Let . The group action by left multiplication on gives a group homomorphism . Its kernel is the normal core of a subgroup,
The containment follows by looking at the stabilizer of the coset , and finite index follows from the finite image in .
The Higman group is
It is visibly a finitely presented group. To prove infinitude, first form
It is the amalgamated free product of and , identifying their infinite cyclic subgroups generated by . Each factor is an HNN extension of an infinite cyclic group, so its base and stable letter both have infinite order. No nonzero power of belongs to in the first factor, by the map to sending to one and to zero. In the second factor, no nonzero power of belongs to : the stable-letter map forces a hypothetical equality to have , and the base has infinite order. The normal form theorem for an amalgamated free product therefore shows that is a rank-two free group.
Similarly,
contains as a rank-two free group. Identifying these two free subgroups yields
The normal form theorem for an amalgamated free product embeds in . In particular, contains a free group of rank two and is infinite.
The finite quotients of cyclic squaring presentations argument now rules out every nontrivial finite quotient of . In a finite image, a relation forces the order of to be odd, since conjugate elements have the same order. If any generator has nontrivial image, let be the least prime number dividing the order of any of the four generator images, and choose whose order is divisible by . Its predecessor conjugates it to its square. If is the order of , iterating conjugation gives . Hence the multiplicative order of modulo divides . It is greater than one and divides , so it has a prime factor smaller than , which also divides . This contradicts the minimal choice of . Thus all four generator images are trivial. has no nontrivial finite quotient, and the normal-core argument above implies that has no proper finite-index subgroup.
For the final argument, Conjugation preserves the order of an element. Thus if one nonidentity element has finite order , every nonidentity element has that same order, and . Moreover is prime: if a prime factor properly divides , then is nonidentity but has the smaller order .
When , the element is nonidentity, so choose with . The conjugator is not the identity, since , and therefore . Induction gives , and at this yields
But Fermat's little theorem, with the odd prime , gives , contradicting that divisibility.
For , is not in the nonidentity conjugacy class, so the required conjugator cannot be chosen. Instead, a group in which every element has square one is an abelian group: also equals . In an abelian group every conjugacy class is a singleton, so one nonidentity class permits only one nonidentity element, giving a group of order two. This contradicts infinitude. Consequently the infinite group in question is a .
Construct the free product from the empty word and all finite alternating words , whose syllables in a free product are nonidentity elements of tagged copies of , with adjacent syllables from different factors. Multiply by concatenating, multiplying adjacent elements in the same factor, and deleting identities until the word is reduced. The normal form theorem for a free product gives a unique result; reducing three concatenated words gives the same result under either parenthesization, so multiplication is associative. The empty word is the identity, and the inverse reverses the word and inverts each syllable. Each factor embeds as words of length one.
The universal property of a free product says that for every group and group homomorphisms there is a unique group homomorphism extending both. Explicitly, send a reduced word to the product of its syllable images; reduction preserves this product. This gives existence, while generation by the two factors gives uniqueness.
A standard form of Klein's combination theorem, or the ping-pong lemma, is the following. Let nontrivial subgroups of the homeomorphisms of a topological space have disjoint nonempty subsets with
Assume also that at least one factor has at least three elements. Then the generated subgroup is . The cardinality hypothesis cannot simply be omitted: the same involution swapping two disjoint sets would otherwise provide a counterexample with both factors equal to .
Here is the ping-pong lemma proof. A reduced word of odd length begins and ends in the same factor, so repeated application of the displayed inclusions sends the other factor's domain into that factor's domain. Disjointness shows that the word is not the identity. For an even reduced word, relabel the factors so that , and invert the word if necessary to make it begin with and end in . Choose . The conjugate reduces to an odd-length word beginning with and ending with , both in , so it is nontrivial. Thus no nonempty reduced word lies in the kernel of the natural group homomorphism , proving the theorem.
For an explicit example, let be the one-dimensional Real projective space, and take the Möbius transformations
For every nonzero integer , sends into , while sends into . Indeed when , and . Both transformations have infinite order. Hence the ping-pong lemma gives , a free product of two nontrivial finitely presented groups.
