Previously it was unclear if there were any .org hits, until we found the first one with clear comms: web.archive.org/web/20110624203548/http://awfaoi.org/hand.jar
Later on, two more clear ones were found with expired domain trackers:
further settling their existence. Later on newimages.org also came to light.
Others that had been previously found in IP ranges but without clear comms:
  • 65.61.127.177: material-science.org
  • 212.4.17.61: tech-stop.org
  • 74.116.72.244 arborstribune.org
.org is very rare, and has been excluded from some of our search heuristics. That was a shame, but likely not much was missed.
This is a dark art, and many of the sources are shady as fuck! We often have no idea of their methodology. Also no source is fully complete. We just piece up as best we can.
In order to explore IPs in known IP ranges, what we need are good DNS databases.
This is our primary data source, the first article that pointed out a few specific CIA websites which then served as the basis for all of our research.
We take the truth of this article as an axiom. And then all we claim is that all other websites found were made by the same people due to strong shared design principles of the such websites.
There are four main types of communication mechanisms found:
  • There is also one known instance where a .zip extension was used! web.archive.org/web/20131101104829*/http://plugged-into-news.net/weatherbug.zip as:
    <applet codebase="/web/20101229222144oe_/http://plugged-into-news.net/" archive="/web/20101229222144oe_/http://plugged-into-news.net/weatherbug.zip"
    JAR is the most common comms, and one of the most distinctive, making it a great fingerprint.
    Several of the JAR files are named something like either:
    as if to pose as Internet speed testing tools? The wonderful subtleties of the late 2000s Internet are a bit over our heads.
    All JARs are directly under root, not in subdirectories, and the basename usually consist of one word, though sometimes two camel cased.
  • JavaScript file. There are two subtypes:
    • JavaScript with SHAs. Rare. Likely older. Way more fingerprintable.
    • JavaScript without SHAs. They have all been obfuscated slightly different and compressed. But the file sizes are all very similar from 8kB to 10kB, and they all look similar, so visually it is very easy to detect a match with good likelyhood.
  • Adobe Flash swf file. In all instances found so far, the name of the SWF matches the name of the second level domain exactly, e.g.:
    http://tee-shot.net/tee-shot.swf
    While this is somewhat of a fingerprint, it is worth noting that is was a relatively commonly used pattern. But it is also the rarest of the mechanisms. This is a at a dissonance with the rest of the web, which circa 2010 already had way more SWF than JAR apparently.
    Some of the SWF websites have archives for empty /servlet pages:
    ./bailsnboots.com/20110201234509/servlet/teammate/index.html
    ./currentcommunique.com/20110130162713/servlet/summer/index.html
    ./mynepalnews.com/20110204095758/servlet/SnoopServlet/index.html
    ./mynepalnews.com/20110204095403/servlet/release/index.html
    ./www.hassannews.net/20101230175421/servlet/jordan/index.html
    ./zerosandonesnews.com/20110209084339/servlet/technews/index.html
    which makes us think that it is a part of the SWF system.
  • CGI comms
These have short single word names with some meaning linked to their website.
Because the communication mechanisms are so crucial, they tend to be less varied, and serve as very good fingerprints. It is not ludicrous, e.g. identical files, but one look at a few and you will know the others.
First we must start the tor servers with the tor-army command from: stackoverflow.com/questions/14321214/how-to-run-multiple-tor-processes-at-once-with-different-exit-ips/76749983#76749983
tor-army 100
and then use it on a newline separated domain name list to check;
./cdx-tor.sh infile.txt
This creates a directory infile.txt.cdx/ containing:
  • infile.txt.cdx/out00, out01, etc.: the suspected CDX lines from domains from each tor instance based on the simple criteria that the CDX can handle directly. We split the input domains into 100 piles, and give one selected pile per tor instance.
  • infile.txt.cdx/out: the final combined CDX output of out00, out01, ...
  • infile.txt.cdx/out.post: the final output containing only domain names that match further CLI criteria that cannot be easily encoded on the CDX query. This is the cleanest domain name list you should look into at the end basically.
Since archive is so abysmal in its data access, e.g. a Google BigQuery would solve our issues in seconds, we have to come up with creative ways of getting around their IP throttling.
The CIA doesn't play fair. They're actually the exact opposite of fair. So neither shall we.
This should allow a full sweep of the 4.5M records in 2013 DNS Census virtual host cleanup in a reasonable amount of time. After JAR/SWF/CGI filtering we obtained 5.8k domains, so a reduction factor of about 1 million with likely very few losses. Not bad.
