacity is $1-(-1)=2$, not one. Alternate crossing paths, next $s\to 2\to 1\to t$, then $s\to 1\to 2\to t$, and so on. Each of the next $M-1$ augmentations has bottleneck two. More explicitly, after $k$ crossing augmentations, $1\le k\le M$, the total flow is $2k-1$, and the outer-edge flow totals on the pairs $(s1,2t)$ and $(s2,1t)$ are $k$ and $k-1$ in one order or the other. The middle net flow is $\pm 1$. The next opposite crossing path uses the less-loaded outer pair and has reverse-middle capacity two. Until $k=M$, its outer residual capacities are at least two.

After these $M$ augmentations, one outer pair is full and the other has one unit left. One final opposite crossing augmentation of one reaches $2M$. The total amounts are $1$, then $M-1$ copies of $2$, then $1$, giving exactly $M+1$ augmentations. For $M=1$ the middle block is empty and this gives two augmentations as well. These are explicit requested path-choice histories. In an undirected network, $M+1$ need not be a bound on every possible history: for $M=2$, choosing the crossing path, the two direct paths, and then the crossing path again gives four successive unit augmentations.

For a general undirected network, let $y_{ij}=x_{ij}-x_{ji}$ be the antisymmetric net flow. Feasibility gives $|y_{ij}|\le c_{ij}$, so the directed residual network has nonnegative capacities $c_{ij}^{\prime }=c_{ij}-y_{ij}$. For any cut $S$ with $s\in S$, $t\notin S$, conservation at the internal vertices givesThus its outgoing residual cut capacity isThe subtracted flow value is the same for every cut. Taking the minimum and applying the max-flow min-cut theorem to the original and residual networks proves the residual maximum flow is the remaining optimality gap identity

Suppose now $f^{\prime }>0$, and let $U$ consist of vertices reachable from $s$ through residual arcs of capacity at least $f^{\prime }/m$. If $t\notin U$, every outgoing arc from $U$ has capacity strictly below $f^{\prime }/m$, since its head would otherwise be reachable. At most $m$ original undirected edges cross this cut, and each supplies exactly one outgoing directed arc. Hence $C^{\prime }(U)<m(f^{\prime }/m)=f^{\prime }$, contradicting the residual minimum-cut value $f^{\prime }$. Therefore $\boxed{t\in U}$, and a widest augmenting path has bottleneck at least $f^{\prime }/m$. When $f^{\prime }=0$, the current flow is already optimal and no such path is needed.

Let $F_k$ be the remaining residual maximum flow after $k$ augmentations of the modified rule, starting from zero flow. Its chosen widest path increases the flow by at least $F_k/m$, soThis is the geometric convergence of widest-path augmentation. For $m\ge 2$, $F_k\le e^{-k/m}{f}^{\ast }$. Starting from zero with integer capacities keeps all flow values and residual optimality gaps integer. Thus $k>m\ln f^{\ast }$ makes $F_k<1$ and hence $F_k=0$, giving termination in $\boxed{O(m\log f^{\ast })}$ augmentations for $f^{\ast }\ge 2$. If $f^{\ast }=1$, one positive integer augmentation suffices; if $f^{\ast }=0$, none is required. A uniform statement is $O(m\log (1+f^{\ast }))$. With $m=1$, a nonzero flow is also completed in one augmentation, consistent with the recurrence's zero contraction factor.

Let $v:2^N\to \mathbb{R}$, $v(\varnothing )=0$, be a coalitional game with $n=|N|$. The Shapley value isEquivalently, choose a uniformly random player ordering and average each player's marginal contribution when that player joins its predecessors. The coefficient counts precisely the orderings with predecessor set $S$.

The standard axioms are efficiency, ${\sum }_i{\varphi }_i=v(N)$; symmetry, giving equal values to players with identical marginal contributions; the dummy-player property, giving ${\varphi }_i=v(\{i\})$ if every marginal contribution of $i$ equals $v(\{i\})$; and additivity, ${\varphi }_i(v+w)={\varphi }_i(v)+{\varphi }_i(w)$. The null-player form of the dummy axiom gives zero to a player contributing nothing. These properties characterize the Shapley value. They also follow directly from its formula: efficiency telescopes along each ordering, symmetry relabels orderings, constant dummy contributions average to themselves, and the sum is linear in $v$.

