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Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 37 1 i Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Let be the design matrix with row , let , and write . Independence gives the Poisson regression likelihood functionThe score function and negative Hessian matrix areBecause , the score has mean zero; independence and the Poisson distribution variance give . Thus the observed and expected Fisher information matrices are the same here.
Assume has full column matrix rank . For a nonzero vector , . The concavity of the Poisson regression likelihood therefore makes any finite solution of the unique maximum-likelihood estimator. If the design is rank deficient, parameters differing by a vector in give the same distribution, so only identifiable combinations can be estimated. Full rank alone does not ensure a finite maximizer: for an intercept-only model with all observations zero, approaches its supremum as . More generally, directions that decrease only fitted means attached to zero counts can produce boundary fits. A useful sufficient case for a finite fit is full rank with every count positive: each summand tends to in either tail, and some diverges whenever diverges.
For an interior fit, Newton's method and Fisher scoring give the same update:This is also iteratively reweighted least squares. Define the working response , with , and regress on using weights :A numerical implementation solves these linear equations rather than explicitly forming the inverse, checks convergence of the score and likelihood, and can shorten a step when necessary.
Under the usual fixed-design regularity conditions, with growing information and no single observation dominating it, a score Taylor expansion about the true parameter givesEstimate the covariance matrix by ; its diagonal square roots are the coefficient standard errors. This justifies large-sample Wald confidence intervals and Wald tests for specified coefficients or contrasts. Finite-sample unbiasedness is not being asserted. A likelihood-ratio test compares nested fits through twice their maximized log-likelihood difference. The Poisson deviance against the saturated fit iswith . Residual diagnostics and a check of overdispersion assess whether the assumed Poisson variance is adequate; the variance correction required when it is not is derived in the next part.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 5 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
No: uniform convergence of utilities on bounded sets does not imply closed convergence of preferences. It does imply the upper condition. Indeed, suppose , and . These bundles all lie in one bounded ball. Uniform convergence there, together with continuity of , givesso .
For a strict limiting comparison , the fixed pair itself satisfies eventually. The obstruction is the lower condition at an indifference relation, where the strict approximating rankings need not disappear.
For a counterexample valid in every dimension , takeOn , , exactly as required. Every induces if and only if , while makes every pair indifferent. In particular, holds in the limit. Any sequences , eventually have , so they cannot satisfy . The lower graph-limit condition fails.
Equivalently, an open neighborhood of sufficiently small to keep the first coordinate of its first bundle below that of its second bundle meets the limiting graph and none of the approximating graphs. The corresponding hit-open neighborhood in the Fell topology proves failure of convergence directly. HenceThe uniform utility convergence need not preserve closed preference convergence phenomenon reflects the loss of ranking information when the limiting utility has a flat indifference region.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 5 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
There are two equivalent graph-limit requirements. Both are necessary. The upper condition is that, for every subsequence and convergent pairs , ,The lower condition is that every limiting comparison can be approximated: for every , there exist and withThe upper condition excludes spurious limiting comparisons; the lower condition prevents genuine limiting comparisons from disappearing. The subsequence quantifier in the upper condition is important: a violation need occur along only some of the indices. On the locally compact separable metric space , these two conditions are exactly closed convergence of preference relations.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 5 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Put and identify a continuous preference relation with its closed graph . The closed convergence of preference relations is the topology induced by the Fell topology on these closed subsets of .
Concretely, a subbasis consists of the setsFinite intersections of these requirements form a basis, restricted to the specified complete, transitive, continuous preference relations. Thus a neighborhood may require some comparisons in prescribed open regions and forbid any comparison in prescribed compact regions. The use of compact sets in the avoidance condition is what makes this the Fell topology, rather than a stronger hyperspace topology on an unbounded consumption space.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 4 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
When both consumers have the same quasilinear utility on , the same strictly concave one-variable maximization gives , independently of their wealth. If their first-good endowments are , thenThus the joint regular-value condition always holds. With positive total first-good endowment, the equilibrium isBoth first-good markets and second-good markets clear: second-good demands sum to . If a nonstandard endowment choice has , there is no positive-price zero, so the regular value condition is vacuous. In the usual positive-endowment case every parameter has the displayed unique regular exchange economy.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 4 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Write the first endowment as . The budget constraint at normalized prices is . Because the quasilinear utility is increasing in , the budget binds, and its maximization reduces to maximizing over . Its derivative is and its second derivative is , giving the unique demand correspondenceThe first-good demand has no wealth effect. Since the second consumer's endowment and preference relation are fixed, everywhere. Thus the joint condition of part (a) becomes at equilibrium; it is not automatically satisfied.