5.8k is still a bit annoying to fully go over however, so we can also try to count CDX hits to the domains and remove anything with too many hits, since the CIA websites basically have very few archives:
cd 2013-dns-census-a-novirt-domains.txt.cdx
./cdx-tor.sh -d out.post domain-list.txt
cd out.post.cdx
cut -d' ' -f1 out | uniq -c | sort -k1 -n | awk 'match($2, /([^,]+),([^)]+)/, a) {printf("%s.%s %d\n", a[2], a[1], $1)}' > out.count
This gives us something like:
12654montana.com 1
aeronet-news.com 1
atohms.com 1
av3net.com 1
beechstreetas400.com 1
sorted by increasing hit counts, so we can go down as far as patience allows for!
New results from a full CDX scan of 2013-dns-census-a-novirt.csv:
  • 219.90.61.123 journeystravelled.com
JAR, SWF and CGI-bin scanning by path only is fine, since there are relatively few of those. But .js scanning by path only is too broad.
One option would be to filter out by size, an information that is contained on the CDX. Let's check typical ones:
grep -f <(jq -r '.[]|select(select(.comms)|.comms|test("\\.js"))|.host' ../media/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hits.json) out | out.jshits.cdx
sort -n -k7 out.jshits.cdx
Ignoring some obvious unrelated non-comms files visually we get a range of about 2732 to 3632:
net,hollywoodscreen)/current.js 20110106082232 http://hollywoodscreen.net/current.js text/javascript 200 XY5NHVW7UMFS3WSKPXLOQ5DJA34POXMV 2732
com,amishkanews)/amishkanewss.js 20110208032713 http://amishkanews.com/amishkanewss.js text/javascript 200 S5ZWJ53JFSLUSJVXBBA3NBJXNYLNCI4E 3632
This ignores the obviously atypical JavaScript with SHAs from iranfootballsource, and the particularly small old menu.js from cutabovenews.com, which we embed into ../cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/cdx-post-js.sh.
The size helps a bit, but it's not insanely good unfortunately, only about 3x, these are some common JS sizes right there!
Many hits appear to happen on the same days, and per-day data does exist: archive.org/details/widecrawl but apparently cannot be publicly downloaded unfortunately. But maybe there's another way? TODO select candidates.
The CGI comms websites contain the only occurrence of HTTPS, so it might open up the door for a certificate fingerprint as proposed by user joelcollinsdc at: news.ycombinator.com/item?id=36280801!
crt.sh appears to be a good way to look into this:
They all appear to use either of:
Let's try another one for secure.altworldnews.com: search.censys.io/certificates/e88f8db87414401fd00728db39a7698d874dbe1ae9d88b01c675105fabf69b94. Nope, no direct mega hits here either.
This data source was very valuable, and led to many hits, and to finding the first non Reuters ranges with Section "secure subdomain search on 2013 DNS Census".
Hit overlap:
jq -r '.[].host' ../media/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hits.json ) | xargs -I{} sqlite3 aiddcu.sqlite "select * from t where d = '{}'"
Domain hit count when we were at 279 hits: 142 hits, so about half of the hits were present.
The timing of the database is perfect for this project, it is as if the CIA had planted it themselves!
We've noticed that often when there is a hit range:
  • there is only one IP for each domain
  • there is a range of about 20-30 of those
and that this does not seem to be that common. Let's see if that is a reasonable fingerprint or not.
Note that although this is the most common case, we have found multiple hits that viewdns.info maps to the same IP.
First we create a table u (unique) that only have domains which are the only domain for an IP, let's see by how much that lowers the 191 M total unique domains:
time sqlite3 u.sqlite 'create table t (d text, i text)'
time sqlite3 av.sqlite -cmd "attach 'u.sqlite' as u" "insert into u.t select min(d) as d, min(i) as i from t where d not like '%.%.%' group by i having count(distinct d) = 1"
The not like '%.%.%' removes subdomains from the counts so that CGI comms are still included, and distinct in count(distinct is because we have multiple entries at different timestamps for some of the hits.
Let's start with the 208 subset to see how it goes:
time sqlite3 av.sqlite -cmd "attach 'u.sqlite' as u" "insert into u.t select min(d) as d, min(i) as i from t where i glob '208.*' and d not like '%.%.%' and (d like '%.com' or d like '%.net') group by i having count(distinct d) = 1"
OK, after we fixed bugs with the above we are down to 4 million lines with unique domain/IP pairs and which contains all of the original hits! Almost certainly more are to be found!
This data is so valuable that we've decided to upload it to: archive.org/details/2013-dns-census-a-novirt.csv Format:
8,chrisjmcgregor.com
11,80end.com
28,fine5.net
38,bestarabictv.com
49,xy005.com
50,cmsasoccer.com
80,museemontpellier.net
100,newtiger.com
108,lps-promptservice.com
111,bridesmaiddressesshow.com
The numbers of the first column are the IPs as a 32-bit integer representation, which is more useful to search for ranges in.