For balanced contributions of Shapley values, remove player $j$ from a uniformly random ordering. The resulting ordering of $N\setminus \{j\}$ is uniform, so it computes $i$'s Shapley value in the restricted game. If $j$ comes after $i$, removing it does not change $i$'s marginal contribution. If $j$ precedes $i$, and $S$ consists of $i$'s other predecessors, the difference isThere are $(|S|+1)!(n-|S|-2)!$ full orderings with exactly $S\cup \{j\}$ before $i$. ConsequentlyBoth the summand and coefficient are unchanged when $i,j$ are interchanged. ThusThe restriction keeps all coalition values for the remaining players, exactly matching the payoff comparison after a departure. The identity does not require the differences to be positive.

Now consider the coverage coalitional game formed by the finite book sets. For disjoint coalitions $S,T$, put $B(S)={\bigcup }_{i\in S}{B}_i$. ThenThus coverage is generally subadditive. It is a superadditive coalitional game precisely when the book sets are pairwise disjoint: disjointness makes the displayed formula additive, while a common book of players $i,j$ gives $v(\{i,j\})<v(\{i\})+v(\{j\})$. For example, $B_1=B_2=\{b\}$ gives values $1,1,1$ and disproves unconditional superadditivity. The printed clause must therefore have its disjointness condition apply to superadditivity as well as to core nonemptiness.

For the core of a coverage game, an allocation must satisfy efficiency ${\sum }_i{x}_i=v(N)$ and ${\sum }_{i\in S}{x}_i\ge v(S)$ for every coalition. In particular $x_i\ge |B_i|$. Summing givesThe reverse inequality always holds, with equality exactly when no book appears in two sets. Therefore overlap makes the core empty. If the sets are disjoint, $x_i=|B_i|$ gives every coalition exactly its value and is a core allocation; the singleton lower bounds and efficiency make it the only one. Hence superadditivity and a nonempty core each occur exactly in the pairwise-disjoint case.

Finally write the game as a sum over individual books. For a book $b$, let $K_b=\{k:b\in B_k\}$. Its contribution to coalition value is one if the coalition meets $K_b$, and zero otherwise. In a random ordering, player $i$ contributes this book precisely when $i\in K_b$ and is earliest among its $|K_b|$ knowers. Each knower is equally likely to be earliest. Additivity of the Shapley value therefore gives the Shapley value of a coverage gameThis formula remains valid when books overlap and the core is empty.

For a finite bimatrix game, let $A,B\in {\mathbb{R}}^{r\times s}$ be the two players' payoff matrices. A pair of mixed strategies $(p,q)\in {\Delta }_r\times {\Delta }_s$ is a Nash equilibrium ifHere ${\Delta }_r$ is the probability simplex on the first player's pure actions, and similarly for ${\Delta }_s$. The two payoff matrices need not be negatives of each other. Nash's theorem asserts that every finite two-person game has an equilibrium in mixed strategies.

We prove it using the Brouwer gain-map proof of bimatrix equilibrium. Put $u=p^{T}Aq$, $v=p^{T}Bq$ and define the positive pure-deviation gainsWrite $G={\sum }_i{g}_i$, $H={\sum }_j{h}_j$ and defineEvery coordinate is nonnegative and each player's coordinates sum to one. The map is continuous, since the payoffs and positive-part function are continuous and both denominators are at least one. Thus $T$ is a continuous self-map of the nonempty compact convex set ${\Delta }_r\times {\Delta }_s$. The Brouwer fixed-point theorem supplies a fixed point $(p,q)$.

At that fixed point the first coordinate equations give $g_i=G{p}_i$. Suppose $G>0$. For every $i$ with $p_i>0$, this makes $g_i>0$, so $(Aq{)}_i-u=g_i=G{p}_i$. But averaging the payoff excess over the support givesa contradiction. Therefore $G=0$, and every $g_i$ is zero. Each pure action has payoff at most $u$, so every mixed deviation, being a convex combination of pure actions, has payoff at most $u$ too. The same argument for $h_j=H{q}_j$ gives $H=0$ and excludes every unilateral deviation by the second player. The fixed point is therefore a Nash equilibrium, proving the stated theorem without a zero-sum assumption.