Here is a complete smooth counterexample, with the second consumer's consumption set specified explicitly. The question does not impose the first consumer's consumption set on the second consumer. Take endowments and . Give the second consumer consumption set , where , and put . Its utility function isThis defines complete, transitive, continuous preference relations. It is in fact smooth on : writing and , the positive branch is ; at all derivatives tend to zero locally uniformly where . The endowment belongs to . Allowing negative holdings is explicit here, just as the first consumer's second coordinate is unrestricted in the printed question.
We now derive, rather than posit, the second consumer's demand correspondence. For , the upper contour is described by , with . At a fixed , its cheapest first coordinate uses . Minimizing total expenditure over therefore means minimizingThe unique minimum occurs at , with . The expenditure necessary to reach this contour is consequentlySet and . Wealth is , so the best affordable contour hasAll affordable positive-utility bundles have , and the minimum-expenditure bundle on that contour is unique and spends precisely the budget. Zero-utility bundles cannot be optimal because this positive-utility bundle is available. Substitution yields globally smooth unique demands for every :The aggregate excess demand is nowFor every , the unique equilibrium price is , and . At this price the allocations are and , whose sum equals the aggregate endowment . Second-good excess demand is , so it too is smooth and clears. Hence every economy in this smooth parameterized family is singular. This demonstrates why the first consumer's missing wealth effect alone gives no transversality guarantee; the stronger conclusion in part (c) comes from the second consumer's additional demand restriction.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 4 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Normalize the second price to one and write for the first price and for the varying endowment. Let be first-good aggregate excess demand. Under Walras law, the second excess-demand coordinate equals , so one market-clearing equation suffices. A regular exchange economy at fixed has at every equilibrium.
A sufficient joint condition is that zero be a regular value of the smooth map :To prove the almost-everywhere conclusion, the regular level set theorem makes a smooth one-dimensional manifold. Project to the parameter axis by . Its tangent space consists of vectors with . If , every is possible, so the derivative of is surjective. If , the joint condition gives , forcing ; the point is critical for .
Thus the parameters with a singular equilibrium are exactly the critical values of this projection. Sard theorem makes that set a null set. Therefore almost every parameter gives a regular economy. No claim of existence at every parameter is needed for this sufficient regularity criterion.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 3 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Use the same Kakutani fixed-point theorem pair as in part (b). If any coordinate of vanished, the additional boundary condition would force some coordinate of every member of , including , to be positive. This contradicts . Hence for every .
Now Walras law reads , a sum of nonpositive terms with strictly positive coefficients. Every term must vanish, soThe boundary hypothesis first excludes boundary prices; strict positivity of all prices then turns nonpositive excess demand into exact market clearing.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 3 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
By the Kakutani fixed-point theorem, choose with and . The maximizing property of and the assumed Walras law giveEvery coordinate of is therefore nonpositive. Since , we obtainThis step does not yet imply that the entire vector is zero: a zero price can coexist with negative excess demand in its coordinate.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 3 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
For , write . Maximizing a linear functional on the price simplex givesThus is a nonempty closed convex face of the compact price simplex. Its graph of a set-valued mapping is closed: if , and , then, for every fixed , the inequalities pass to .
Each value is closed in by the closed-graph hypothesis, hence compact; it is nonempty and convex by assumption. Therefore has nonempty closed convex values in the nonempty compact convex set .
Its graph of a set-valued mapping is also closed. If and with and , the two closed-graph properties give and . Finally, this closed graph implies upper hemicontinuity because the whole output space is compact. If an open set containing failed to contain the nearby values, select outputs outside it along a convergent input sequence. A subsequence of those outputs converges in ; closedness puts its limit in , whereas closedness of the open set's complement puts it outside. This contradiction proves upper hemicontinuity.
Consequently all the hypotheses of the Kakutani fixed-point theorem hold: the domain is nonempty, compact and convex, and the set-valued mapping maps it into itself with nonempty closed convex values and upper hemicontinuity.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 2 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
The measurable structure of an exchange economy includes measurability of consumers' preference relations: in particular, for each rational vector , the setis measurable. Continuity of each individual's preference relation alone would not imply this across-consumer requirement. We use this usual measurability convention explicitly.