To make a histogram with the distribution of the single hostname IPs:
#!/usr/bin/env bash
bin=$((2**24))
sqlite3 2013-dns-census-a-novirt.sqlite -cmd '.mode csv' >2013-dns-census-a-novirt-hist.csv <<EOF
select i, sum(cnt) from (
  select floor(i/${bin}) as i,
         count(*) as cnt
    from t
    group by 1
  union
  select *, 0 as cnt from generate_series(0, 255)
)
group by i
EOF
gnuplot \
  -e 'set terminal svg size 1200, 800' \
  -e 'set output "2013-dns-census-a-novirt-hist.svg"' \
  -e 'set datafile separator ","' \
  -e 'set tics scale 0' \
  -e 'unset key' \
  -e 'set xrange[0:255]' \
  -e 'set title "Counts of IPs with a single hostname"' \
  -e 'set xlabel "IPv4 first byte"' \
  -e 'set ylabel "count"' \
  -e 'plot "2013-dns-census-a-novirt-hist.csv" using 1:2:1 with labels' \
;
Which gives the following useless noise, there is basically no pattern:
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/cirosantilli/media/master/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/2013-dns-census-a-novirt-hist.svg
There are two keywords that are killers: "news" and "world" and their translations or closely related words. Everything else is hard. So a good start is:
grep -e news -e noticias -e nouvelles -e world -e global
iran + football:
  • iranfootballsource.com: the third hit for this area after the two given by Reuters! Epic.
3 easy hits with "noticias" (news in Portuguese or Spanish"), uncovering two brand new ip ranges:
  • 66.45.179.205 noticiasporjanua.com
  • 66.237.236.247 comunidaddenoticias.com
  • 204.176.38.143 noticiassofisticadas.com
Let's see some French "nouvelles/actualites" for those tumultuous Maghrebis:
  • 216.97.231.56 nouvelles-d-aujourdhuis.com
news + world:
  • 210.80.75.55 philippinenewsonline.net
news + global:
  • 204.176.39.115 globalprovincesnews.com
  • 212.209.74.105 globalbaseballnews.com
  • 212.209.79.40: hydradraco.com
OK, I've decided to do a complete Wayback Machine CDX scanning of news... Searching for .JAR or https.*cgi-bin.*\.cgi are killers, particularly the .jar hits, here's what came out:
  • 62.22.60.49 telecom-headlines.com
  • 62.22.61.206 worldnewsnetworking.com
  • 64.16.204.55 holein1news.com
  • 66.104.169.184 bcenews.com
  • 69.84.156.90 stickshiftnews.com
  • 74.116.72.236 techtopnews.com
  • 74.254.12.168 non-stop-news.net
  • 193.203.49.212 inews-today.com
  • 199.85.212.118 just-kidding-news.com
  • 207.210.250.132 aeronet-news.com
  • 212.4.18.129 sightseeingnews.com
  • 212.209.90.84 thenewseditor.com
  • 216.105.98.152 modernarabicnews.com
Wayback Machine CDX scanning of "world":
  • 66.104.173.186 myworldlymusic.com
"headline": only 140 matches in 2013-dns-census-a-novirt.csv and 3 hits out of 269 hits. Full inspection without CDX led to no new hits.
"today": only 3.5k matches in 2013-dns-census-a-novirt.csv and 12 hits out of 269 hits, TODO how many on those on 2013-dns-census-a-novirt? No new hits.
"world", "global", "international", and spanish/portuguese/French versions like "mondo", "mundo", "mondi": 15k matches in 2013-dns-census-a-novirt.csv. No new hits.
Let' see if there's anything in records/mx.xz.
mx.csv is 21GB.
They do have " in the files to escape commas so:
mx.py
import csv
import sys
writer = csv.writer(sys.stdout)
with open('mx.csv', 'r') as f:
    reader = csv.reader(f)
    for row in reader:
        writer.writerow([row[0], row[3]])
Would have been better with csvkit: stackoverflow.com/questions/36287982/bash-parse-csv-with-quotes-commas-and-newlines
then:
# uniq not amazing as there are often two or three slightly different records repeated on multiple timestamps, but down to 11 GB
python3 mx.py | uniq > mx-uniq.csv
sqlite3 mx.sqlite 'create table t(d text, m text)'
# 13 GB
time sqlite3 mx.sqlite ".import --csv --skip 1 'mx-uniq.csv' t"

# 41 GB
time sqlite3 mx.sqlite 'create index td on t(d)'
time sqlite3 mx.sqlite 'create index tm on t(m)'
time sqlite3 mx.sqlite 'create index tdm on t(d, m)'

