Ciro Santilli @cirosantilli 37

30 individual suspected of spying for the US were arrested and 42 CIA operatives were identified in connection with the network.

The network, which was set up by a considerable number of seasoned CIA operatives in several countries, attempted to trick citizens into spying for them under the guise of issuing visa, helping with permanent residency, and making job and study offers.

From January 2005 until January 2009, I worked as a government contractor at the CIA. I was assigned to [Directorate](ledger item 1) in the [Division] (ledger item 2). I served as a Uob) (ledger item 3) whose responsibility was to facilitate the dissemination of intelligence reporting to the Intelligence Community. I also served as a Oob 2) (ledger item 4) whose responsibility was to identify Human Intelligence (humint) targets of Interest for exploitation. I was assigned the telecommunications and information operations account.

As our efforts increased, we started to notice anomalies in our operations and conflicting intelligence reporting that indicated that several of our operations had been compromised. The indications ranged from [ redacted ] to sources abruptly and without reason ceasing all communications with us.

These warning signs were alarming due to the fact that our officers were approaching sources using [operational technique] (ledger item 16)

When our efforts began, ultimate operational authority rested with us. The other component provided the finances for the operation while we gave the operational guidance and the country specific knowledge.

knew we had a massive intelligence failure on our hands. All of our assets [ redacted ] were in jeopardy.

To give our compromise context, the U.S. communications infrastructure was under siege

All of this information was collected under the project cryptonym [cryptonym] (ledger item 52)

Meanwhile throughout 2010, I started to hear about catastrophic intelligence failures in the government office I formally worked for. More than one government employee reached out to me and notified me that the "nightmare scenario" I had described and tried to prevent had transpired. I was told that in upwards of 70% of our operations had been compromised.

it is not just a potential compromise in one country, It effects every country

The Chinese government systematically dismantled C.I.A. spying operations in the country starting in 2010, killing or imprisoning more than a dozen sources over two years and crippling intelligence gathering there for years afterward.

Some were convinced that a mole within the C.I.A. had betrayed the United States. Others believed that the Chinese had hacked the covert system the C.I.A. used to communicate with its foreign sources. Years later, that debate remains unresolved.

[...]

From the final weeks of 2010 through the end of 2012, [...] the Chinese killed at least a dozen of the C.I.A.’s sources. [...] One was shot in front of his colleagues in the courtyard of a government building — a message to others who might have been working for the C.I.A.

It was a shocking blow to an American spy agency that prides itself on its field operations. There was also a devastating human cost: Some 20 CIA sources were executed by the Chinese government, two former officials said — a higher number of dead than initially reported by NBC News and the New York Times. Then an unknown number of Russian assets also disappeared, sources say.

Soon after the task force concluded the Chinese had penetrated covcom, it got an even more troubling report: That after a joint training session between Chinese and Russian intelligence officers, the Russians "came back saying we got good info on covcom," as the former official put it

FBI agents began to suspect Lee after they received a tip that he had passed information to Chinese intelligence officers while working for a Japanese tobacco company in Hong Kong, sources said, a detail first reported Thursday by the New York Times. They also found it suspicious when Lee took a job at an auction house in Hong Kong that was co-owned by a senior Communist Party official, sources said. He eventually ended up working for Christie's, the international auction house.

When agents searched Lee's hotel rooms in 2012, they found notebooks with the names of covert CIA sources, according to court documents.

But not all of the agent arrests and deaths could be linked to information possessed by Lee, who left the CIA in 2007, the former officials said.

The former officer, Jerry Chun Shing Lee, 55, pleaded guilty in May to conspiring with Chinese intelligence agents starting in 2010, after he left the agency. Prosecutors detailed a long financial paper trail that they said showed that Mr. Lee received more than $840,000 for his work.

Mr. Lee, an Army veteran, worked for the C.I.A. from 1994 to 2007, including in China.

But F.B.I. agents who investigated whether he was the culprit passed on an opportunity to arrest him in the United States in 2013, allowing him to travel back to Hong Kong even after finding classified information in his luggage. F.B.I. agents had also covertly entered a hotel room Mr. Lee occupied in 2012, finding handwritten notes detailing the names and numbers of at least eight C.I.A. sources that he had handled in his capacity as a case officer.

It was considered one of the CIA’s worst failures in decades: Over a two-year period starting in late 2010, Chinese authorities systematically dismantled the agency’s network of agents across the country, executing dozens of suspected U.S. spies. But since then, a question has loomed over the entire debacle. How were the Chinese able to roll up the network?

U.S. intelligence officers were also able to identify digital links between the covert communications system and the U.S. government itself, according to one former official—links the Chinese agencies almost certainly found as well. These digital links would have made it relatively easy for China to deduce that the covert communications system was being used by the CIA. In fact, some of these links pointed back to parts of the CIA’s own website, according to the former official.

When CIA officers begin working with a new source, they often use an interim covert communications system—in case the person turns out to be a double agent.

The communications system used in China during this period was internet-based and accessible from laptop or desktop computers, two of the former officials said.

This interim, or “throwaway,” system, an encrypted digital program, allows for remote communication between an intelligence officer and a source, but it is also separated from the main communications system used with vetted sources, reducing the risk if an asset goes bad.

Although they used some of the same coding, the interim system and the main covert communication platform used in China at this time were supposed to be clearly separated.

In 2013, hundreds of CIA officers — many working nonstop for weeks — scrambled to contain a disaster of global proportions: a compromise of the agency’s internet-based covert communications system used to interact with its informants in dark corners around the world. Teams of CIA experts worked feverishly to take down and reconfigure the websites secretly used for these communications

In fact, the Iranians used Google to identify the website the CIA was using to communicate with agents.

