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Classical first-order logic has the quantifier and logical equality rules of natural deduction together with unrestricted double-negation elimination, or equivalently the law of excluded middle. It is interpreted in ordinary two-valued first-order structures.

Existential quantification forms $\exists x\phi (x,\mathbf{y})$. In a first-order structure, it is true at an assignment to $\mathbf{y}$ when some domain element makes the instance true. In natural deduction, elimination uses a fresh variable for the hypothetical witness; that variable may not escape into the conclusion or the remaining undischarged assumptions.

Existence requires at least one witness, not exactly one. Over the natural numbers $\mathbb{N}=\{0,1,2,\dots \}$, $\exists m(m>5)$ is true: $m=6$ works, as do $7,8,\dots$. In intuitionistic first-order logic, a direct proof supplies a witness together with a proof of the corresponding instance; merely rejecting nonexistence is generally weaker.

Placing existential quantification before universal quantification requires a single witness that works throughout:This first-order sentence is false. For any proposed $m$, choose $n=m$: the required inequality becomes $m>m$. For example, $m=3$ works for $n=0,1,2$ but fails at $n=3$. No finite list of successful checks establishes universal quantification over the natural numbers.

In first-order logic with logical equality, $s=t$ asserts that the terms denote the same domain element. Logical equality is interpreted as identity rather than as an arbitrary binary predicate. Its natural deduction rules include reflexivity and substitution: equal terms can replace one another in a first-order formula, subject to capture-avoiding substitution. Double-negating logical equality atoms in a Gödel-Gentzen negative translation preserves these rules when the transported translated first-order formula is stable.

The Gödel-Gentzen negative translation transforms $\Gamma {⊢}_{\mathrm{CL}}A$ into ${\Gamma }^N{⊢}_{\mathrm{IL}}{A}^N$. Induct on a natural deduction derivation. The translated logical conjunction, logical implication and universal rules are ordinary intuitionistic rules. Logical disjunction and existential introduction add double logical negation; their elimination rules first derive the double logical negation of the stable translated conclusion, then use its stability. Classical double-negation elimination translates precisely to stability. If logical equality atoms are double-negated, transport a stable translated conclusion through a logical equality by contradiction and then remove the resulting double logical negation. Original nonlogical axioms must also be translated; the result does not say arbitrary untranslated classical first-order theories are intuitionistically valid.

In the simply typed lambda calculus, types are generated from atomic types by the arrow constructor $A\to B$. A typed lambda term is a lambda term equipped with a derivation of a judgement $\Gamma ⊢t:A$, where the context assigns types to its free variables. The basic typing rules areThe Implicational Curry-Howard correspondence reads atomic types as propositions and $A\to B$ as logical implication. A typed variable is an assumption, abstraction is the implication introduction rule discharging that assumption, and application is the implication elimination rule. Consequently a typed lambda term is a proof in implicational Intuitionistic propositional logic, and a natural deduction proof recursively supplies such a term. For example, $\lambda x.x:A\to A$ expresses implication reflexivity. Products, sums, and the empty type extend the correspondence to conjunction, disjunction, and falsity; pure arrow types give precisely the implicational fragment. Beta reduction removes an introduction followed immediately by its elimination, matching proof simplification.

A Church numeral iswhere $f^{n}x$ means $n$ repetitions of application. At base type $A$, it has type $C_A=(A\to A)\to A\to A$. The following Church numeral arithmetic terms use left-associated application:Their concise conclusions areFor successor, the initial $f$ adds one application. For addition, the inner $nfx$ supplies $n$ applications and $mf$ supplies $m$ more. For multiplication, the repeated operation $nf$ applies $f$ $n$ times, and $m$ repetitions give $mn$. For exponentiation, $\overline{n}$ iterates the operation $\overline{m}$ on $f$: each iteration replaces a function $g$ by its $m$-fold iterate, yielding $f^{m^n}$. Zero iterations give $f$, so this encoding takes $m^0=1$, including $0^0=1$. The explicit outer $f,x$ abstractions make the result the standard Church numeral even at exponent zero, without needing eta equivalence.

