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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / Communication mechanism by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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There are four main types of communication mechanisms found:
  • There is also one known instance where a .zip extension was used! web.archive.org/web/20131101104829*/http://plugged-into-news.net/weatherbug.zip as:
    <applet codebase="/web/20101229222144oe_/http://plugged-into-news.net/" archive="/web/20101229222144oe_/http://plugged-into-news.net/weatherbug.zip"
    JAR is the most common comms, and one of the most distinctive, making it a great fingerprint.
    Several of the JAR files are named something like either:
    as if to pose as Internet speed testing tools? The wonderful subtleties of the late 2000s Internet are a bit over our heads.
    All JARs are directly under root, not in subdirectories, and the basename usually consist of one word, though sometimes two camel cased.
  • JavaScript file. There are two subtypes:
    • JavaScript with SHAs. Rare. Likely older. Way more fingerprintable.
    • JavaScript without SHAs. They have all been obfuscated slightly different and compressed. But the file sizes are all very similar from 8kB to 10kB, and they all look similar, so visually it is very easy to detect a match with good likelyhood.
  • Adobe Flash swf file. In all instances found so far, the name of the SWF matches the name of the second level domain exactly, e.g.:
    http://tee-shot.net/tee-shot.swf
    While this is somewhat of a fingerprint, it is worth noting that is was a relatively commonly used pattern. But it is also the rarest of the mechanisms. This is a at a dissonance with the rest of the web, which circa 2010 already had way more SWF than JAR apparently.
    Some of the SWF websites have archives for empty /servlet pages:
    ./bailsnboots.com/20110201234509/servlet/teammate/index.html
./currentcommunique.com/20110130162713/servlet/summer/index.html
./mynepalnews.com/20110204095758/servlet/SnoopServlet/index.html
./mynepalnews.com/20110204095403/servlet/release/index.html
./www.hassannews.net/20101230175421/servlet/jordan/index.html
./zerosandonesnews.com/20110209084339/servlet/technews/index.html
    which makes us think that it is a part of the SWF system.
  • CGI comms
These have short single word names with some meaning linked to their website.
Because the communication mechanisms are so crucial, they tend to be less varied, and serve as very good fingerprints. It is not ludicrous, e.g. identical files, but one look at a few and you will know the others.
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / CGI comms by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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We've come across a few shallow and stylistically similar websites on suspicious ranges with this pattern.
No JS/JAR/SWF comms, but rather a subdomain, and an HTTPS page with .cgi extension that leads to a login page. Some names seen for this subdomain:
  • secure.: most common
  • ssl.: also common
  • various other more creative ones linked to the website theme itself, e.g.:
    • musical-fortune.net has a backstage.musical-fortune.net
The question is, is this part of some legitimate tooling that created such patterns? And if so which? Or are they actual hits with a new comms mechanism not previously seen?
The fact that:
  • hits of this type are so dense in the suspicious ranges
  • they are so stylistically similar between on another
  • citizenlabs specifically mentioned a "CGI" comms method
suggests to Ciro that they are an actual hit.
In particular, the secure and ssl ones are overused, and together with some heuristics allowed us to find our first two non Reuters ranges! Section "secure subdomain search on 2013 DNS Census"
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / CGI comms variant by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / SSL certificate by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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The CGI comms websites contain the only occurrence of HTTPS, so it might open up the door for a certificate fingerprint as proposed by user joelcollinsdc at: news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36280801!
crt.sh appears to be a good way to look into this:
They all appear to use either of:
Let's try another one for secure.altworldnews.com: search.censys.io/certificates/e88f8db87414401fd00728db39a7698d874dbe1ae9d88b01c675105fabf69b94. Nope, no direct mega hits here either.