There are only countably many vectors in . Remove all the null sets that have zero measure, obtainingLet . Equivalently, is the union over of the rational strict-improvement directions available to consumer . This choice of ensures that a direction available to even one consumer in is available to a positive-measure group.
We claim that . Otherwise, take finitely many and positive weights with and . Choose so small that . We can choose disjoint measurable sets with . Indeed, after the earlier choices remove at most mass, the remaining portion of has mass greater than . The scalar case of the Lyapunov convexity theorem, applied to its restricted atomless measure, realizes every mass between zero and its total, including .
Now change to on and leave it unchanged elsewhere. Every changed bundle is a feasible consumption bundle and is strictly preferred by its recipient. This new consumption allocation remains integrable, andThus is exactly feasible and improves a group of total mass , contradicting Pareto efficiency. Notice that no individual's consumption bundles were averaged: an atomless measure allows different small cohorts to make different improvements. Individual convexity of the preference relations is unnecessary.
If is nonempty, separate its convex hull from zero using the supporting hyperplane theorem. There exists with for every . Only weak separation is needed, so it is harmless if zero belongs to the closure of this convex hull.
Fix any and any . Completeness and continuity make the strictly preferred set relatively open in . Approximate by rational vectors for which is feasible and still strictly preferred. At a zero consumption coordinate, choose the rational approximations from the feasible side. Then implies , and passage to the limit gives . The same full-measure set works for all such bundles , not merely for each bundle separately.
If is empty, the same rational approximation argument says that consumers in have no strictly preferred feasible bundles at all. In that case any nonzero satisfies the required implication. In either case,To see why transfers cannot simply be omitted, give all consumers endowment and utility function . Allocate to half of them and to the other half. This is Pareto efficient, since any Pareto improvement would increase the integral of utility while aggregate resources fix it. At these interior bundles the support inequalities force : directions arbitrarily close to force equality, and strict increases force positivity. The poorer half then receives less wealth than the original endowment supplies and has a cheaper strict improvement within its original budget. The support theorem concerns the redistributed budget, as defined in part (b).
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 2 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
The support statement uses a price quasi-equilibrium with transfers. A pair consists of an exactly feasible consumption allocation and a nonzero price vector such that, outside one null set of consumers,The allocation is on the consumer's transfer-adjusted budget boundary, at wealth . Relative to the original endowment, the lump-sum transfer is ; exact feasibility gives . A price quasi-equilibrium rules out cheaper strict improvements, but may allow a strictly preferred bundle of exactly equal cost. That is why it is weaker than maximizing the preference relation over the entire weak budget set.
Two conventions matter. The conclusion allows redistribution; it does not assert support at each consumer's original wealth . Also, no monotonicity or free-disposal hypothesis is given, so the nonzero supporting vector is not asserted to have nonnegative coordinates. Those stronger economic conventions require additional hypotheses.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 2 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Use the exact-resource-balance convention for an exchange economy. If is the integrable initial-endowment profile, a feasible consumption allocation is a measurable integrable function withIt is Pareto efficient if there is no other feasible consumption allocation satisfying for almost every consumer and on a set of positive measure. A Pareto improvement makes nobody worse off, up to a null set, and makes a positive-measure group strictly better off. Positive measure is essential: reallocating to a single consumer of zero mass does not constitute an aggregate Pareto improvement.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 1 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
First pass from the preorder to a partial order. Define the indifference relation by and . Reflexivity and transitivity make this an equivalence relation. On the quotient set , putTransitivity makes this independent of the representatives, and the quotient relation is antisymmetric, hence a partial order.
We need its order-extension property, including freedom to order incomparable classes. Here is the argument. Order all partial order extensions of by inclusion. The union of a chain of extensions is again a partial order: any finite list of comparisons needed to check an axiom occurs together in one member of the chain. Zorn's lemma therefore supplies a maximal extension. If two classes remain incomparable, adjoin and take the transitive closure of a relation. The only possible new comparisons have the form . A cycle would require a previously existing path , contradicting incomparability. The enlarged relation is still a partial order, contradicting maximality. Consequently the maximal extension is a total order. This also proves the Szpilrajn extension theorem used here.