A finitely presented group admits a group presentation with both and finite; it is the quotient of the free group on by the normal closure of . If
with disjoint generator sets, then
Maps from this group presentation to any group are exactly pairs of maps from and , so the universal property of a free product proves the formula.
For a group homomorphism , choose a word representing for each . The presentation of a semidirect product is
The presentation maps onto the specified semidirect product. Conversely, its conjugation relations allow any word to be written as a word from followed by one from . The natural maps from the two factors to the presented group satisfy the full action relation, because conjugation agrees with first on generators and hence on all elements. They define the reverse group homomorphism . The two maps are inverse on every generator, proving the group isomorphism. There are finitely many cross-relations, so the result is again a finitely presented group.
Apply this to the specified permutation action. The presentation is
Eliminate and . The last cross-relation becomes , already implied by . Thus
Both factors are nontrivial finitely presented groups, as required.
The Bradley-Terry model assigns comparison probability to each observed edge. Up to factors independent of the parameters, its likelihood function is
The comparison graph is a path graph, hence a tree. After fixing , its edge ratios are unconstrained positive coordinates: every collection determines uniquely .
For a convenient strict-concavity calculation, use the edge log-ratios in a Bradley-Terry comparison tree . The log-likelihood separates as
Each derivative is , where is the logistic function of , and each second derivative is . Because , there is a unique finite global maximum at
Converting back gives the Bradley-Terry maximum-likelihood estimate on a path:
Equivalently, recurse backwards using . All estimates are finite and positive. The sample size changes the curvature of the likelihood but not this maximizer; absence of comparison cycles is what permits every empirical edge proportion to be fitted simultaneously.
We derive the probabilities for a sequential elimination all-pay contest from a discounted subgame perfect equilibrium, using backward induction, and only then take . This preserves the selection supplied by discounting.
First consider a two-player all-pay auction with effective prizes , so the incremental payoff is times winning probability minus effort. For , the independent mixed strategies have effort cumulative distribution functions
The second player has an atom at zero. For positive bids on this support, the first player's payoff is and the second's is . Bids above cannot improve either payoff. The first has no zero atom, so the second's zero bid also earns zero. If the first deviates to zero, it can win only when the second bids zero; even with every such tie resolved in its favor, its payoff is at most . The two-player complete-information all-pay equilibrium therefore has winning probabilities
These follow by integrating against the uniform . A third player with effective prize at most cannot profit by entering: for , its winning probability is , giving payoff at most zero; above its effort exceeds its prize.
For the dynamic induction, relabel any remaining subgame's valuations as , with prizes left. Define the backward-induction threshold in an elimination all-pay contest
For the sum is empty and . The discounted continuation value in an elimination contest is obtained from the following net utilities:
The base case is the one-prize all-pay auction: only the two highest valuations need positive effort, with prizes and payoffs . Every lower player has a nonprofitable deviation by the preceding calculation.
For , if either of the top two wins, the other becomes the highest player in a subgame with prizes. The continuation threshold in either such subgame is the same number
The remaining top player's continuation payoff is . Its effective prize in a sequential contest, net of the discounted payoff from losing, is therefore
Thus for , and the two-player distributions above apply. Adding the losing-state baselines gives
which agree with the proposed formulas.
For a player of rank , the inductive continuation utility after either top player wins is identical: its new rank is , and the utility expression depends only on its own value and the lower-valued tail. Thus its current zero-effort payoff is that common continuation value multiplied by , exactly the stated . Its effective prize for deviating to win now is . For , direct subtraction gives
For , , since the coefficients in are nonnegative and sum to one. Such a player cannot gain by entering against the two active players. There is one additional zero-bid deviation to check for the highest player. If both active bids become zero, the tie could award a prize to any remaining player. Losing to any player below rank gives no greater continuation utility than losing to rank : deleting rank makes the ordered remaining rival list componentwise smallest, and its continuation threshold is a nonnegative weighted sum of that list. Thus even resolving every all-zero tie in the highest player's favor gives payoff at most its usual losing baseline plus . No tie rule can improve this deviation. This verifies all best responses and the continuation-utility formulas. Applying the construction to every remaining-player set proves a subgame perfect equilibrium of the discounted contest, not merely an on-path prescription.