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / JavaScript reverse engineering by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / JavaScript with SHAs by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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There are two types of JavaScript found so far. The ones with SHA and the ones without. There are only 2 examples of JS with SHA:
Both files start with precisely the same string:
var ms="\u062F\u0631\u064A\u0627\u0641\u062A\u06CC",lc="\u062A\u0647\u064A\u0647 \u0645\u062A\u0646",mn="\u0628\u0631\u062F\u0627\u0632\u0634 \u062F\u0631 \u062C\u0631\u064A\u0627\u0646 \u0627\u0633\u062A...\u0644\u0637\u0641\u0627 \u0635\u0628\u0631 \u0643\u0646\u064A\u062F",lt="\u062A\u0647\u064A\u0647 \u0645\u062A\u0646",ne="\u067E\u0627\u0633\u062E",kf="\u062E\u0631\u0648\u062C",mb="\u062D\u0630\u0641",mv="\u062F\u0631\u064A\u0627\u0641\u062A\u06CC",nt="\u0627\u0631\u0633\u0627\u0644",ig="\u062B\u0628\u062A \u063A\u0644\u0637. \u062C\u0647\u062A \u062A\u062C\u062F\u064A\u062F \u062B\u0628\u062A \u0635\u0641\u062D\u0647 \u0631\u0627 \u0628\u0627\u0632\u0622\u0648\u0631\u06CC \u06A9\u0646\u064A\u062F",hs="\u063A\u064A\u0631 \u0642\u0627\u0628\u0644 \u0627\u062C\u0631\u0627. \u062E\u0637\u0627 \u062F\u0631 \u0627\u062A\u0651\u0635\u0627\u0644",ji="\u063A\u064A\u0631 \u0642\u0627\u0628\u0644 \u0627\u062C\u0631\u0627. \u062E\u0637\u0627 \u062F\u0631 \u0627\u062A\u0651\u0635\u0627\u0644",ie="\u063A\u064A\u0631 \u0642\u0627\u0628\u0644 \u0627\u062C\u0631\u0627. \u062E\u0637\u0627 \u062F\u0631 \u0627\u062A\u0651\u0635\u0627\u0644",gc="\u0633\u0648\u0627\u0631 \u06A9\u0631\u062F\u0646 \u062A\u06A9\u0645\u064A\u0644 \u0634\u062F",gz="\u0645\u0637\u0645\u0626\u0646\u064A\u062F \u06A9\u0647 \u0645\u064A\u062E\u0648\u0627\u0647\u064A\u062F \u067E\u064A\u0627\u0645 \u0631\u0627 \u062D\u0630\u0641 \u06A9\u0646\u064A\u062F\u061F"
Good fingerprint present in all of them:
throw new Error("B64 D.1");};if(at[1]==-1){throw new Error("B64 D.2");};if(at[2]==-1){if(f<ay.length){throw new Error("B64 D.3");};dg=2;}else if(at[3]==-1){if(f<ay.length){throw new Error("B64 D.4")
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / iraniangoals.com JavaScript reverse engineering by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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Notably, the password is hardcoded and its hash is stored in the JavaScript itself. The result is then submitted back via a POST request to /cgi-bin/goal.cgi.
TODO: how is the SHA calculated? Appears to be manual.
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / feedsdemexicoyelmundo.com JavaScript reverse engineering by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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The JavaScript of each website appears to be quite small and similarly sized. They are all minimized, but have reordered things around a bit.
First we have to know that the Wayback Machine adds some stuff before and after the original code. The actual code there starts at:
ap={fg:['MSXML2.XMLHTTP
and ends in:
ck++;};return fu;};
We can use a JavaScript beautifier such as beautifier.io/ to be abe to better read the code.
It is worth noting that there's a lot of <script> tags inline as well, which seem to matter.
Further analysis would be needed.
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / Google searches for known domains and IPs by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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Googling most domains gives only very few results, and most of them are just useless lists of expired domains. Skipping those for now.
Googling "dedrickonline.com" has a git at www.webwiki.de/dedrickonline.com# Furthermore, it also contains the IP address "65.61.127.174" under the "Technik" tab!