Successor, addition, and multiplication operate on the same $C_A$. The displayed exponentiation term has type $C_A\to C_{A\to A}\to C_A$: its exponent iterates an operation on functions. Thus the numeral syntax admits several type instances; one should not force every occurrence into one fixed monomorphic Church type.

The Y combinator is the fixed-point combinatorFor $X_g=(\lambda x.g(xx))(\lambda x.g(xx))$, beta reduction gives $Yg{\to }_{\beta }{X}_g{\to }_{\beta }g{X}_g$. Since $X_g{\equiv }_{\beta }Yg$, we obtain $Yg{\equiv }_{\beta }g(Yg)$. This allows a recursive program body to receive a representation of itself.

Here the computation is in the untyped lambda calculus. The self-application $xx$ would require a simple type satisfying $A=A\to B$, impossible for finite simple types. Accordingly $Y$ is not a typed lambda term of the simply typed system. The Strong normalization theorem for simply typed lambda calculus also rules out a universal divergent fixed-point operator there.

To obtain a lambda representation of partial computable functions, encode machine configurations as finite data using Church numerals, Church pairs, and Church Booleans. Initial configuration, one transition, the halting test, and output extraction are primitive recursive functions, represented by lambda terms through the initial functions, composition, and lambda definition of primitive recursion by pair iteration. If these representations are $\mathsf{Init}$, $\mathsf{Next}$, $\mathsf{Halt}$, and $\mathsf{Out}$, defineUse normal-order beta reduction so the Church Boolean halting test selects one branch without evaluating the unused recursive branch. A halting computation follows finitely many transitions and returns the Church numeral of the output. A nonhalting computation forces successive tests forever and has no head normal form; by normal-order normalization theorem, it cannot be beta equivalent to a Church numeral. Thus every partial computable function is represented, with divergence preserved; every total computable function is the halting special case. This explains the role of $Y$ in computational universality while keeping the typed proof interpretation precise.

Write $Q=(A\to B)\to A$ and $P=Q\to A$. The displayed formula is $(P\to B)\to B$. A proof of logical implication may use its temporary assumption more than once; this is ordinary natural deduction, not a linear proof system.

Assume $h:P\to B$, then $f:Q$, then $a:A$, then $g:Q$. The identity weakening rule derives $a:A$ from the hypotheses $a:A$ and $g:Q$. Discharging $g$ by the implication introduction rule gives $\lambda g^Q.a:P$. Applying $h$ by the implication elimination rule gives $h(\lambda g^Q.a):B$. Discharge $a$ to obtain $\lambda a^A.h(\lambda g^Q.a):A\to B$. Applying $f$ gives an $A$; discharge $f$ to obtain a $P$; apply $h$ once more to obtain $B$, and finally discharge $h$.

Here is the complete decorated natural deduction derivation, split at its intermediate $A\to B$ conclusion to keep the tree readable. Superscript labels mark which assumption occurrences are discharged; both occurrences labelled $1$ are discharged together.To avoid an excessively wide final tree, continue the same derivation as follows, using the right-hand derived premise above:followed byThus the concise lambda term, with bound-variable types determined by the displayed tree, isUnder the Curry-Howard correspondence, implication introduction rules correspond to lambda abstractions, implication elimination rules to applications, and the identity weakening rule retains the first term while allowing an unused second hypothesis. No other inference rule or classical axiom is required.

Use the Gödel-Gentzen negative translation, writing $A^N$ for the translated first-order formula. On atomic formulas $P$, including logical equality, put $P^N=\neg \neg P$, and put ${\perp }^N=\perp$. Extend recursively byLogical negation abbreviates logical implication to logical falsity, so $(\neg A{)}^N=\neg A^N$. The displayed logical disjunction and existential clauses are intuitionistically equivalent to the usual negative clauses $\neg (\neg A^N\wedge \neg B^N)$ and $\neg \forall x\neg A^N$, respectively. Thus these clauses specify the same negative interpretation. Translation commutes with capture-avoiding substitution of terms for free variables.