Lift such a total order to the original bundles by comparing their equivalence classes. The lifted preference relation is complete and transitive, contains , and preserves its strict preference: if , their distinct classes satisfy , and antisymmetry of the extended order prevents the reverse comparison. In particular, the class is nonempty and .
For the reverse inclusion, take a pair with . If , then , so every member of strictly ranks above and excludes . If neither comparison holds, their classes are incomparable. First adjoin , which creates no cycle by the preceding argument, and then extend to a total order. Its lift belongs to and again excludes . Thus every pair outside is outside at least one member of , provingThe intersection proof is an order-theoretic fact about any preorder. The congruence axiom additionally ensures exact rationalization of the observed demand correspondence: every chosen bundle weakly outranks every affordable bundle, while an affordable unchosen bundle is strictly worse by part (b). Hence each completion's budget-maximizing set is exactly the observed chosen set.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 1 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
The congruence axiom requires that an affordable alternative indirectly revealed at least as desirable as a chosen alternative is itself chosen. In the notation of part (a),Equivalently, a chosen bundle and an affordable but unchosen bundle satisfy . Since already holds, this means . The axiom therefore distinguishes a genuine strict preference for a chosen bundle from indifference between two chosen bundles; it applies to the entire demand correspondence, including budgets with several chosen alternatives.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 36 1 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Let be the set allowed by the budget constraint. A demand correspondence is understood to choose only feasible bundles: . Define the direct revealed preference relation byThe indirect revealed preference relation is its reflexive transitive closure. Thus precisely when there is a finite chain whose successive comparisons satisfy . Chains of length zero are included. This makes a preorder on all of , including alternatives that are never chosen. The associated strict preference isIf a convention defines indirect revelation using only positive-length chains, one must add the diagonal before the intersection assertion in part (c) can hold: every complete weak preference relation contains the diagonal.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 35 5 d Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
The unit zero-coupon bond pays one at maturity. Its risk-neutral valuation therefore isNo particular rate coefficients were specified, so this expectation is the general answer; evaluating it further requires a chosen one-factor short-rate model.
For the alternative derivation let be the bank discount factor. For an integrable discounted payoff, pricing giveswhich is a martingale by the tower property of conditional expectation. For a payoff determined by the Markov rate state, this conditional expectation is represented by the indicated pricing function. A path-dependent claim requires an appropriately enlarged state, as in part (c). Now has finite variation. Applying Itô formula and the product rule under the risk-neutral measure, whose rate drift is , yieldsUnder the smoothness and integrability conditions used above, the martingale has zero finite-variation drift. The bracket therefore vanishes, giving againFor the bond the terminal condition is . This argument also shows why stochastic discounting remains inside the conditional expectation.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 35 5 c Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
For sufficiently smooth, Itô formula under the physical measure givesHence and . Substitute these into the common risk-price condition from part (b), obtaining the Cox-Ross short-rate pricing equationFor a terminal payoff the final condition is . Writing prices as functions of requires the relevant Markov state to be sufficient for the claim; a path-dependent payoff generally requires additional state variables. The negative sign in is the adjustment from physical to risk-neutral rate drift.
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 35 5 b Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
The common short-rate market price of risk follows from absence of arbitrage, with the securities driven by the same Brownian motion. Take two traded derivatives with drifts and diffusion coefficients . At a given state hold units of the first and of the second, and place in the bank account. The portfolio has zero current value and zero diffusion exposure. Its instantaneous excess drift isIf this were nonzero, selecting its positive orientation and maintaining the local risk-cancelling self-financing hedge would generate a gain without risk from zero wealth. Under the usual trading and regularity assumptions this violates absence of arbitrage. Thus the expression vanishes, and at nonzero exposuresAt zero exposure the correct relation is , without dividing by zero. This is a condition on traded securities: the physical drift of the nontraded short rate alone does not determine .
Past exam of the mathematics course of the University of Cambridge 2004 iii Paper 35 5 a Solution by
Codex 0 Created 2026-10-03 Updated 2026-10-14
Take a unit-face zero-coupon bond with . Its continuously compounded zero-coupon yield to maturity, instantaneous forward rate, and short rate areThe last equality assumes the appropriate maturity differentiability at the diagonal. Integration of the forward-rate definition and differentiation of the yield definition giveAt fixed observation time , the yield curve plots this yield against maturity ; it describes today's discount prices at different horizons. Forward rates are extracted from these prices, not identified with the subsequent realized path of the short rate.
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