Unfortunately that website appears to be split by language? E.g. the English version does not contain it: www.webwiki.com/dedrickonline.com, which would make searching a bit harder, but still doable.
But if we can Google search those IPs there, we might just hit gold.
IP search did work! www.webwiki.de/65.61.127.174
But doesn't often/ever work unfortunately for others.
Searching on github.com: github.com/DrWhax/cia-website-comms by Jurre van Bergen from September 2022 contains some of the links to some of the ones reported by Reuters including some of their JARs, presumably for reversing purposees. Pinged him at: github.com/DrWhax/cia-website-comms/issues/1
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / Breakthroughs by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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Some less-trivial breakthroughs:
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / Non Reuters ranges by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / secure subdomain search on 2013 DNS Census by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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Grepping the 2013 DNS Census first by overused CGI comms subdomains secure. and ssl. leaves 200k lines. Grepping for the overused "news" led to hits:
  • secure.worldnewsandent.com,2012-02-13T21:28:15,208.254.40.117
  • ssl.beyondnetworknews.com,2012-02-13T20:10:13,66.104.175.40
Also tried but failed:
OK, after the initial successes in secure., we went a bit more data intensive:
New results: only one...
  • 208.254.42.205 secure.driversinternationalgolf.com,2012-02-13T10:42:20,
After 2013 DNS Census virtual host cleanup heuristic keyword searches we later understood why there were so few hits here: the 2013 DNS Census didn't capture the secure. subdomains of many domains it had for some reason. Shame, because if it had, this method would have yielded many more results.
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / Oleg Shakirov's findings by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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Starting at twitter.com/shakirov2036/status/1746729471778988499, Russian expat Oleg Shakirov comments "Let me know if you are still looking for the Carson website".
He then proceeded to give Carson and 5 other domains in private communication. His name is given here with his consent. His advances besides not being blind were Yandexing for some of the known hits which led to pages that contained other hits:
Unfortunately, these methods are not very generalizable, and didn't lead to a large number of other hits. But every domain counts!
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / Searching for Carson by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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Edit: Carson was found Oleg Shakirov's findingsby Oleg Shakirov: alljohnny.com, communicated at: twitter.com/shakirov2036/status/1746729471778988499, earliest archive from 2004 (!): web.archive.org/web/20040113025122/http://alljohnny.com/, The domain was hidden in plain sight, it was present in a not very visible watermark visible in the Reuters article screenshot! The watermark was added to the CIA to the background image, it is actually present on the website. In retrospect, it was actually present at on the expired domain trackers dataset, but the mega discrete all second word made Ciro Santilli miss it: github.com/cirosantilli/expired-domain-names-by-day-2015/blob/9d504f3b85364a64f7db93311e70011344cff788/07/05/02#L1572
Figure 1.
2004 Wayback Machine archive of alljohnny.com
.
What follows is the previous
The fact that the Reuters article has a screenshot of it, and therefore a Wayback Machine link, plus the specificity of the website topic, will likely keep Ciro awake at night for a while until someone finds that domain.
Some text visible on the Reuters screenshot:
It is unclear however if this text is plaintext or part of a an image.
Some failed attempts, either dry guesses or from DNS grepping dataset searches:
Searching the Wayback Machine proved fruitless. There is no full text search: Wayback Machine full text search, and a heuristic web.archive.org/web/20230000000000*/Johnny%20Carson search has relevant hits but not the one we want.