Now take the vanishing-discount limit of an elimination all-pay contest. At every nonfinal subgame,
Thus the two highest remaining players win with equal probabilities in a nonfinal stage. In the final stage the effective prizes are their actual valuations, so its lower-valued participant beats the higher one with probability equal to half their valuation ratio.
Return to the original ranks. Only the original top can ever win; at most higher players can have left before the final stage, so players of rank or worse never enter its top pair. Player must lose fair nonfinal contests to remain unawarded until the final stage, where its opponent has value . Hence
A player first enters the top pair at stage , after higher-ranked winners have left. To remain unawarded, it must lose the nonfinal contests from then on, followed by the final contest against rank . Therefore
There are exactly distinct winners, so the expected value of their indicator sum is . Combining these calculations gives
This proves the ranked winning probabilities in an undiscounted elimination contest. When , it reduces to the ordinary two-player all-pay winning probabilities; when , the repeated fair stages explain each power of .
Use the usual continuous-distribution convention , , and write . After observing , the follower can win by matching it, because ties favor the follower. Its best response is to match when and choose zero when ; the indifferent equality has probability zero. Thus the leader wins with probability and a leader of type maximizes
Bids above are dominated by bidding . This is the leader optimization in a sequential private-value all-pay contest. Since is a concave function, is concave. An interior optimum satisfies , with the usual endpoint conditions when that equation has no interior solution.
For precision, select the smallest maximizer when the leader is indifferent. This defines a Stackelberg equilibrium and supplies the printed strict conditional comparison at the threshold type. Let . The density is positive: if it vanished there, its nonnegative nonincreasing continuation would force to remain up to , which is impossible. At the median,
If this is positive, every maximizer is strictly greater than , so the leader wins with probability greater than . If it is negative, every maximizer is strictly smaller than . If it is zero, is a maximizer, and the smallest maximizer is at most . Therefore the median-density threshold for the leader in an all-pay contest is
Strict concavity of would make the optimum unique, removing the selection convention. With mere concavity, the printed assertion needs that convention at equality. For example, and make all bids optimal, and choosing makes the leader more likely to win even though the strict threshold is not exceeded.
The same issue can occur at an interior type, rather than just an endpoint. A continuously differentiable concave distribution is
Its density decreases from to , is constant on , and then decreases to ; integration gives . Its median is . At , every bid in maximizes , and choosing gives winning probability . This confirms the genuine best-response selection at a flat leader objective issue. The smallest-maximizer convention avoids it; the threshold type has zero ex ante probability.
The unconditional comparison is valid for every optimal selection. Zero effort guarantees the leader payoff zero, so an optimal bid satisfies
Consequently . If has the continuous distribution , the probability integral transform makes uniform on . Taking expectations proves the ex ante follower advantage in a sequential all-pay contest:
For strictly increasing atom-free , optimal bids in fact satisfy for almost every , so the first inequality is strict. Conditional advantage for unusually high leader types is therefore compatible with an unconditional follower advantage.
Let , so a type values a prize at . In a symmetric increasing Bayes-Nash equilibrium of this rank-order contest, a player reporting type wins when at most opponents have larger types. Its winning probability is
Here the count of opponents above has a binomial distribution. Differentiation, or the associated order statistic density, gives
Define the effort by the all-pay effort identity
This also verifies equilibrium globally. The derivative of a type 's payoff from reporting is , positive before and negative after . Thus truthful reporting is a best response. Bidding above the maximal equilibrium effort gains no additional winning probability. Type zero chooses zero effort.
By exchanging the two integrations, the expected value of total effort is
The last integral is the moment for a Beta distribution with parameters and , namely . This is the uniform-value multi-prize all-pay effort formula.
Put and . The positive constant multiplying does not affect the maximizing . Since
the assumed inequality makes nonincreasing on the feasible interval. Hence one prize maximizes expected total effort.
For the power family, the PDF gives . Then
If , this derivative is strictly negative for : the bracket is affine and its values at the endpoints are and . Thus is optimal.
If , the unique continuous maximizer is
The objective strictly increases before and decreases after it. Therefore its discrete maximizer lies among
Compare the surviving candidates using , since . If is an integer, that integer is the unique maximizer; if its floor is zero, the only feasible candidate is . This proves the discrete prize-count optimization for a power-valued contest including the endpoint cases.