Former U.S. officials said the internet-based platform, which was first used in war zones in the Middle East, was not built to withstand the sophisticated counterintelligence efforts of a state actor like China or Iran. “It was never meant to be used long term for people to talk to sources,” said one former official. “The issue was that it was working well for too long, with too many people. But it was an elementary system.”

As a result, many who are directly responsible for working with sources on the ground within the CIA’s Directorate of Operations are furious

The fiascos in Iran and China continue to be sticking points between the Directorate of Operations and the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T) — the technical scientists. “There is a disconnect between the two directorates,” said one former CIA official. “I’m not sure that will be fixed anytime soon.”

Entire careers in the CIA’s Office of Technical Service — the part of DS&T directly responsible for developing covert communications systems — were built on these internet-based systems, said a former senior official. Raising concerns about them was “like calling someone’s baby ugly,” said this person.

CIA agents using the system were supposed to conduct “electronic surveillance detection routes” — that is, to bounce around on various sites on the internet before accessing the system, in order to cover their tracks — but often failed to do so, creating potentially suspicious patterns of internet usage, said this person.

“And the agency would produce its own COVCOM [covert communications] systems in-house. We’d test it there. In denied areas, we had special systems.”

In addition, some sites bore strikingly similar names. For example, while Hosseini was communicating with the CIA through Iraniangoals.com, a site named Iraniangoalkicks.com was built for another informant. At least two dozen of the 350-plus sites produced by the CIA appeared to be messaging platforms for Iranian operatives, the analysts found.

Online records they analyzed reveal the hosting space for these front websites was often purchased in bulk by the dozen, often from the same internet providers, on the same server space. The result was that numerical identifiers, or IP addresses, for many of these websites were sequential, much like houses on the same street.

This vulnerability went far beyond Iran. Written in various languages, the websites appeared to be a conduit for CIA communications with operatives in at least 20 countries, among them China, Brazil, Russia, Thailand and Ghana, the analysts found.

Using only a single website, as well as publicly available material such as historical internet scanning results and the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine, we identified a network of 885 websites and have high confidence that the United States (US) Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) used these sites for covert communication.

The websites included similar Java, JavaScript, Adobe Flash, and CGI artifacts that implemented or apparently loaded covert communications apps. In addition, blocks of sequential IP addresses registered to apparently fictitious US companies were used to host some of the websites. All of these flaws would have facilitated discovery by hostile parties.

The websites, which purported to be news, weather, sports, healthcare, and other legitimate websites, appeared to be localized to at least 29 languages and geared towards at least 36 countries.

The bulk of the websites that we discovered were active at various periods between 2004 and 2013.

Nevertheless, a subset of the websites are linked to individuals who may be former and possibly still active intelligence community employees or assets:

• Several are currently abroad
• Another left mainland China in the time frame of the Chinese crackdown
• Another was subsequently employed by the US State Department
• Another now works at a foreign intelligence contractor

Given that we cannot rule out ongoing risks to CIA employees or assets, we are not publishing full technical details regarding our process of mapping out the network at this time. As a first step, we intend to conduct a limited disclosure to US Government oversight bodies.

Now, an important caveat: I have known dedicated former CIA officials who have spoken of the care, respect, and obligation they felt toward their sources, and the lengths they would go to assist them. For many case officers — that is, the CIA's primary corps of spy handlers — this is a core part of their professional identity.

During the roll-up in China, for instance, a former U.S. official told me about a CIA officer who, aware that something was going terribly wrong there, organized final, assuredly dangerous, in-person meetings with agency sources. This distraught CIA officer essentially shoved wads of cash into sources' hands. This CIA officer warned them of the unfolding disaster and begged them to leave the country as fast as they could. Another source told me a story about a CIA official who, while being debriefed in Langley about the asset roll-up — and the slapdash COVCOM system — broke down in tears upon hearing that sources’ lives had been destroyed because of such obvious dereliction, of which they were previously unaware.

But I don’t want to oversell this point, either. By its nature, the world of espionage is steeped in the sordid aspects of human experience, exploiting people’s vulnerabilities for narrow informational gain. [...]

Indeed, many former CIA officials have a decidedly pragmatic and amoral conception of their profession. Bad things happen when you spy, or recruit others to do so. [...] I had a conversation once with a former senior CIA official with experience in Iran issues who had an almost naturalistic view of recurring asset losses there over the years: for him, it was a built-in, cyclical feature of the work and environment, like the denuding of deciduous forests every fall.

NSA wanted to impress the Japanese. Show them our reach. They loved the live video from drones. This is Pakistan right now [video shows American agents demonstrating drone footage to Japanese officials]. They were not as excited about that we wanted their help to spy on the Japanese population. They said it was against their laws.

Of course we tapped the entire country anyway.

And we did not stop there. Once we owned their communications systems, we started going after the physical infrastructure.

We'd slip these little sleeper programs into power grids, dams, hospitals. The idea was that if the day came when Japan was no longer an ally, it would be "lights out".

And it wasn't just the Japanese. We were planting malware in Mexico, Germany, Brazil, Austria.

I mean, China, I can understand. Russia. Iran. Venezuela, okay.

But Austria?!

[shows footage of cow on an idyllic Alpine mountain grazing field, suggesting that there is nothing in Austria to spy on]

Each of you is going to build a covert communications network in your home city [i.e. their fictitious foreign target location written on each person's desk such as Berlin, Istanbul and Bangkok, not necessarily where they were actually born], you're going to deploy it, backup your site, destroy it, and restore it again.

Thou shalt eat thy watermelon in the morning, and thy melon in the evening. Thou shalt not eat thy watermelon in the evening, nor shalt thou eat thy melon in the morning.