Another attempt was to search for "carson" on webmasterhome.cn which lists expired domains in bulk by expiration day, and it search engine friendly. It contains most of the domains we've found so far. Google either doesn't support partial word search or requires you to be a God to find it
so we settle for DuckDuckGo which supports it: duckduckgo.com/?q=site%3Awebmasterhome.cn+%22carson%22&t=h_&ia=web Adding years also helps: duckduckgo.com/?q=site%3Awebmasterhome.cn+%22carson%22+2011&ia=web with this we might be getting all possible results. Ciro went through all in 2011, 2012 and 2013 but no luck. Also fuck en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carson_City,_Nevada and en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carson,_California :-)
Let's search tools.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search for "carson" contained in any historic domain name. 10,001 lines. Grepping those, no good Wayback machine hits for those that also contain "johnny" or "show". Data at: raw.githubusercontent.com/cirosantilli/media/master/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/tools.whoisxmlapi.com_reverse-whois-search_carson.csv in case anyone want to try and dig...
Let's also search the fortuitously timed 2013 DNS Census.
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / Wakatime redirects by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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Summary: this is just a red herring. Wakatime owner likely registered the domains just after this article was published as a publicity stunt. Fair play though.
As raised at: news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36280666, many, but not all, of the domains currently redirect to wakatime.com/ as of 2023, and apparently they were taken up in 2013 (TODO how to confirm that). TODO what is the explanation for that? Some examples that do:
But some failed resolution examples:
Even more suspiciously, according to his LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/alanhamlett/, the owner of Wakatime, Alan Hamlett, worked at WhiteHat Security, Inc from Aug 2011 - Sep 2013. The company was then acquired by Synopsys in 2022. Holy crap!!! As shown at: web.archive.org/web/20131013193406/https://www.whitehatsec.com/ that company made website security tools. Did that dude use the tools to find the vulnerabilty and then just gobble up all the domains??? What a fucking legend if he did!!!
Running e.g.
curl -vvv dedrickonline.com
gives:
*   Trying 162.255.119.197:80...
* Connected to dedrickonline.com (162.255.119.197) port 80 (#0)
> GET / HTTP/1.1
> Host: dedrickonline.com
> User-Agent: curl/7.88.1
> Accept: */*
>
< HTTP/1.1 301 Moved Permanently
< Date: Mon, 12 Jun 2023 20:30:19 GMT
< Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
< Content-Length: 55
< Connection: keep-alive
< Location: https://wakatime.com
< X-Served-By: Namecheap URL Forward
< Server: namecheap-nginx
<
<a href='https://wakatime.com'>Moved Permanently</a>.

* Connection #0 to host dedrickonline.com left intact
so we see that he must have setup redirection with Namecheap as mentioned at: www.namecheap.com/support/knowledgebase/article.aspx/385/2237/how-to-redirect-a-url-for-a-domain/
Let's also try DNS history
  • whoisrequest.com/history/:
    • dedrickonline.com: registered: 1 Nov, 2010, dropped: 24 Nov, 2013
    • activegaminginfo.com : registered: 1 Feb, 2010, dropped: 1 Apr, 2012
  • tools.whoisxmlapi.com/whois-history-search
    • dedrickonline.com:
      • CIA (registrar: Godaddy, registrant name: domainsbyproxy.com)
        • Created Date: October 27, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: October 28, 2013 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: October 27, 2014 00:00:00 UTC
      • Alan (namecheap):
        • Created Date: June 11, 2023 09:59:25 UTC
        • Expires Date: June 11, 2024 09:59:25 UTC
    • activegaminginfo.com:
      • CIA (Network Solutions, registrant name: LLC. Corral, Elizabeth|ATTN ACTIVEGAMINGINFO.COM|care of Network Solutions)
        • Created Date: January 26, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: November 27, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: January 26, 2012 00:00:00 UTC
      • Alan:
        • Created Date: June 11, 2023 09:59:40 UTC
        • Expires Date: June 11, 2024 09:59:40 UTC
    • iraniangoalkicks.com:
      • CIA (registrar: Godaddy, registrant name: domainsbyproxy.com)
        • Created Date: April 9, 2007 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: March 2, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: April 9, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
      • Alan:
        • Created Date: June 11, 2023 09:59:20 UTC
        • Expires Date: June 11, 2024 09:59:20 UTC
    • iraniangoals.com:
      • CIA (registrar: Godaddy, registrant name: domainsbyproxy.com):
        • Created Date: March 6, 2008 00:00:00 UTC
        • Updated Date: March 7, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
        • Expires Date: March 6, 2014 00:00:00 UTC
      • Reuters:
        • Created Date: September 29, 2022 11:16:09 UTC
        • Updated Date: September 29, 2022 11:16:09 UTC
        • Expires Date: September 29, 2023 11:16:09 UTC
So these suggest Alan might have just come along in 2023 way after the 2022 Reuters article and did the same basic IP range search that Ciro is doing now, so possibly no new tech. Let's ask... twitter.com/cirosantilli/status/1668369786865164289
The domain name history presented is however of interest, and could lead to patterns being found.