The sufficient condition need only hold on . The power family is undefined at zero, so the printed endpoint cannot apply to it. More generally, a positive finite value would make the displayed inequality fail at zero. The design argument uses only positive feasible prize fractions and needs no value there.
Write and let . Player 's payoff in the proportional contest with outside effort is . When , this is strictly concave and
The best response is zero when , and otherwise is . Thus the nonnegative-effort Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions at a pure strategy Nash equilibrium give
For an active player the first-order equation is . For an inactive player the derivative at zero is . Strict concavity makes these conditions sufficient as well as necessary.
If , an equilibrium cannot have just one active player: that player would win with certainty and could lower its positive effort. An all-zero profile also cannot be an equilibrium under the usual completion of proportional allocation at zero: at least one player can gain by investing an arbitrarily small amount. Consequently there are at least two active players, so every is positive. If this positivity is automatic. The allocation rule's otherwise undefined all-zero value at is therefore immaterial to the equilibrium calculation.
Let , , and use the harmonic mean . Summing the active efforts gives
The positive root supplies the total-effort formula for a proportional contest with outside effort:
At this reduces to . There is also a genuine zero-active case: if , then and ; no harmonic mean of an empty family is needed.
For a fully explicit active-set rule, set
The equilibrium equation is . For , is strictly decreasing from to . For its limit at zero is , and it is strictly decreasing wherever a zero could occur. Hence the positive root is unique. Moreover , since its equation gives , and supplies an equilibrium with total effort .
Player is active exactly when , equivalently . Ordering the valuations, including ties, gives
Therefore the active-set threshold for a proportional contest with outside effort is
The qualifying indices form a prefix because is decreasing. Equality excludes the marginal player, as required by strict positivity of effort. Equivalently, the positive root of the displayed quadratic must satisfy , with . These formulas include one active player when and exclude that case when .

Pinned article: Introduction to the OurBigBook Project

Welcome to the OurBigBook Project! Our goal is to create the perfect publishing platform for STEM subjects, and get university-level students to write the best free STEM tutorials ever.
Everyone is welcome to create an account and play with the site: ourbigbook.com/go/register. We belive that students themselves can write amazing tutorials, but teachers are welcome too. You can write about anything you want, it doesn't have to be STEM or even educational. Silly test content is very welcome and you won't be penalized in any way. Just keep it legal!
We have two killer features:
  1. topics: topics group articles by different users with the same title, e.g. here is the topic for the "Fundamental Theorem of Calculus" ourbigbook.com/go/topic/fundamental-theorem-of-calculus
    Articles of different users are sorted by upvote within each article page. This feature is a bit like:
    • a Wikipedia where each user can have their own version of each article
    • a Q&A website like Stack Overflow, where multiple people can give their views on a given topic, and the best ones are sorted by upvote. Except you don't need to wait for someone to ask first, and any topic goes, no matter how narrow or broad
    This feature makes it possible for readers to find better explanations of any topic created by other writers. And it allows writers to create an explanation in a place that readers might actually find it.
    Figure 1.
    Screenshot of the "Derivative" topic page
    . View it live at: ourbigbook.com/go/topic/derivative
  2. local editing: you can store all your personal knowledge base content locally in a plaintext markup format that can be edited locally and published either:
    This way you can be sure that even if OurBigBook.com were to go down one day (which we have no plans to do as it is quite cheap to host!), your content will still be perfectly readable as a static site.
    Figure 5. . You can also edit articles on the Web editor without installing anything locally.
    Video 3.
    Edit locally and publish demo
    . Source. This shows editing OurBigBook Markup and publishing it using the Visual Studio Code extension.
  3. https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook-media/master/feature/x/hilbert-space-arrow.png
  4. Infinitely deep tables of contents:
    Figure 6.
    Dynamic article tree with infinitely deep table of contents
    .
    Descendant pages can also show up as toplevel e.g.: ourbigbook.com/cirosantilli/chordate-subclade
All our software is open source and hosted at: github.com/ourbigbook/ourbigbook
Further documentation can be found at: docs.ourbigbook.com
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