# Remove dupes.
# Rows: 150m
time sqlite3 mx.sqlite <<EOF
delete from t
where rowid not in (
  select min(rowid)
  from t
  group by d, m
)
EOF

# 15 GB
time sqlite3 mx.sqlite vacuum
Let's see what the hits use:
awk -F, 'NR>1{ print $2 }' ../media/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hits.csv | xargs -I{} sqlite3 mx.sqlite "select distinct * from t where d = '{}'"
At around 267 total hits, only 84 have MX records, and from those that do, almost all of them have exactly:
smtp.secureserver.net
mailstore1.secureserver.net
with only three exceptions:
dailynewsandsports.com|dailynewsandsports.com
inews-today.com|mail.inews-today.com
just-kidding-news.com|just-kidding-news.com
We need to count out of the totals!
sqlite3 mx.sqlite "select count(*) from t where m = 'mailstore1.secureserver.net'"
which gives, ~18M, so nope, it is too much by itself...
Let's try to use that to reduce av.sqlite from 2013 DNS Census virtual host cleanup a bit further:
time sqlite3 mx.sqlite '.mode csv' "attach 'aiddcu.sqlite' as 'av'" '.load ./ip' "select ipi2s(av.t.i), av.t.d from av.t inner join t as mx on av.t.d = mx.d and mx.m = 'mailstore1.secureserver.net' order by av.t.i asc" > avm.csv
where avm stands for av with mx pruning. This leaves us with only ~500k entries left. With one more figerprint we could do a Wayback Machine CDX scanning scan.
Let's check that we still have most our hits in there:
grep -f <(awk -F, 'NR>1{print $2}' /home/ciro/bak/git/media/cia-2010-covert-communication-websites/hits.csv) avm.csv
At 267 hits we got 81, so all are still present.
secureserver is a hosting provider, we can see their blank page e.g. at: web.archive.org/web/20110128152204/http://emmano.com/. security.stackexchange.com/questions/12610/why-did-secureserver-net-godaddy-access-my-gmail-account/12616#12616 comments:
secureserver.net is the name GoDaddy use as the reverse DNS for IP addresses used for dedicated/virtual server hosting

Pinned article: Introduction to the OurBigBook Project

Welcome to the OurBigBook Project! Our goal is to create the perfect publishing platform for STEM subjects, and get university-level students to write the best free STEM tutorials ever.
Everyone is welcome to create an account and play with the site: ourbigbook.com/go/register. We belive that students themselves can write amazing tutorials, but teachers are welcome too. You can write about anything you want, it doesn't have to be STEM or even educational. Silly test content is very welcome and you won't be penalized in any way. Just keep it legal!
We have two killer features:
  1. topics: topics group articles by different users with the same title, e.g. here is the topic for the "Fundamental Theorem of Calculus" ourbigbook.com/go/topic/fundamental-theorem-of-calculus
    Articles of different users are sorted by upvote within each article page. This feature is a bit like:
    • a Wikipedia where each user can have their own version of each article
    • a Q&A website like Stack Overflow, where multiple people can give their views on a given topic, and the best ones are sorted by upvote. Except you don't need to wait for someone to ask first, and any topic goes, no matter how narrow or broad
    This feature makes it possible for readers to find better explanations of any topic created by other writers. And it allows writers to create an explanation in a place that readers might actually find it.
    Figure 1.
    Screenshot of the "Derivative" topic page
    . View it live at: ourbigbook.com/go/topic/derivative
  2. local editing: you can store all your personal knowledge base content locally in a plaintext markup format that can be edited locally and published either:
    This way you can be sure that even if OurBigBook.com were to go down one day (which we have no plans to do as it is quite cheap to host!), your content will still be perfectly readable as a static site.
    Figure 2.
    You can publish local OurBigBook lightweight markup files to either https://OurBigBook.com or as a static website
    .
    Figure 3.
    Visual Studio Code extension installation
    .
    Figure 4.
    Visual Studio Code extension tree navigation
    .
    Figure 5.
    Web editor
    . You can also edit articles on the Web editor without installing anything locally.
    Video 3.
    Edit locally and publish demo
    . Source. This shows editing OurBigBook Markup and publishing it using the Visual Studio Code extension.
    Video 4.
    OurBigBook Visual Studio Code extension editing and navigation demo
    . Source.
  3. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook-media/master/feature/x/hilbert-space-arrow.png
  4. Infinitely deep tables of contents:
    Figure 6.
    Dynamic article tree with infinitely deep table of contents
    .
    Descendant pages can also show up as toplevel e.g.: ourbigbook.com/cirosantilli/chordate-subclade
All our software is open source and hosted at: github.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook
Further documentation can be found at: docs.ourbigbook.com
Feel free to reach our to us for any help or suggestions: docs.ourbigbook.com/#contact