Searching tools.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search with term "Corral, Elizabeth" gave no results unfortunately.
Basic search under tools.whoisxmlapi.com/reverse-whois-search for "Corral" also empty. They can't see their own data? Ah, need advanced. Marked "Historic" and selected "Corral, Elizabeth", ony one hit, activegaminginfo.com.
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / IP and DNS metadata by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-19
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Some dumps from us looking for patterns, but could not find any.
Sources of whois history include:
The vast majority of domains seem to be registered either via domainsbyproxy.com which likely intgrates with Godaddy and is widely used, and seems to give zero infromation at all about the registrar.
A much smaller number however uses other methods, some of which sometimes leak a little bit of data:
Big question: webmasters.stackexchange.com/questions/13237/how-do-you-view-domain-whois-history DomainTools also has it.
How on Earth did did Citizen Labs find what seems to be a DNS fingerprint??? Are there simply some very rare badly registered domains? What did they see!
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / iraniangoals.com by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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whoisxmlapi WHOIS history April 11, 2011:
  • Created Date: March 6, 2008 00:00:00 UTC
  • Updated Date: March 7, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
  • Expires Date: March 6, 2014 00:00:00 UTC
  • Registrant Name: domainsbyproxy.com.
  • Registrant Organization: Domains by Proxy, Inc.
  • Registrant Street: 15111 N. Hayden Rd., Ste 160,
  • Registrant City: Scottsdale
  • Registrant State/Province: Arizona
  • Registrant Postal Code: 85260
  • Registrant Country: UNITED STATES
  • Name servers: NS29.WORLDNIC.COM|NS30.WORLDNIC.COM
Folowed by reuters registration in 2022.
whoisrequest.com/history/ mentions:
  • 1 Apr, 2008: Domain created*, nameservers added. Nameservers:
  • ns1.webhostingpad.com
  • ns2.webhostingpad.com
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / iraniangoalkicks.com by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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whoisxmlapi WHOIS history March 23, 2011:
  • Created Date: April 9, 2007 00:00:00 UTC
  • Updated Date: March 2, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
  • Expires Date: April 9, 2011 00:00:00 UTC
  • Registrant Name: domainsbyproxy.com
  • Name servers: dns1.registrar-servers.com|dns2.registrar-servers.com
whoisrequest.com/history/ mentions:
1 May, 2007: Domain created*, nameservers added. Nameservers:
  • ns1.qwknetllc.com
  • ns2.qwknetllc.com
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / activegameinfo.com by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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whoisxmlapi WHOIS history March 22, 2011:
  • Registrar Name: NETWORK SOLUTIONS, LLC.