First prove by structural induction the stability of a formula under double negation:Every double logical negation is stable, since intuitionistic first-order logic proves $\neg \neg \neg \neg C\to \neg \neg C$; logical falsity is stable as well. Stability passes to logical conjunction by obtaining double logical negation of each component. For a logical implication $C\to D$ with stable $D$, assume $\neg \neg (C\to D)$ and $C$. An assumption $\neg D$ would give $\neg (C\to D)$, a contradiction, so $\neg \neg D$ and then $D$. For a universal first-order formula, $\neg \neg \forall xC(x)$ implies $\neg \neg C(y)$ for arbitrary fresh $y$; use stability pointwise and generalize. Logical disjunction and existential translations are already double negations. This proves all cases.

Now regard classical first-order natural deduction as intuitionistic natural deduction plus unrestricted double-negation elimination, and induct on a classical derivation. The rules for logical conjunction, logical implication, universal quantification and logical falsity translate directly. Logical disjunction introduction gives $A^N\vee B^N$ and then its double logical negation. For logical disjunction elimination, the translated premise is $\neg \neg (A^N\vee B^N)$ and the two translated branches yield the stable conclusion $C^N$. Assuming $\neg C^N$ makes each branch contradictory, giving $\neg A^N$ and $\neg B^N$, hence $\neg (A^N\vee B^N)$, which contradicts the premise. We have $\neg \neg C^N$ and remove it by stability.

Existential introduction likewise adds a double logical negation to the ordinary witness introduction. In existential elimination, the witness branch $A^N(y)⊢C^N$ has the original fresh-variable condition. Assuming $\neg C^N$ makes that branch give $\neg A^N(y)$; generalization gives $\forall y\neg A^N(y)$ and therefore $\neg \exists y{A}^N(y)$, contradicting the translated premise. Again stability supplies $C^N$. The universal-rule side conditions are preserved because the translation introduces no new free variables.

For logical equality, reflexivity gives $t=t$ and then its double logical negation. For substitution, from $\neg \neg (s=t)$ and $A^N(s)$, temporarily assume $\neg A^N(t)$. An assumption $s=t$ would transport $A^N(s)$ to $A^N(t)$ by intuitionistic logical equality substitution, so it gives a contradiction and hence $\neg (s=t)$. The first premise contradicts this. Thus $\neg \neg A^N(t)$ holds and stability gives $A^N(t)$. Finally a classical double-negation elimination step translates precisely to $\neg \neg A^N\to A^N$, already proved. Every rule is therefore covered, giving negative translation of a classical proof:In particular a classical thesis has an intuitionistic, constructive translated proof. If nonlogical assumptions are present, they must be translated too.

In classical logic, double-negation elimination gives $P^N\leftrightarrow P$ on atoms. Structural induction propagates equivalence through logical conjunction, logical implication and both quantifiers, and removes the added double negations on logical disjunction and existence. Therefore

Under the Curry-Howard correspondence, Intuitionistic propositional logic propositions are types and proofs are typed terms. Assumptions correspond to typed variables. The logical implication $A\to B$ corresponds to the function type, logical conjunction $A\wedge B$ to the product type, logical disjunction $A\vee B$ to the sum type, logical truth to the unit type, and logical falsity to the empty type.

The rules of natural deduction become term constructors. Implication introduction sends a derivation of $B$ from a variable $x:A$ to the abstraction $\lambda x.M:A\to B$, while implication elimination becomes application $MN$. Pairing and projection implement conjunction, and injections with case analysis implement disjunction. Under this correspondence, normalization of proofs is computation by beta reduction in the simply typed lambda calculus.

Proof theory studies formal proofs and the deductive systems that produce them. It examines which conclusions follow from axioms, how proofs can be transformed, and what those transformations reveal about the chosen logic. Natural deduction organizes a proof through introduction and elimination rules for logical connectives and quantifiers.

Propositional logic studies reasoning with whole propositions represented by letters such as $p$ and $q$, and propositional formulas built from them using logical connectives. The classical two-valued, truth-functional presentation below assigns each primitive proposition either true or false: each compound value depends only on its component values. This is classical propositional logic; other systems, including Intuitionistic propositional logic, have different semantics and rules.