Assume $n\ge 1$ and the integer coefficient bound $U\ge 1$. There are $m(n+1)$ integers to record. Each signed integer in $[-U,U]$ can be encoded in $\lceil {\log }_2(2U+1)\rceil$ bits, so a fixed-width dense encoding needsbits, including the dimensions and bound. Its size is $\boxed{O(mn\log (U+1))}$. This is the bit-input model used for polynomial time; an arithmetic-operation count alone would not suffice.

We first construct a rational feasibility certificate for integer inequalities. Choose a feasible point and an orthant containing it, adding coordinate inequalities of the form $x_i\ge 0$ or $-x_i\ge 0$. The intersection $Q$ is nonempty. Starting at a point of $Q$, if the active constraint normals have rank less than $n$, choose a nonzero direction $d$ annihilating them. A sufficiently short move in either direction remains feasible, since every inactive constraint has positive slack. At least one direction has a finite endpoint: a nonzero coordinate of $d$ can be oriented toward the orthant boundary. Move to the first constraint met along such a direction. Its normal does not annihilate $d$, so it is independent of the previously active normals. Their rank strictly increases. In at most $n$ moves we obtain a point with $n$ independent active constraints.

At that point $Bx=d_0$ for an invertible integer $n\times n$ matrix $B$. Its rows are original constraint rows or signed coordinate rows, and $d_0$ has entries from $b$ or zero. All entries have absolute value at most $U$. By Cramer's rule,where $B_i$ replaces column $i$ by $d_0$. The Hadamard determinant inequality bounds both determinants by $(\sqrt{n}U{)}^n\le (nU{)}^n$. The denominator is a nonzero integer. Hence each coordinate has the claimed representation with numerator and denominator bounded in absolute value by $R=(nU{)}^n$. The orthant argument is needed because $P$ itself may contain lines and have no vertex. If $U=0$ is allowed literally, all coefficients and right sides vanish, and $x=0$ is feasible; the printed fraction bound then needs $U$ replaced by $\max (1,U)$, since a nonzero denominator cannot have absolute value at most zero. The bound just proved uses the customary positive coefficient bound.

Recording $n$ such fractions takes $O(n^2\log (nU))$ bits. A verifier checks that denominators are nonzero, changes their signs if needed, and verifies all inequalities by exact integer arithmetic after multiplying by positive denominators. The intermediate integers still have polynomial bit length. Thus a yes-instance has a polynomial-size, polynomial-time verifiable witness, and $\boxed{\mathrm{FP}\in \mathbf{NP}}$.

For optimization, let $c$ be rational with a finite binary encoding; clear its denominators to make it integer, which multiplies the objective by a positive constant and preserves its minimizers. All bit bounds below include the encoding length of $c$. Let $V=\max (1,{\max }_i|c_i|)$ and $B_0=nVR$.

A useful refinement of the preceding vertex argument is that if an objective is bounded below, a feasible point can be moved to an orthant vertex without increasing its objective. Choose the annihilating direction to have $c^{T}d\le 0$. If the inequality is strict, the forward feasible interval must have a finite endpoint, since otherwise the objective would be unbounded below. If $c^{T}d=0$, choose either finite endpoint supplied by the orthant. Rank increases as before. There are only finitely many such vertices across the finitely many orthants. Every feasible point therefore has one of these vertices with no larger objective; taking the least vertex value proves that a finite optimum is attained at one of them.

The Cramer representations at this optimum have one common denominator $\det B$, of magnitude at most $R$. Therefore its objective value $z^{\ast }$ has a representation with denominator at most $R$ and numerator at most $B_0$. In particular $|z^{\ast }|\le B_0$. No enumeration of orthants or vertices is part of the algorithm; they provide only polynomial-bit bounds.

Here is an exact linear optimization from a feasibility oracle. First call the assumed ellipsoid method feasibility routine on $P$; if it is empty, report infeasibility. Otherwise query feasibility with the extra inequality $c^{T}x\le -B_0-1$. A yes answer proves unboundedness below, because any finite optimum would be at least $-B_0$; an unbounded objective necessarily gives a yes answer. Thus the infeasible, unbounded and finite-optimum cases are distinguished using two feasibility calls.

