The rank-two bundle of fibre spans is globally generated and splits as $\mathcal{O}(a_1)\oplus \mathcal{O}(a_2)$ with $a_1+a_2=g-2$. On its rational normal scroll, $L{|}_C$ is the degree-three pencil and $M{|}_C=K_C$. The adjunction formula then forces the displayed divisor class. Writing $a=a_2-a_1$ and $M=B+a_{2}L$ on the Hirzebruch surface gives $C\in |3B+(a+a_2+2)L|$.

In mostly-minus signature, take $D_j=(\ell +r_j{)}^2-m^2+i0$. Feynman parameters and a momentum shift giveFor massive internal lines this is ultraviolet finite in four dimensions. Physical external kinematics can still create threshold cuts, encoded by the Feynman i-epsilon prescription.

Convergence holds in total variation distance. A triangle indicator depends only on its three edges, so its dependency neighborhood consists of itself and the $3(n-3)$ triangles sharing an edge. The Poisson approximation with dependency neighborhoods gives errors $b_1=O(n^4{p}^6)$ and $b_2=O(n^4{p}^5)$. Under the displayed scaling $p$ is of order $n^{-1}$, so both vanish. The probability of at least one triangle therefore tends to $1-e^{-\alpha }$.

For the triangle count in a binomial random graph, distinct triangle indicators are independent unless they share an edge. A shared-edge pair has covariance $p^5(1-p)$, and there are $12\left(\genfrac{}{}{0ex}{}{n}{4}\right)$ ordered pairs of that type. The individual indicator variances give the first term. Equivalently,by counting ordered pairs according to the number of shared vertices.

For three real scalar fields with field interaction term ${\mathcal{L}}_I=-\frac{1}{2}(g_1{\varphi }^2\Phi +g_2{\psi }^2\Phi )$ and mediator mass $M$, the connected tree-level Feynman diagram for $\varphi \psi \to \varphi \psi$ has one exchanged $\Phi$ and Mandelstam invariant $t=(p-p^{\prime }{)}^2$. Each vertex has a factor $-i{g}_j$: its two identical-field Wick contractions cancel the factor $1/2$. Thus $i\mathcal{M}=(-i{g}_1)(-i{g}_2)i/(t-M^2+i0)$. There is no $s$- or $u$-channel at this order because the interaction has no mixed $\varphi \psi \Phi$ vertex. Distinguishable external particles also require no exchange symmetrization.

At regular transverse intersections, the displayed map has a rank-three $3\times 4$ Jacobian matrix. Its one-dimensional kernel is the parameter tangent, while the physical tangent is parallel to the cross product of the surface normals. A continuation method predicts along that tangent and corrects $F=0$ together with a transverse section equation using Newton method. Patch bounds and component isolation supply seeds; one seed alone cannot discover every disconnected curve or closed loop. Tangency or coincident surfaces violate the regular-curve assumptions and require separate analysis.

Row and column potentials satisfying the displayed inequalities give a lower bound on the cost of every feasible shipment matrix: ${\sum }_{ij}{c}_{ij}{x}_{ij}\ge {\sum }_i{u}_i{s}_i+{\sum }_j{v}_j{d}_j$, since row sums are supplies $s_i$ and column sums are demands $d_j$. The reduced costs are $c_{ij}-u_i-v_j$. A feasible matrix using only zero-reduced-cost cells attains the lower bound, proving optimality by weak duality. The transportation simplex algorithm sets these potentials by equality on a transportation spanning tree, and enters a negative-reduced-cost cell if one exists.

When factory $i$ incurs unit production cost $p_i$ only on goods actually shipped, add that cost to every real shipping destination in its row. Unused capacity incurs no production cost; a dummy unused-capacity column therefore keeps zero cost rather than receiving $p_i$. This changes the optimal factory utilization when capacity exceeds total demand. Transportation dual certificate with capacity inequalities proves optimality without assuming every factory must produce at full capacity.

For fixed positive density $\delta$, every sufficiently large $A\subseteq [1,N]$ of size at least $\delta N$ has a long arithmetic progression in its triple sumset. Embed it in $\mathbb{Z}/(8N)\mathbb{Z}$, where its density is at least $\delta /8$. A translated Bohr neighborhood in a triple sumset has bounded rank and fixed positive radius depending only on $\delta$. A torus pigeonhole principle argument supplies a nonzero step whose small multiples stay in the Bohr set, with polynomially many multiples. All resulting residues have representatives in $[3,3N]$, an interval shorter than half the modulus, so their successive ordinary integer differences agree and give an actual integer arithmetic progression. The positive constant prefactor is absorbed by reducing the exponent for sufficiently large $N$.

The transitive closure of a relation connects $x$ to $y$ when a finite nonempty chain of $R$-steps leads from $x$ to $y$. Concatenation proves transitivity, and induction along a chain shows that any transitive relation containing $R$ contains $R^{+}$. This concerns closure of a relation, rather than the transitive closure of a set under membership.

The number of point-stabilizer orbits, equivalently the number of orbits on ordered pairs. On $k$-spaces of an $n$-space with $k\le n/2$, $G{L}_n(q)$ has rank $k+1$, indexed by intersection dimension.