Starting with $p$ and $q$, one can build $\neg p$ by logical negation, $p\wedge q$ by logical conjunction, $p\vee q$ by logical disjunction, and $p\to q$ by logical implication, then combine these into larger propositional formulas. Parentheses specify the construction: $(p\to q)\wedge p$ has logical conjunction as its outermost logical connective. Primitive propositions have no internal structure in this language; a first-order formula can additionally describe objects and quantify over them. The formation rules are given in forall x: Calgary, chapter 6.

The following truth table shows the four basic logical connectives. Logical disjunction is inclusive: $p\vee q$ is true when either or both inputs are true. Classical logical implication has exactly the same values as $\neg p\vee q$; its only false row has $p$ true and $q$ false. These truth conditions are specified in forall x: Calgary, chapter 9.

Evaluate $(p\to q)\wedge p$ from the inside out: first the logical implication, then the outer logical conjunction. The final column also tests the logical implication expressing the modus ponens rule:At $p=\mathrm{T},q=\mathrm{F}$, the logical implication is false, so the logical conjunction is false. The abstract syntax tree below separates the construction of the propositional formula from the values propagated through it. Both occurrences of $p$ receive the same value from the Boolean valuation. With the opposite assignment $p=\mathrm{F},q=\mathrm{T}$, the logical implication is true but the logical conjunction is still false because its second input $p$ is false. Recursive evaluation and exhaustive truth tables are explained in forall x: Calgary, chapter 11.

The last column is always true: $((p\to q)\wedge p)\to q$ is a tautology. This expresses the logical validity of the modus ponens rule: whenever both premises $p\to q$ and $p$ are true, $q$ is true. It does not say the premises are true under every Boolean valuation; their logical conjunction is true only on the first row. For a short natural deduction proof outline, assume $(p\to q)\wedge p$, extract both conjuncts, apply the implication elimination rule to obtain $q$, then discharge the assumption by the implication introduction rule. See forall x: Calgary, sections 17.3–17.5.

Three tests answer different questions: Boolean satisfiability requires at least one true row, a tautology requires every row true, and a contradiction has every row false. Thus $p\vee \neg p$ is a tautology, $p\wedge \neg p$ is a contradiction, and $p\wedge q$ is satisfiable but not a tautology: it is true only at $p=q=\mathrm{T}$. See forall x: Calgary, sections 12.1–12.4.

Propositional logic is useful because an inference pattern can be checked once and reused for many choices of propositions. Its beauty is that a finite truth table completely settles classical truth-functional questions about a fixed propositional formula. But logical validity does not verify real atomic claims. If $p$ means “the switch is closed” and $q$ means “the lamp is lit”, a valid use of the modus ponens rule still requires establishing its premises about the apparatus; the truth table supplies neither an observation nor a causal explanation. See forall x: Calgary, chapter 2 and chapter 10.

Universal quantification forms $\forall x\phi (x,\mathbf{y})$. In a first-order structure, it is true at an assignment to $\mathbf{y}$ when every domain element assigned to $x$ makes the instance true. Its introduction rule requires that the generalized variable not occur freely in undischarged assumptions.

Over the natural numbers, reversing the preceding existential quantification and universal quantification gives a true first-order sentence:Choose $m=n+1$. The computed witnesses for $n=0,1,2,3$ are $m=1,2,3,4$. The choice may depend on the previously given $n$. The formula states that every natural number has a larger natural number; the reversed formula demands one larger than all of them.

The diagram displays a finite window, while the rules $m=n+1$ and $n=m$ settle the two statements for every natural number. This dependence is why quantifier order matters in precise specifications. Choosing one $m$ that works for every $n$ would also provide a witness for each $n$; the reverse inference fails here.

To introduce universal quantification in natural deduction, reason with an arbitrary input, without assuming a special property of it. The construction $m=n+1$ does exactly this and also gives a proof in intuitionistic first-order logic. The introduction and elimination rules for both quantifiers are developed in Frank Pfenning, First-Order Logic and Type Theory, section 4.1.