In the finite case, maintain an infeasible lower threshold $-B_0-1$ and a feasible upper threshold $B_0$. Bisect the interval, querying $c^{T}x\le t$ each time. After polynomially many calls its length is less than $1/(2R^2)$, and $z^{\ast }$ lies in the resulting interval. Distinct reduced fractions with positive denominators at most $R$ differ by at least $1/R^2$, so there is only one possible value. It can be recovered in polynomial time by continued fractions: for the midpoint $t$, $|z^{\ast }-t|<1/(4R^2)\le 1/(2q^2)$, where $q\le R$ is the denominator of $z^{\ast }$. Thus $z^{\ast }$ occurs among the continued-fraction convergents of $t$. Compute those by the Euclidean algorithm and choose the unique fraction with denominator at most $R$ in the interval. If $t=z^{\ast }$, use the final exact convergent. The Euclidean algorithm and all thresholds have polynomial bit length.

Even if the feasibility routine returns only a decision, an optimal point can be recovered without assuming a witness-producing oracle. Add $c^{T}x=z^{\ast }$ and $-R\le x_i\le R$ for all $i$. This bounded optimal convex polytope is nonempty, since the optimal vertex above lies in it. Clear the denominator of $z^{\ast }$ and setAll vertex coordinates of this fixed convex polytope have denominators at most $D_0$ by the same determinant argument. Minimize $x_1$, recover its exact minimum by feasibility bisection and rational reconstruction, then fix it; do the same for $x_2$, and so on. Each restriction is an optimal face of the same original bounded convex polytope, so its vertices are original vertices. The single denominator bound $D_0$ therefore works at every step; repeated new precision bounds do not grow exponentially. After $n$ steps all coordinates are fixed to a feasible optimizer. There are polynomially many calls on polynomial-length rational instances, converted to integer inequalities by clearing denominators. Consequently linear optimization has a polynomial-time algorithm whenever linear feasibility does, with exact optimal value and optimizer, and correct reports of infeasibility or unboundedness.

Introduce nonnegative slack variables $s_1,\dots ,s_4$ and write $z$ for the objective value. The initial simplex dictionary, recovered from the original PDF rather than the corrupted converted table, isFor this minimization convention, nonnegative objective coefficients give dual feasibility. The dual simplex algorithm repairs a negative basic value while retaining those nonnegative reduced costs. If the leaving row is $x_B=b+{\sum }_j{a}_j{x}_j$, $b<0$, an entering variable must have $a_j>0$; choose the smallest ratio of its objective coefficient to $a_j$.

Choose $s_1$ to leave. Eligible columns are $x_1,x_3$, with ratios $2/1=2$ and $18/6=3$. Thus $x_1$ enters. Solving its row and substituting givesNow only $s_3$ has a negative basic value. Its only eligible entering column is $x_3$, so pivot there, with $s_3$ leaving. The resulting dictionary isSetting the nonbasic variables $s_1,x_2,s_3$ to zero gives a basic feasible solution. The final objective row also proves $z\ge 23$ for every feasible point, because its nonbasic variables are nonnegative. Hence the unique relaxed optimum is

For the integer program, all four original slack variables are integers whenever the decision variables are integers. The fractional row can be writtenThe Gomory fractional cut keeps the fractional parts of these coefficients: $\{-1\}=\{-2\}=0$ and $\{-1/2\}=1/2$. It therefore gives $\frac{1}{2}{s}_3\ge \frac{1}{2}$, or $s_3\ge 1$. Its validity can also be seen directly: the displayed row makes $s_3$ an odd nonnegative integer. In original variables this cut is $2x_1+10x_3\le 18$.

Introduce the new integer-valued slack $u=s_3-1\ge 0$, with initial row $u=-1+s_3$. It is primal infeasible but retains dual feasibility, so one more dual-simplex pivot has $u$ leave and $s_3$ enter. Substitute $s_3=1+u$ to obtainAll basic values at $s_1=x_2=u=0$ are nonnegative integers, including $s_3=1$. The objective row proves a lower bound of $26$ on every point satisfying the valid cut, hence on every integer-feasible point. It is attained atThe strictly positive nonbasic objective coefficients also show uniqueness. One Gomory cut and its reoptimization are sufficient.