A derangement is an element fixing none of the points of a group action. Every finite transitive action on at least two points has a derangement. Count pairs $(g,x)$ with $gx=x$: transitivity gives ${\sum }_g|\mathrm{Fix}(g)|={\sum }_x|G_x|=|G|$. If every element fixed a point, the identity's extra fixed points would make this sum strictly larger than $|G|$. This is the Burnside lemma counting argument specialized to existence of a derangement.

A transitive group action is regular if every point stabilizer is trivial. Equivalently each ordered pair of points is connected by exactly one group element. Identifying one point with the identity identifies the action with left multiplication on the group. A regular normal subgroup inside a larger primitive group can supply translations or nonabelian left multiplication; the whole primitive group usually has a nontrivial stabilizer acting by automorphisms of this regular subgroup.

A group action on a nonempty set $X$ is simply transitive when exactly one group element sends any chosen point to any other:Equivalently it is both a transitive group action and a free group action; this is also a regular group action. Transitivity supplies a transport, and freeness makes it unique. Conversely, putting $y=x$ in the uniqueness condition shows that every stabilizer subgroup is $\{e\}$, since the identity element already fixes $x$. In a transitive group action, checking that just one stabilizer subgroup is trivial suffices: all the others are conjugate subgroups.

The cyclic group $C_3$ in the diagram under transitive group action is simply transitive. More generally, the left regular action of any group $G$ on itself is simply transitive: the equation $gx=y$ has the unique solution $g=y{x}^{-1}$, using the inverse element of $x$. This shows why the property is useful: every position has a unique label relative to a chosen starting position.

Choose a point $x_0\in X$. Its orbit mapis a bijection and an equivariant map from the left regular action: ${\varphi }_{x_0}(hg)=h\cdot {\varphi }_{x_0}(g)$. This identifies $X$ with a copy of $G$, but $X$ does not come with a preferred identity element. If $x_1=a\cdot x_0$, then ${\varphi }_{x_1}(g)={\varphi }_{x_0}(ga)$: changing the chosen point composes this identification with right multiplication by $a$. An old label $g$ therefore becomes the new label $g{a}^{-1}$, which also specifies the side of multiplication for a noncommutative group.

The transport from $x$ to $y$ remains independent of the chosen point. Writing $x=b\cdot x_0$ and $y=c\cdot x_0$, it is $c{b}^{-1}$. With $x_1=a\cdot x_0$, the new labels are $b{a}^{-1}$ and $c{a}^{-1}$, andFor a finite group, simple transitivity implies $|X|=|G|$. Conversely, a transitive group action with $|X|=|G|<\infty$ is simply transitive by the orbit-stabilizer theorem. Equality of cardinalities alone is insufficient without transitivity: the cyclic group $C_2$ can fix both points of a two-point set, giving two group orbits and two possible self-transports at each point.

Using the convention that $\mathrm{TC}(x)$ is the least transitive set containing $x$ as a subset, put $x_0=x$, $x_{n+1}=\bigcup x_n$ and $\mathrm{TC}(x)={\bigcup }_{n<\omega }{x}_n$. If $\mathrm{rank}x=\alpha$, every element encountered is an iterated member of an original element and has rank below $\alpha$. Thus the closure has rank at most $\alpha$, while $x\subseteq \mathrm{TC}(x)$ gives the reverse inequality. A convention requiring $x$ itself to be an element instead has rank $\alpha +1$.

The Gibbs energy of activation is the standard molar Gibbs free energy change associated with going from the starting reactants to the transition state in transition state theory. It specifies the directional barrier, rather than the overall endpoint change in Gibbs free energy. Use consistent standard states when comparing Gibbs energies of activation and rate constants. See the IUPAC Gold Book: Gibbs energy of activation.

The characteristic function assigns every coalition its total attainable transferable payoff, with $v(\varnothing )=0$. It determines the efficiency condition of an imputation and all constraints of the core of a cooperative game. For the glove game, $v(S)=\omega \min (|S\cap L|,|S\cap R|)$; for miners requiring $r$ people to carry one lump, $v(S)=\lfloor |S|/r\rfloor$. This game-theoretic function is distinct from the characteristic function of a probability distribution.

Players each own one object of one of two complementary types. A matched pair sells for $\omega >0$, and objects of one type alone have no value. The characteristic function of a coalitional game is therefore the displayed matching count times pair price. The core of a glove game pays the scarce type the entire pair value and the abundant type zero; if type counts are equal, a common split between the two types can vary continuously.

The characteristic function of a coalitional game is superadditive when disjoint coalitions can attain at least the sum of their separate values by joining. This follows when their separate strategies can be played together without interference. Superadditivity is an additional property of an abstract transferable utility game, not a consequence of merely assigning values to subsets: $v(\{1\})=v(\{2\})=v(\{1,2\})=1$ is a normalized counterexample.

With nonnegative claims $c_i$ and an estate $0\le a\le {\sum }_i{c}_i$, a coalition's guaranteed worth is the estate left after all outside claims are met, or zero if those claims exhaust it. Writing the total deficit $d={\sum }_i{c}_i-a$ gives $v(S)=({\sum }_{i\in S}{c}_i-d{)}_{+}$. For disjoint coalitions, $(p+q-d{)}_{+}\ge (p-d{)}_{+}+(q-d{)}_{+}$, so this is a superadditive coalitional game. Its core of a cooperative game consists exactly of efficient allocations with $0\le x_i\le c_i$: the upper bounds are equivalent to the complementary-coalition constraints, and the lower bounds together with efficiency imply every other coalition constraint.