  • Created Date: January 26, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
  • Updated Date: November 27, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
  • Expires Date: January 26, 2012 00:00:00 UTC
  • Registrant Name: Corral, Elizabeth|ATTN ACTIVEGAMINGINFO.COM|care of Network Solutions
  • Registrant Street: PO Box 459
  • Registrant City: PA
  • Registrant State/Province: US
  • Registrant Postal Code: 18222
  • Registrant Country: UNITED STATES
  • Administrative Name: Corral, Elizabeth|ATTN ACTIVEGAMINGINFO.COM|care of Network Solutions
  • Administrative Street: PO Box 459
  • Administrative City: Drums
  • Administrative State/Province: PA
  • Administrative Postal Code: 18222
  • Administrative Country: UNITED STATES
  • Administrative Email: xc2mv7ur8cw@networksolutionsprivateregistration.com
  • Administrative Phone: 5707088780
  • Name servers: NS23.DOMAINCONTROL.COM|NS24.DOMAINCONTROL.COM
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CIA 2010 covert communication websites / feedsdemexicoyelmundo.com by Ciro Santilli 40 Updated 2025-07-16
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whoisxmlapi WHOIS record on April 28, 2011
  • Registrar Name: GODADDY.COM, INC
  • Created Date: February 9, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
  • Updated Date: February 9, 2010 00:00:00 UTC
  • Expires Date: February 9, 2015 00:00:00 UTC
  • Registrant Name: domainsbyproxy.com
  • Name servers: NS55.DOMAINCONTROL.COM|NS56.DOMAINCONTROL.COM
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Pinned article: Introduction to the OurBigBook Project

Welcome to the OurBigBook Project! Our goal is to create the perfect publishing platform for STEM subjects, and get university-level students to write the best free STEM tutorials ever.
Everyone is welcome to create an account and play with the site: ourbigbook.com/go/register. We belive that students themselves can write amazing tutorials, but teachers are welcome too. You can write about anything you want, it doesn't have to be STEM or even educational. Silly test content is very welcome and you won't be penalized in any way. Just keep it legal!
Video 1.
Intro to OurBigBook
. Source.
We have two killer features:
  1. topics: topics group articles by different users with the same title, e.g. here is the topic for the "Fundamental Theorem of Calculus" ourbigbook.com/go/topic/fundamental-theorem-of-calculus
    Articles of different users are sorted by upvote within each article page. This feature is a bit like:
    • a Wikipedia where each user can have their own version of each article
    • a Q&A website like Stack Overflow, where multiple people can give their views on a given topic, and the best ones are sorted by upvote. Except you don't need to wait for someone to ask first, and any topic goes, no matter how narrow or broad
    This feature makes it possible for readers to find better explanations of any topic created by other writers. And it allows writers to create an explanation in a place that readers might actually find it.
    Figure 1.
    Screenshot of the "Derivative" topic page
    . View it live at: ourbigbook.com/go/topic/derivative
    Video 2.
    OurBigBook Web topics demo
    . Source.
  2. local editing: you can store all your personal knowledge base content locally in a plaintext markup format that can be edited locally and published either:
    This way you can be sure that even if OurBigBook.com were to go down one day (which we have no plans to do as it is quite cheap to host!), your content will still be perfectly readable as a static site.
    Figure 2.
    You can publish local OurBigBook lightweight markup files to either https://OurBigBook.com or as a static website
    .
    Figure 3.
    Visual Studio Code extension installation
    .
    Figure 4.
    Visual Studio Code extension tree navigation
    .
    Figure 5.
    Web editor
    . You can also edit articles on the Web editor without installing anything locally.
    Video 3.
    Edit locally and publish demo
    . Source. This shows editing OurBigBook Markup and publishing it using the Visual Studio Code extension.
    Video 4.
    OurBigBook Visual Studio Code extension editing and navigation demo
    . Source.
  3. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook-media/master/feature/x/hilbert-space-arrow.png
  4. Infinitely deep tables of contents:
    Figure 6.
    Dynamic article tree with infinitely deep table of contents
    .
    Descendant pages can also show up as toplevel e.g.: ourbigbook.com/cirosantilli/chordate-subclade
All our software is open source and hosted at: github.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook
Further documentation can be found at: docs.ourbigbook.com
Feel free to reach our to us for any help or suggestions: docs.ourbigbook.com/#contact
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